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ABSTRACT 
Given the rapidly changing nature of third party reproduction, there is an 
increasing need for pastoral guidance about the use of these technologies and the 
relationships that develop from them.  This dissertation explores theological bases upon 
which Episcopalians can ground their practice of third party reproduction, with 
implications for the wider Church. Beginning with a study of Episcopal clergy and their 
present practices, this dissertation engages Episcopal, womanist, and feminist theological 
resources to forge a practical theological response. It highlights layered practices, 
including the development of relationships between third parties and intended parents, the 
abuse of third parties, and disclosure to children that call for theological reinterpretations 
of family, the ministerial vision of Jesus, and the doctrine of God. 
 The thesis of this dissertation is that third party procedures offer an opportunity 
for Christians to enrich their relationships with one another and with God in unique 
and—literally—life-giving ways.  The argument unfolds with qualitative research 
findings from Episcopal clergy interviews and it documents how the writings of F.D. 
	  	   viii	  
Maurice and David H. Smith provide additional context for an Episcopal practical 
theology.  It then turns to the work of Delores Williams for the purpose of arguing that, 
while contemporary third party reproduction potentially casts third parties as scapegoats, 
it does not necessarily do so.  In response, it develops a six-fold application of William’s 
ministerial vision to prevent abuse.  This model in turn provides resources for Episcopal 
clergy to use in pastoral conversations.  The next chapter discusses Sallie McFague’s 
metaphorical theology to argue that American culture upholds the biological family as a 
model much as Christians have upheld patriarchal language as a model.  It advocates for 
new language to express the God-human relationship that might in turn support the 
construction of broader metaphors for family relationships. 
Finally, this dissertation incorporates these findings into practical theological 
themes and questions that Episcopal priests can utilize in their work.  It advocates for 
applying discernment when navigating loyalty claims, for thinking about reproduction as 
a calling, for broader constructions of family, for building awareness of how autonomy 
can facilitate idolatry, for encouraging disclosure and healthy boundaries, and for 
composing liturgies for those participating in third party procedures. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The day Louise Brown got made was the day that a core aspect of human life, 
reproduction, moved from a mystery to a technology, moved from something that 
we were in awe of to something that we manipulate. –Arthur Caplan, Emmanuel 
and Robert Hart Professor of Bioethics and the director of the Center for Bioethics 
at the University of Pennsylvania1 
 
Statement of the Problem and Thesis 
In 1977, Dr. Robert G. Edwards fertilized Lesley Brown’s ovum with her 
husband’s sperm in a petri dish, then implanted the embryo back into Lesley Brown’s 
uterus.  The resulting child, Louise Brown, became the world’s first baby born using a 
procedure that would become known as in vitro fertilization. 
Since Louise Brown’s birth, thousands of babies across the world have been born 
with the aid of technology, with the United States consistently remaining the country with 
the highest rate of usage.2  New procedures also sprung from in vitro fertilization, 
including ones that utilize outside participants.  These procedures, known collectively as 
third party procedures, include egg donation, sperm donation, natural and gestational 
surrogacy, and they remain fascinating manifestations of assisted reproduction, at least in 
part because of the questions they raise about relationships between participants. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Arther Caplan interview via Public Broadcasting System, “Ethical Questions: Test Tube Babies,” 
WGBH American Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/interview/ethical-
questions/ (accessed July 13, 2012). 
 
2 International Committee for Monitoring Assisted Reproductive Technology (ICMART), “World 
Collaborative Report on Assisted Reproduction,” Oxford Journals, 
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/9/2310/T1.expansion.html, (accessed January 30, 2013).  
 
	   	   	  
	  
2	  
Of specific relevance to this dissertation, third party reproduction raises a set of 
questions about the kinds of relationships that exist between those in the reproductive 
community: When third parties participate in family creation, then theoretical questions 
about the nature of family and community relationships arise.  Their participation also 
raises a set of practical questions about how we exercise relationships in these units, a 
question particularly relevant to ecclesial leaders who provide guidance to those who 
utilize these technologies.  A new theological orientation for thinking about third party 
reproduction is therefore needed. 
In order to adequately ask and answer these questions, this dissertation starts by 
presenting theological and pastoral perspectives on third party reproduction from clergy 
in The Episcopal Church.  These findings will then inform and be informed by the 
wisdom of scholars who have thought about relationships theologically, even if they have 
not written specifically about third party reproduction.  This analytical and interpretive 
process will help inform a Christian theological vision of the kinds of life-giving 
relationships that third party procedures can create.  Analyzing and interpreting the work 
of Delores Williams in this way, for instance, allows us to consider whether modern day 
surrogacy relationships can be signs of resurrection hope and Jesus’ ministerial vision or 
whether surrogacy is irreducibly exploitive.  Utilizing in the same manner the scholarship 
of Episcopal thinkers like incarnational theologian Frederick Denison Maurice and 
medical ethicist David H. Smith allows us to ask anew what it means to be members of a 
community, be it the Church or the family.  Finally, engaging in that same process with 
Sallie McFague’s metaphorical theology encourages us to reconsider the contours of the 
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God-human relationship and the language we use to express it.  Analyzing and 
interpreting the literature of these scholars through reference to the pastoral and 
theological insights of Episcopal clergy ultimately allows me to argue that third party 
procedures offer an opportunity for Christians to enrich their relationships with one 
another and with God in unique and—literally—life-giving ways. 
Relationships as Central to Knowing God 
Third party reproduction challenges traditional configurations of family 
relationships, which means that the technologies in turn challenge how we think 
pastorally and theologically about these relationships.  Because what it means to be a 
person in relationships is a recurring theme throughout this dissertation, it is important at 
the start to provide a theological framework for understanding why humans are relational 
beings. 
In this dissertation, I operate as an Episcopal theologian grounded by Episcopal 
texts and traditions, so to that end, I reference prominent Anglican theologian Frederick 
Denison Maurice as I consider what it means to be in relationship with neighbor and God 
when interpreted in light of third party procedures.  During his life in nineteenth-century 
England, Maurice developed what is now referred to as incarnational theology, a strain of 
Episcopal theology that originates with the claim that the singular act of God taking flesh 
becomes pivotal to salvation.  Salvation therefore occurs through the entire lifespan of 
Jesus, inclusive of the cross and resurrection but not limited to them.   
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For Maurice, salvation occurs through relationship with the God embodied in 
Jesus, and because humans are made in God’s image, Maurice suggests that any person 
may therefore come to know God through knowing another human.  As he writes: 
Human relationships are not artificial types of something divine, but are actually 
the means, and the only means, through which man ascends to any knowledge of 
the divine—and that every breach of a human relation, as it implies a violation of 
the higher law, so also is a hindrance and barrier to the perception of that higher 
law—the drawing a veil between the spirit of a man and his God.3 
 
Inter-human relationships therefore become pivotal to Maurice and to the development of 
The Episcopal Church’s theological outlook at large because of the postulation that arises 
from Maurice’s claims about the supreme importance of Incarnation.  In other words, for 
Episcopalians, inter-human relationships ultimately matter; indeed, many Episcopalians 
today believe that they are a primary way that one may come to know God and God’s 
will for humanity.  Being open to the idea that God can speak through human 
relationships, that relationships can be a valid source of revelation, therefore, becomes 
central to the study that follows.  
Maurice’s theological conception that inter-human relationships are the primary 
means of establishing relationship with the Divine will loom large over the content of the 
following pages both implicitly and explicitly as I discuss relationships in the 
reproductive community.  I will argue throughout this dissertation that the exercise of 
healthy, non-exploitive relationships not only requires attention to relationships with 
one’s neighbor and with God but also requires attention to how individuals exist in these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Frederick Denison Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ; or Hints Respecting the Principles, 
Constitution, and Ordinances of The Catholic Church (New York: D. Appleton & Co, 1843), Nabu Public 
Domain Reprint, 226. 
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systems—especially the system of the family.  In other words, I will operate from the 
premise that salutary third party practices and the theological concepts that relate to them 
must privilege inter-human relationships while never doing so at the expense of the 
individual.  To that end, therefore, I am particularly interested in the relationships that do 
or do not form between intended parents and third parties, the role of power in these 
relationships, and the prevalence of anonymity and exploitation that often defines these 
relationships in the United States.  These topics all bear relevance for praxis and for 
pastoral care. 
Significance of the Problem 
Approximately one in ten American heterosexual couples experience negative 
reproductive events like infertility or reproductive loss, and many are members of 
Christian communities like The Episcopal Church.  In addition to the longstanding 
tradition of adoption, third party assisted reproduction is one alternative that these 
individuals can utilize in order to start a family.  In addition, an increasing number of 
same-sex, transgender, and single individuals are also utilizing third party technologies to 
start families.  However, Christian leaders like those in The Episcopal Church have few 
resources that specifically reference these technologies or that provide theological 
insights as to how relationships between third parties, intended parents, children, and the 
wider community transform when they are used. 
By way of example, while The Episcopal Church has a long history of addressing 
how participants in assisted reproduction might relate to one another, the conclusions it 
has drawn about them are far from definitive.  The marriage liturgy in the 1979 Book of 
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Common Prayer states, for instance, that one of the primary purposes of marriage is 
reproduction. As the priest says in the Opening Sentences, “The union of husband and 
wife in heart, body, and mind is intended by God for their mutual joy…and, when it is 
God’s will, for the procreation of children.”4  Yet a statement like this is potentially 
confusing when infertility and reproductive loss come into play, as it causes clergy and 
lay Episcopalians to wonder whether reproductive technologies might serve “God’s will” 
without offering much in the way of clarification or guidance as to how to proceed. 
One might expect clergy to turn to Episcopal sources about assisted reproduction 
for clarification; however, denominational leaders and authoritative documents from the 
tradition have not explored at length the intersection of The Episcopal Church’s 
theological commitments and third party procedures.  This means that clergy have limited 
resources to inform their pastoral interactions.  For instance, General Convention—the 
governing body of The Episcopal Church—has not issued a resolution on assisted 
reproduction at all since 1992, though assisted reproductive technologies have developed 
at an astonishing rate over the past twenty years, with third party procedures becoming 
increasingly common.  It has also never passed a resolution specifically relating to third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Oxford University Press, 1979 Book of Common Prayer Readers Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2008), 423. While the current prayer book describes the procreation of children as 
one of the purposes of marriage, this softens previous statements. The 1549 Prayer Book, the earliest in the 
Anglican tradition, stated three purposes for marriage, of which procreation was the first (the second was as 
a remedy for sin and the third was for comfort and support). See Marion J. Hatchett, Commentary on the 
American Prayer Book (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980), 429. 
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party procedures, though in 1982, 1985, and 1988, General Convention deputees did 
reject proposed resolutions specifically relating to surrogacy.5 
Moreover, the Convention has issued confusing conclusions about how members 
might utilize assisted reproduction in general.  For instance, Resolution A067 passed by 
the 1982 meeting of the General Convention reads, “The Episcopal Church gives 
approval to usage of so-called ‘in vitro’ fertilization for the purpose of providing children 
in marriage.”6  Then in 1991, General Convention followed this resolution with a more 
nuanced one, Resolution A101, which states,  
Married couples who are members of this Church, and who are considering the use 
of external fertilization and embryo transfer seek the advice of a qualified 
professional counselor and the pastoral counsel and care of this church and consider 
adoption as one of the options open to them.7   
 
These two statements express some level of inconsistency about The Episcopal Church’s 
stance on assisted reproduction generally.  One document explicitly permits the use of in 
vitro fertilization while the other encourages caution and impresses upon the reader the 
importance of alternative options like adoption.  Moreover, both statements assume the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Resolution 1982-A066 and Resolution 1982-A068 in General Convention, Journal of the 
General Convention of The Episcopal Church, New Orleans, 1982 (New York: General Convention, 1983), 
p. 141-2.  See Resolution 1985-A089 in General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The 
Episcopal Church, Anaheim, 1985 (New York: General Convention, 1985), p. 142.  See also Resolution 
1988-D006 General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, Detroit, 
1988 (New York: General Convention, 1988). 
 
6 General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, New Orleans, 
1982 (New York: General Convention, 1983), p. C-158. 
 
7 General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, Phoenix, 
1991 (New York: General Convention, 1992), p. 773. Note the term “reaffirm” is particularly perplexing as 
it implies the passage of a previous resolution requesting that couples considering the use of assisted 
reproduction seek advice from their priests, doctors, and psychologists. However, the only prior resolution 
affirmed by General Convention is the aforementioned Resolution A067 from 1982, which simply 
approves the use of in vitro fertilization without any further cautionary requests. 
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pre-existence of the marriage relationship, thereby raising questions for unmarried 
couples or single individuals who want to start families of their own. 
Compounding these inconsistencies is the form of the resolution itself, which, 
unlike a Vatican Instruction, does not allow space for writers to state what motivates or 
what is at stake in a particular statement or stance.  As shown above, resolutions are terse, 
perhaps one or two sentences, and they exist without context or warrant.  Given their 
brevity, therefore, it is unreasonable to expect much in the way of theological depth or 
grounding, making it difficult for Episcopal Church leaders to explore the foundation 
upon which its theology of assisted reproduction generally—and third party procedures 
specifically—rests, because the foundation itself has not been laid.  Leaders may 
therefore be left not only unclear as to the meaning of the resolutions but also as to the 
official theological commitments related to them.   
Because the intersection of The Episcopal Church’s theological commitments and 
these procedures has not been explored at length by Episcopal theologians or church 
leaders, members of The Episcopal Church lack in-depth direction for how to discern this 
relational dimension of third party reproduction.8  Ethicists David H. Smith and Judith A. 
Granbois attribute this lack of research to a lack of dialogue between scholars, 
theologians, and faithful individuals; hence, the need for a project such as this. In their 
own words: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As Smith and Granbois write, the Church “has chosen repeatedly to comment on intimate and 
anguishing matters touching closely on the identities of persons without adequately laying the foundation 
for its concern.” See “New Technologies for Assisted Reproduction” in The Crisis in Moral Teaching in 
the Episcopal Church, ed. Timothy Sedgwick and Philip Turner, (BSC Litho: Harrisburg, PA, 1992), 48. 
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The inconsistencies and omissions largely flow from the absence of serious 
intellectual conversation partners from the Christian past, the ecumenical world, 
or the contemporary moral and medical community. Talking to a parent, sibling, 
or neighbor is richer than talking to oneself.9 
 
Ergo, while The General Convention discusses praxes like third party reproduction 
through resolutions, this format may be ill-equipped to produce the kind of theological 
depth that is needed. That said, reminiscing Maurice, one thing these sources do iterate 
repeatedly is that God’s intention is to be in relationship with the world.10   
One might therefore say that by referencing the kinds of challenges raised by third 
party relationships, this dissertation engages critically with a new kind of theological 
orientation for thinking about the broader God-human relationship.  Likewise, by using 
The Episcopal Church and its leaders as something of a case study, this dissertation has 
implications for how Episcopal leaders think about and pastor those who consider using 
third party reproduction. 
What is Third Party Assisted Reproduction?  
The United States remains the country with the highest utilization of assisted 
reproduction, and the rate of usage rises annually for all procedures.11  However, there is 
currently no universally held definition of assisted reproductive technology, or ART, 
though clinicians agree that assisted reproduction comprises any one of a number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 49. 
 
10 See Method section below, especially those sections concerning McFague, Williams, Maurice, 
and Smith. 
 
11 Of the 16,531 donor egg transfers, 9,866 involved fresh embryos and 6,665 involved frozen 
embryos.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention did not state the number of donors involved; 
because some donors participate more than once in the donation process, it is impossible to estimate how 
many donors participated in assisted reproduction procedures in 2010.  Statistics on surrogates also did not 
differentiate between natural and gestational surrogates.   
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medical procedures that carry the potential to result in the birth of an infant.  What 
professionals disagree upon is which medical procedures constitute technological 
assistance.  Most agree that taking a medication—such as Clomid, a fertility drug 
commonly used to stimulate ovulation—does not fall under the definition of reproductive 
technology.  However, clinicians differ as to what constitutes technological ‘assistance’ 
beyond that. 
Many use the Center for Disease Control’s definition, which explains assisted 
reproductive technology as “all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are 
handled.”  According to this definition, assisted reproduction does not include the use of 
medication or the use of procedures such as artificial insemination, in which technicians 
interact with only ova or sperm.12  Other practitioners utilize a broader definition that 
understands assisted reproduction as any medical procedure that bypasses heterosexual 
intercourse in order to enhance the probability of creating new life.  These practitioners 
would include artificial insemination in the definition of assisted reproduction, but not the 
use of medications like Clomid.  
The latter definition of assisted reproduction will be employed for the purposes of 
this dissertation, both because it is utilized by a large number of clinicians, and because it 
is commonly utilized by those outside of the medical community, including those within 
Christian denominations—such as The Episcopal Church—who speak about assisted 
reproduction.  As a case in point, resolutions passed by the Episcopal Church’s General 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “CDC-Home-Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(ART)-Reproductive Health,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ 
(accessed June 18, 2012). 
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Convention—including resolutions A067 from the 1982 General Convention and 
resolution A101 from the 1991 General Convention—do not stipulate that assisted 
reproduction involves only procedures in which ova and sperm have been handled but 
rather assume the inclusion of procedures like artificial insemination.  Likewise, the 
Methodist handbook, Spiritual Discernment: A Guide for Genetic and Reproductive 
Technologies, does not make this distinction, nor do Donum Vitae or Dignitas Personae, 
the Roman Catholic documents on assisted reproduction.13  Therefore, for the purposes of 
this dissertation, assisted reproduction will be defined as the use of any medical 
technology that bypasses heterosexual intercourse for the purpose of creating new life. 
The Relationships of Third Party Reproduction 
No third party procedure occurs in isolation, beginning with an individual or 
couple’s visit to medical professionals: Those seeking to make use of the technologies 
visit one of a number of assisted reproductive technology clinics and work with 
specialists like reproductive endocrinologists who are experts in these procedures.  If a 
choice is made to utilize third party reproduction, then a donor or surrogate is recruited, 
either anonymously—by perusing profiles offered by the clinic—or by asking a friend or 
family member to participate. 
Moreover, women who participate in third party procedures may be said to 
establish an embodied relationship with one another even if they never meet.  For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Spiritual Discernment: A Guide for Genetic and Reproductive Technologies (United 
Methodist Publishing: Nashville, TN, 2005).  See also Donum Vitae: Instruction on Respect for Human 
Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (Pauline Books and Media: Boston, MA, 2003) and 
Dignitas Personae: The Dignity of a Person (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops: Washington, 
DC, 2009). 
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instance, in cases where intended mothers plan to carry their own children, these women 
will begin to take birth control pills so that the reproductive endocrinologist has greater 
knowledge and control of their ovulation schedules.  An egg donor’s menstrual cycle is 
then synched with the intended mother’s, also using birth control pills.  In cases where a 
surrogate is used to carry the intended mother’s eggs, it is the mother and surrogate who 
synchronize their cycles.  The women continue to take birth control pills for one or two 
months—the length of time varies, depending on the clinic—and as a result, therefore, 
the women’s bodies become related to one another through the shared connection 
established between their reproductive cycles. 
After this initial step is taken, the women’s embodied connection continues to 
develop.  Donors, for instance, receive a single shot of gonadotropin-releasing hormone 
followed by daily shots of a follicle-stimulating hormone to increase the production of 
eggs.14  Retrieval of the eggs takes place during an outpatient surgical procedure, 
approximately fifteen minutes in length, during which time the woman is fully sedated 
and a doctor inserts a needle through the vaginal wall and into the ovaries in order to 
retrieve the mature eggs.  Meanwhile, the intended mother or gestational surrogate takes 
daily shots of progesterone to stimulate the lining of the uterus for implantation.  Hence, 
the actions of these two women combine to mimic the typical biological process of a 
single female body that occurs when no reproductive difficulties are at play. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This results in an enlargement of the ovaries from the size of walnuts to the size of oranges; 
towards the end of a stimulation cycle, thinner women may be able to feel or see their enlarged ovaries 
through the skin of their abdomens. 
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The contributions of the male also do not occur in isolation: At the time of the 
retrieval, the male—either a sperm donor or the intended father—contributes sperm to 
fertilize the eggs.  Following the retrieval, medical professionals intervene to fertilize a 
given egg with a single sperm, either by combining them in a petri dish or, if doctors are 
concerned about the quality of sperm, by selecting the healthiest sperm and injecting 
them individually into the eggs.  Three to five days after the retrieval, doctors implant the 
resulting embryos into the intended mother or surrogate’s body.  The assistance of 
medical professionals thereby becomes essential to complete the process of conception 
that a male body undertakes on its own in cases where reproductive difficulties do not 
occur. 
As a result, therefore, one can see that third party reproduction is indeed 
“assisted,” in large part because of the reliance of multiple individuals upon each other to 
complete the various reproductive tasks historically undertaken by a single male and 
female body.  In other words, doctors rely on egg donors, surrogates, and intended 
mothers to take their birth control pills and shots on time.  These women, in turn, rely 
upon medical professionals to prepare their bodies for egg retrieval or implantation.  
Likewise, men involved in third party reproduction rely upon experts to implant their 
genetic material and upon women to prepare their own bodies to carry the resulting 
embryos.   
Hence, third party reproduction might be said to magnify the role that 
relationships play in the reproductive process, for while reproduction was never a solo 
process, it historically only involved two individuals—a single man and a single 
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woman—who likely knew each other and were usually linked together through the 
marriage relationship.  For those individuals who can create new life within such 
confines, it might become tempting to think of reproduction as a private or even 
autonomous activity.  By contrast, third party procedures require multiple interactions 
between a variety of men, women, and medical technicians to facilitate a single live birth.  
These relationships may be known or anonymous; however, either way, they may be said 
to occur at an embodied level, for without the biological connection between participants 
that medical experts establish, the birth of a baby would not occur.  As a result, therefore, 
third party procedures may be said to challenge the historically established view of 
reproduction and the role that relationships play in the creation of new life. 
Method 
As a practical theologian, I engage in practical theological research as a member 
of the Christian community with the conviction that theology “is deeply dependent on a 
concrete community of believers who try to be faithful in the modern world.”15  Hence, I 
operate from the stance that, “practical theology is a discipline arising out of and giving 
guidance to a community of faith.”16 
What this means in regard to the method I employ in this dissertation requires 
some explanation.  Practical theologians James Poling and Donald Miller write that a 
primary goal of practical theology is to answer the following questions: “What is God 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 James N. Poling and Donald E. Miller, Foundations for a Practical Theology of Ministry 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1985), 48. 
 
16 James Fowler. “Practical Theology and the Shaping of Christian Lives,” in Practical Theology: 
The Emerging Field in Theology, Church, and World. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.  152. 
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doing among us?” and “What is God calling us to become?”17  This study seeks to 
consider those questions in relation to third party assisted reproduction.  In this way, this 
project functions as a distinctly practical theological one because it considers what God is 
calling persons and communities engaged in the particular context of third party assisted 
reproduction to become through their relationships with one another. 
In order to undertake this task, I will utilize a method common within practical 
theology, and I explain the details of this method by referring to James Poling and 
Donald Miller’s definition of the discipline itself.  Poling and Miller define the discipline 
of practical theology as: 
A critical and constructive reflection within a living community about human 
experience and interaction, involving a correlation of the Christian story and other 
perspectives, leading to an interpretation of meaning and value, and resulting in 
everyday guidelines and skills for the formation of persons and communities.18 
 
Within this definition are several terms in need of further clarification that bear upon the 
method of this project, specifically, “critical and constructive reflection,” “living 
community of faith,” and “correlation of the Christian story and other perspectives.” 
The first of these—critical and constructive reflection—pertains to the starting 
point for practical theology.  About what is one critically and constructively reflecting?  I, 
like other practical theologians, start from the premise that critical and constructive 
reflection begins with a set of lived experiences because of the inherent interrelation of 
theory and practice.  As practical theologian Don Browning writes, practice and theory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Poling and Miller, 12. 
 
18 Ibid., 62. 
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are intricately linked because of the way practices are rooted in theory, or are theory-
laden.19  In his own words: 
The theologian does not stand before God, Scripture, and the historic witness of 
the church like an empty slate or Lockean tabula rasa ready to be determined, filled 
up, and then plugged into a concrete practical situation. A more accurate 
description goes like this. We come to the theological task with questions shaped 
by the secular and religious practices in which we are implicated—sometimes 
uncomfortably. These practices are meaningful or theory-laden. By using the 
phrase theory-laden, I mean to rule out in advance the widely held assumption that 
theory is distinct from practices. All our practices, even our religious practices, 
have theories behind and within them.20 
 
Therefore, fundamental to this project is the claim that “critical and constructive 
reflection” is reflection about theory-laden practices.  As a result, this investigation will 
follow the practice-theory-practice method that is commonly utilized by practical 
theologians: I describe the practices and orientation of clergy who speak with 
parishioners about these procedures.  I will then engage voices from the Episcopal, 
womanist, and feminist theological traditions, and as a conclusion, I will propose a set of 
revised practices for clergy and other Christian leaders in light of the findings from prior 
chapters.  Summarily, this dissertation will move from “present theory-laden practice to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Don S. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic Proposals.  
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1996), 6. Don Browning, for instance, argues that practice and 
theory are so integrally intertwined that one does not exist in isolation from the other; all practices are 
theory-laden and all theories are rooted in practice. See Don Browning, Fundamental Practical Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 6. Similarly, Miroslav Volf argues that practices shape beliefs while 
beliefs shape practices; ergo, practices can lead to a deeper embrace of belief. See Miroslav Volf, 
“Theology for a Way of Life,” in Practicing Theology: Beliefs and Practices in Christian Life, ed. Miroslav 
Volf and Dorothy C. Bass (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 250-1. 
Meanwhile, Kathryn Tanner argues that theological reflection is required to ground practices that might 
otherwise become “slippery” in their meaning and affiliation with Christianity; hence, theory-laden 
practices always necessitate theological inquiry as a kind of system of checks and balances. See Kathryn 
Tanner, “Theological Reflection and Christian Practices” in Practicing Theology: Beliefs and Practices in 
Christian Life, ed. Miroslav Volf and Dorothy C. Bass (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 2002), 234, 239. 
 
20 Browning, 5-6. 
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retrieval of normative theory-laden practice to the creation of more critically held theory-
laden practices.”21 
 In order to undertake the “critical and constructive reflection” stage, the situation 
requiring reflection must be identified.  John Swinton and Harriet Mowat refer to this as 
the Current Praxis Stage.22  This will involve an initial description of the current practices 
within the field of third party assisted reproduction—seen here in the introduction.  More 
information about the contours of third party reproduction will also be included in the 
chapters that analyze and interpret the work of Williams and McFague. 
The aim of this descriptive step to explore third party practices in a way that 
explicates not only common actions or procedures but that also explicates the context in 
which these actions or procedures occur and derive their meaning.  I will rely on social 
scientists who study third party assisted reproduction and its relational elements to 
effectively complete this task in the chapters on Williams and McFague. 
If this descriptive step considers the subject of “critical and constructive 
reflection,” for the project, then the next descriptive step considers the “living community 
of faith” within which this project is situated.  Swinton and Mowat refer to this stage as 
The Cultural/Contextual Analysis step.  For the purposes of this project, the “living 
community of faith” may be defined as The Episcopal Church, an organized body of 
churches primarily located within the United States that is part of the worldwide 
Anglican Communion.  Within this second descriptive stage, I will consider how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid. 
 
22 John Swinton and Harriet Mowat, Practical Theology and Qualitative Research Methods 
(London: SCM Press, 2006), 95. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
18	  
members of this particular “living community of faith”—specifically clergy—interpret 
third party procedures.  To that end, this stage will present data from qualitative research 
obtained via interviews conducted with Episcopal clergy. As with the prior step, I 
undertake this descriptive step with the assumption that all practices are theory-laden. 
The purpose of this descriptive stage is threefold: First, to gain a greater 
understanding of how Episcopal clergy comprehend the theological significance of 
assisted reproduction generally and third party procedures specifically; second, to 
discover the kinds of pastoral and theological questions that clergy consider when in 
conversation with those considering the use of these technologies; and third, to learn what 
resources or theological work clergy feel has yet to be done, especially in regard to the 
relational impact of third party procedures upon individuals, families, and faith 
communities.  By way of facilitating these goals, I asked clergy a set of questions 
designed to unearth their theology of third party assisted reproduction and the sources 
that narrate that theology. 
In addition to the descriptive stages, I will also engage in what Poling and Miller 
term a “correlation of the Christian story and other perspectives.”  Broadly, this stage 
constitutes the theory section—or what Swinton and Mowat term the Theological 
Reflection Stage—of the dissertation, in which normative theological texts are interfaced 
with the descriptive steps above.  In order to explain the method I use to correlate the 
Christian story with other perspectives, it is necessary to define what “correlation” means 
in regard to this particular project as well as to define the “other perspectives” that I will 
consider. 
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In regard to the first methodological definition, here I use the term “correlation” 
to refer to what Poling and Miller term the critical correlational method between the 
Christian story and social scientific research.23  Critical correlation denotes a specific 
kind of relationship between the Christian story and other perspectives, namely, taking a 
page from Ogletree, that the Christian story gives meaning to the world by describing 
God’s intentions for it, while social scientific research offers a vocabulary through which 
to understand the actions of humans in the world.24  The Christian story therefore imparts 
meaning to these actions while data concerning the actions—offered by the social 
sciences—deepens our understanding of God’s intentions for the world and the meaning 
and purpose of it. 
Within the methodology Poling and Miller term critical correlation are two types: 
critical correlation for the formation of society and critical correlation for the formation 
of the Church. Given the stance I adopt as a practical theologian and given that Christian 
individuals and communities are the intended audience for this project’s findings, this 
study fits within the latter of these two categories.25  In this way, I assume for the 
purposes of this project that wisdom from the Christian faith can illuminate and give 
meaning to contemporary practices of third party assisted reproduction and vice versa, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Poling and Miller, 47.  Poling and Miller delineate six types of correlation practical theologians 
may employ. They define the critical correlational stance as one that involves “insights from the tradition 
with theories of development and virtue from the human sciences. (47) Poling and Miller note that this 
stage is also synonymous with David Tracy’s “mutual critical correlation” (47). 
 
24 Thomas Ogletree. “Dimensions of Practical Theology: Meaning, Action, Self,” in Practical 
Theology: The Emerging Field in Theology, Church, and World. New York: Harper & Row, 1982, 86. 
 
25 Poling and Miller, 47. 
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and that the findings of this study will be for the development and enrichment of 
Christian communities. 
In regard to sources for the study, Episcopal, womanist, and feminist thinkers will 
make up the voices from the Christian tradition that will be referenced during this study.  
Specifically, I will analyze and interpret the work of feminist and ecological theologian 
Sallie McFague, womanist theologian Delores Williams, and Episcopal thinkers F.D. 
Maurice and David H. Smith.  I chose these voices because of their theological concern 
for what it means to be in healthy relationships with God and one’s neighbor, and 
because their findings either explicitly or implicitly bear upon what it means to be a 
member of the community of third party reproduction.  Psychologists, ethicists, and 
others who study assisted reproduction will comprise the voices from “other 
perspectives” that will be incorporated into the dissertation. 
As Poling and Miller define it, the final stage of any practical theological project 
is the formulation of “everyday guidelines and skills for the formation of persons and 
communities.”  To that end, this study will offer concluding material that constitutes what 
Swinton and Mowat term the Formulation of Revised Practice Stage.  This material will 
suggest revised practices for members of The Episcopal Church, which may be 
extrapolated to other contexts in the Christian tradition.  In this way, The Episcopal 
Church serves as something of a case study to investigate the kinds of questions that 
Christians—whether Episcopalian or not—have about the relational issues raised by third 
party practices. 
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Limitations 
I chose to limit this project through its geographic context.  Hence, while this 
project references practices in other countries—especially India, which has become a 
popular site for assisted reproduction medical tourism, and Israel, which has a high rate 
of government-funded surrogacy—the focus of this study remains upon the United States.  
I made this choice for two reasons.  First, the United States remains the country with the 
highest annual usage of third party reproduction, though the procedures are practiced 
worldwide.  Second, the focus of this project is on the United States because it remains 
the geographical locus of The Episcopal Church.26  Therefore, while this study may have 
findings that will be of relevance globally, results are primarily intended for those 
situated within the United States. 
Conclusion 
As the use of third party assisted reproduction becomes increasingly common, it 
is imperative for faith leaders to consider the theological and practical implications of 
these procedures.  By developing a theology of third party assisted reproduction that uses 
The Episcopal Church as something of a case study, this project will become part of that 
ongoing discussion, aiding both Episcopal leaders and the wider Christian community in 
its constructive thinking about these technologies and the relationships that form because 
of them.  It is therefore my hope that this dissertation will ultimately not only enrich our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 A percentage of member churches of The Episcopal Church exist outside the United States, in 
countries including France, Taiwan, Micronesia, and Haiti; however, The Episcopal Church is often 
considered the branch of the Anglican Communion in the United States, and a majority of its member 
churches are located within the United States. 
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understanding of these literally life-giving procedures, but that it will also enrich our 
broader understanding of how we relate to God and one another. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION FROM THE  
PERSPECTIVE OF EPISCOPAL PRIESTS 
 
If it’s sex, it’s a problem.1  –Episcopal priest 
 
To me the assisted—the word assisted just means that it’s calling the human 
community into collaboration with God in creation as participants.2 –Episcopal 
priest 
 
Introduction 
The Episcopal Church has a long history of conversations about human sexuality, 
and particularly within the last decade, those conversations have become increasingly 
prominent.  The election of Gene Robinson as Bishop of New Hampshire in 2003 
inaugurated an ongoing debate about homosexuality specifically, a debate that often 
turned bitter and rancorous to the extent that a small number of congregations abandoned 
their affiliation with the denomination.  The heated discussion concerning homosexuality 
that permeated The Episcopal Church over the past decade has sparked passions, ire, 
sadness, intellectually rigorous essays, prophetic pronouncements, and conflict amongst 
leaders of the Church in a way so prominent that it could not be ignored by a majority of 
Episcopal priests.  Indeed, one could say that it became the defining theological concern 
of the denomination in this era, as well as one that came to dominate questions about the 
process and purpose of ordained ministry itself. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012.  This 
and all subsequent interviews were confidential.  Names are withheld by mutual agreement. 
 
2 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
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Yet while the debate on homosexuality raged, little has been said about a number 
of other topics related to human sexuality, including third party assisted reproduction.  
Indeed, conversations about third party assisted reproduction within The Episcopal 
Church have been limited, in contrast to the prominence afforded it in other 
denominations like Roman Catholicism, where the publication of papal instructions such 
as Donum Vitae and Dignitas Personae received a great deal of attention. 
This chapter aims to open up the conversation by considering how Episcopal 
leaders—specifically Episcopal priests—currently reason about third party reproduction.  
Through interviews conducted with priests throughout The Episcopal Church, this 
chapter seeks to accomplish three goals: First, it aims to present a more comprehensive 
understanding of how Episcopal clergy understand the theological significance of third 
party assisted reproduction.  Second, it aims to uncover what kind of practical theological 
work clergy think is necessary in order to derive a more comprehensive paradigm for 
relationships in third party assisted reproduction.  Third, it seeks to discover the pastoral 
and theological themes and narratives that guide clergy in their conversations about these 
practices.   
To that end, I asked 21 priests a set of questions designed to parse out their 
theology of assisted reproduction and the sources that narrate it.  These clergy were 
randomly selected using the Red Book, the Episcopal clergy and parish finder.  25 clergy 
were initially solicited from throughout the United States.  In order to derive a 
representative sample, five clergy were selected from each of five geographical regions—
the Northeast, the Southeast, the Midwest, the South, the West Coast, and the Northwest.  
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A variety of ages were represented and roughly equal numbers of men and women were 
solicited (13 women and 12 men).  21 clergy responded in the affirmative; two declined, 
and two did not respond to requests to participate.  Of the 21 priests interviewed, 11 were 
women, 10 were men, and their ages varied between their twenties and their sixties, with 
no one age group receiving a majority.   
All of the priests in this study participated in an hour-long interview, in which I asked 
them questions designed to elicit theological and biblical tenets, themes, narratives, and 
sources that informed their view of assisted reproduction, especially as it related to 
relationships between those involved in the procedures, the wider community, and God.  
Follow-up interviews occurred with some clergy for the purpose of clarifying their 
answers to the initial set of questions.  These questions were as follows: 
1. What is your understanding of assisted reproduction? What procedures does it 
involve? 
2. What do you see as the greatest benefits of assisted reproduction? 
3. What do you see as the greatest challenges of assisted reproduction? 
4. What do you see as being at stake theologically in assisted reproduction? 
5. What is your understanding of The Episcopal Church’s theology of assisted 
reproduction? 
6. The marriage liturgy in The Episcopal Church states the following: “The union of 
husband and wife in heart, body, and mind is intended by God for their mutual 
joy; for the help and comfort given one another in prosperity and adversity; and, 
when it is God’s will, for the procreation of children and their nurture in the 
knowledge and love of the Lord.”3 How do you interpret this sentence? How does 
this sentence inform your theology of assisted reproduction? 
7. What biblical passages inform your view of human reproduction?   
8. What biblical passages inform your view of assisted reproduction? 
9. What biblical passages inform your view of proper relations between human 
beings?   
10. What biblical passages inform your view about proper relations between human 
beings and God? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Oxford University Press, 1979 Book of Common Prayer Readers Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2008), 423. 
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11. What resources are you aware of that The Episcopal Church has used in the past 
to consider what is at stake in assisted reproduction? 
12. Have you ever engaged in a pastoral conversation with an individual or couple 
considering the use of assisted reproduction?  
a. If the answer is yes: What sorts of topics did you bring up in those 
discussions? Please refrain from offering specific or identifying 
information that would compromise confidentiality in your answer. 
b. If the answer is no: Please imagine such a conversation. What sorts of 
topics would you bring up in that discussion? Please refrain from offering 
any specific or identifying information that would compromise 
confidentiality in your answer. 
13. Have you ever engaged in a pastoral conversation with an individual or couple 
considering acting as a third party (egg donor, sperm donor, or surrogate) in a 
reproductive technology procedure? 
a. If the answer is yes: What sorts of topics did you bring up in those 
discussions? Please refrain from offering specific or identifying 
information that would compromise confidentiality in your answer. 
b. If the answer is no: Please imagine such a conversation. What sorts of 
topics would you bring up in that discussion? Please refrain from offering 
any specific or identifying information that would compromise 
confidentiality in your answer. 
14. What resources would you like to see The Episcopal Church utilize as it develops 
a theology of assisted reproduction? 
15. Are there any other questions you have for me? Is there anything else you would 
like to add? 
 
In order to report the findings these interview questions yielded, I have divided 
this chapter into three parts. The first section discusses how clergy understand their role 
in pastoral conversations about assisted reproduction as well as the role of The Episcopal 
Church as an institution.  The second part elaborates upon the concerns clergy had about 
assisted reproduction generally and third party reproduction specifically.  This section 
discusses five themes of concern that emerged across the interviews: concerns about 
adoption, concerns about population control, concerns about ‘playing God,’ concerns 
about money, and concerns about embryos.  The final section outlines what I will call the 
theological guiding principles clergy presented.  These guiding principles comprised the 
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overarching narratives or themes that emerged across the interview pool and formed the 
theological foundation for how these priests understood assisted reproduction generally 
and relationships within third party assisted reproduction specifically.    
This chapter ultimately seeks to describe the pastoral approach to assisted 
reproduction that Episcopal clergy exercise, as well as the sources that narrate that 
theology.  It does not seek to interpret those findings at this juncture, nor does it seek to 
judge them.  To that end, I will withhold interpretation of the data until later chapters, 
although, when necessary, I will insert background information to contextualize 
comments made by interviewees that may need clarification. 
A Primer on The Episcopal Church and Relationality 
It is usually dangerous to say anything about what an Episcopalian believes.  
Birthed from the Church of England, The Episcopal Church is now part of the worldwide 
Anglican Communion, a loose confederation of autonomous national churches.  As a 
result, The Episcopal Church lacks an authoritative governor—like the Pope—who holds 
some kind of legal or doctrinal sway among global members.  While some might believe 
that the Archbishop of Canterbury fills this role, that leader is a titular figurehead outside 
of the Diocese of Canterbury, meaning that his jurisdiction ends at the boundaries of the 
diocese.  As a result, the Archbishop cannot, for instance, tell American Episcopalians 
what to believe or how to structure their theology or polity.  Moreover, because The 
Episcopal Church is an autonomous body, the polity of that Church likewise holds no 
sway inside the confines of the Church of England (e.g. until 2013, the Church of 
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England forbade women bishops, meaning that any American priest ordained by a female 
bishop was not considered a priest by the Church of England). 
In addition to lacking a worldwide governing body, The Episcopal Church also 
lacks other characteristics that usually define Christian denominations: Absent a 
confessional statement or authoritative figurehead like Luther or Calvin, Episcopalians do 
not possess those features that often allow other Protestant denominations to formulate 
their dogmatic identities.  As the theologian Mark Chapman summarizes: 
Many Anglicans have been unsure about where to look for norms and sources of 
theology and they have been wary of using history.  Where Lutherans can be secure 
that they should at least look to Luther and the Augsburg Confession, even if they 
might disagree profoundly about interpretation, Anglicans have frequently been 
rather less certain about what constitutes their key identity.4 
 
Without a defining theologian or confessional statement, one might expect the tradition to 
define itself through a particular Scriptural warrant or an argument from Church history 
or philosophical theology; however, that too is difficult to assess.  Churches from the 
Anglican tradition do subscribe to Richard Hooker’s three-legged stool, which dictates 
that God’s revelation can be discovered through the use of Scripture, reason, and 
tradition.  However, the exact details of what that means is never elaborated: What 
constitutes the Church’s tradition is not delineated for Episcopalians, nor is what 
comprises the embodiment of reason.  A similar case may be made for Scripture: One of 
the more important historical documents from the history of the denomination—the 
Thirty-Nine Articles—dictates that, “Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mark Chapman, Anglican Theology (Doing Theology) (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2012), 
173-4. 
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salvation,” but it does not go so far as to explain how to interpret Scripture to this end.5  
Moreover, while the Thirty-Nine Articles assert that Scripture contains all things 
necessary to salvation, Episcopalians commonly believe that it also contains adiaphora—
non-essential faith matters—and that elements of what is necessary to salvation can be 
found outside of Scripture as well as within it.  As a result, Scripture remains an 
authoritative but contentious source of revelation in the tradition, and may be said to be 
all the more so when guidance is needed concerning matters about which the Bible is 
relatively silent.  Again referring to Mark Chapman, “Being Anglican does not usually 
mean subscription to a text and its subsequent interpretation….This is why doing 
Anglican theology is such a complicated, sometimes infuriating, but usually exciting 
task.”6 
 Without a clear governing authority, historical figurehead, confessional text or 
school of biblical interpretation to guide the Church’s identity, worship patterns emerge 
as a potential source of definition due to the emphasis that member churches in the 
Anglican Communion place on collective worship.  Indeed, worship has historically 
proven a crucial way that Anglicans have understood and negotiated their identity.  As 
liturgical theologian Leonel Mitchel writes, “Probably more than any other contemporary 
religious group, Episcopalians are people of a prayer book.  Not only do we use the Book 
of Common Prayer for the conduct of our public services; it is the guide for our private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 1979 Book of Common Prayer, 868. 
 
6 Chapman, 9. 
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prayer and the source of most of our theology.”7  Reflecting Mitchell’s sentiment, many 
contemporary Episcopalians believe that the Book of Common Prayer is the closest thing 
that the tradition has to a confessional statement—note that the Book of Common Prayer 
includes the Thirty-Nine Articles—and that the liturgies contained within it comprise the 
closest thing the tradition has to a binding or authoritative theological identity.   
However, one may well argue that such conclusions are reductive.  Since the birth 
of what is now The Episcopal Church—the branch of the Anglican Communion rooted in 
the United States—there have been multiple iterations of the prayer book, with some 
churches continuing to use older versions even after the publication of new editions.  
Moreover, the global Anglican Communion lacks a single prayer book, meaning that 
while all prayer books trace their origins to the 1549 edition, multiple prayer books are 
now utilized at the same time depending upon the national church of which one is a 
member.  There is, further, no international attempt to reach any kind of theological 
consensus that binds the content of each prayer book together.  As a result, the liturgy in 
an Episcopal church has basic structural similarities and shares important historical and 
theological roots with the liturgies of other parts of the Anglican Communion, yet it can 
also be distinct from them in significant ways.  Compounding matters further, in recent 
years, The Episcopal Church has allowed for multiple liturgical resources, meaning that 
while the 1979 Book of Common Prayer is still widely used, some congregations choose 
to structure their worship using other liturgical resources like Enriching Our Worship.  
Other branches of the Anglican Communion have issued similar resources, such as Fresh 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Leonel L. Mitchell, Praying Shapes Believing: a Theological Commentary On the Book of 
Common Prayer (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Publishing, 1991), 1. 
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Expressions, a supplemental liturgical text in The Church of England specifically 
engineered for young adult worship.  Such varied liturgical resources may help fill 
important voids that the prayer books do not address.  However, because these resources 
represent a variety of theological priorities, pinning down what Episcopalians believe 
about any given topic becomes more complicated when referencing these myriad 
liturgical resources. 
So is it possible, then, to ask Episcopalians to think critically about a topic like 
third party reproductive relationships using resources from their own denomination?  Or, 
even more broadly, given a lack of authoritative source material inside the tradition, is it 
possible to say anything constructive about relationships in general?  Without a clear 
authoritative voice or documents from the tradition, the apparent answer might be that it 
is not.  However, one could also say that the lack of doctrinal stability from within the 
tradition is its greatest strength.  As Anglican theologian F.D. Maurice explained:  
Our church has no right to call herself better than other churches in any respect, and 
in many she must acknowledge herself to be worse.  But our position, we may fairly 
affirm, for it is not a boast but a confession, is one of singular advantage…[O]ur 
faith is not formed by a union of Protestant systems with the Romish system, nor of 
certain elements taken from the one and of certain elements taken from the others.  
So far as it is represented in our liturgy and our articles, it is the faith of a church 
and has nothing to do with any system at all.  That peculiar character which God 
has given us, enables us, if we do not slight the mercy, to understand the difference 
between a Church and a System.8 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Maurice, 565.  Here I do not perceive Maurice using the term “system” in relation to a structure 
or polity, which have been used by Anglicans historically to establish their identity.  Notably, William 
Reed Huntington developed what is known as the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral in the late 1800s to help 
The Episcopal Church assert its identifying features during ecumenical talks.  The Quadrilateral references 
the Bible, the Nicene and Apostles’ Creeds, the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion, and the 
episcopate as the defining features of the denomination in terms of structure and polity.  However, as stated 
above, the denomination does not define how to read the Bible or the Creeds, and there are multiple 
interpretations of the theological significance of these two sacraments even embedded in the liturgies for 
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Here one sees Maurice pressing against the assumption that the concept of Church is 
necessarily synonymous with a particular systematic theological orientation.  Instead, 
Maurice encourages theologians and Church members to remember that the Church is 
ultimately more comprehensive than any one systematic theology could explain.  
Therefore, to claim that the Church has a monopoly on truth as delineated through a 
systematic way of thinking would be reductive of the truth itself.  Instead, it becomes the 
responsibility of the Church to bear witness, as former Archbishop of Canterbury 
Michael Ramsey explained,  
To the Gospel of God by which alone, in which alone, in one universal family, 
mankind can be made perfect.  It is not something Roman or Greek or Anglican; 
rather does it declare to men their utter dependence upon Christ by setting forth the 
universal Church in which all that is Anglican or Roman or Greek or partial or local 
in any way must share in an agonizing death to its pride.9 
 
From Ramsey’s quotation, it might be tempting to assume that to be Anglican or 
Episcopalian is to be a relativist or to be unable to say anything about anything at all.  
However, this too might be reductive.  Instead, it might be more reasonable to say that 
Episcopalians resist codification or systems of thinking precisely because they believe 
that those things that theological systems are designed to explain—i.e. sin and 
salvation—can be more fully and truthfully encountered when no attempt is made to 
reign them in.  Phrased differently, one might think of Episcopalians as viewers of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
them.  Finally, the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral admits that the historic episcopate is to be “locally 
adapted,” meaning that its function may vary from diocese to diocese such that while the prayer book states 
the responsibilities of a bishop in the consecration service, the regard in which a bishop is held does vary.  
See the 1979 Book of Common Prayer, 876-878. 
 
9 A. Michael Ramsey, The Gospel and the Catholic Church (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1936), 41. 
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Impressionist painting.  Up close, the painting may seem to be composed of unrelated 
dots, and one may be tempted to try to find patterns between the dots to make sense of 
them when what is really needed is the action of stepping further away from the dots to 
appreciate the full, completed picture.  This would, therefore, be to say that Episcopalians 
are not pure relativists so much as they are relative absolutists.  Returning to the 
Impressionist metaphor, one might say that it is only by stepping back to see the 
Episcopal picture fully that one can understand what members truly believe about 
relationships or any other matter. 
 The goal of this chapter is therefore to do just that by referring to data obtained 
from Episcopal clergy.  By observing their pastoral approach to assisted reproduction, the 
sources that narrate their theologies of it, their view of the Church institution, their 
concerns about procedures, and their theological hopes for further investigation, it may 
become possible to see how all of these dots paint a complete picture of what 
contemporary Episcopal leaders believe about third party reproductive relationships and 
relationships at large.  To that task, this chapter now turns. 
The Practice of Pastoral Conversation and the Role of the Institutional Church 
In this section, I will discuss how clergy understand their role in pastoral 
conversations with those considering engaging in an assisted reproduction procedure.  
Specifically, I will explore how they perceive their role in these conversations as a 
cultivator of individual conscience.  I will next discuss the sources they use to narrate 
those conversations, with specific attention given to Scripture and the role of the 
institutional Church.   
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The Priest as Cultivator of Individual Conscience 
The idea that the “obligation” of an Episcopal clergy person is to help individuals 
discern or think constructively about assisted reproduction emerged throughout the 
interviews.  No priest consulted for this study felt it was his or her responsibility to tell 
members of the Church how to think about reproduction or to direct their choice to utilize 
this technology.  Rather, the priests universally felt that assisted reproduction generally 
and third party assisted reproduction specifically fell into a kind of grey zone, and 
therefore, the resulting praxis needed to be determined on a case-by-case basis using 
individual conscience as a guide.  One priest summarized this sentiment when he said, 
“None of these are inherently right or wrong…but the main thing is starting with sex, that 
this is an intense form of communication between two people and depending on what you 
do, it may become sinful.  Treating one inappropriately what have you.  A lack of 
consideration or care for one another.”10 
Recognizing the possibility that reproductive technologies like those that involve 
third parties could be used for good as easily as ill, priests felt their role was to help 
parishioners discern and become intentional about their choices to create new life.  
Indeed, they felt that this was the expectation parishioners had for them as well.  As one 
priest stated, “Often, when people come for counseling, they want you to tell them if 
something is right or wrong.  But Episcopalians don’t think that way.”11   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
11 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
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Another priest explained that she thought it did a disservice to her congregation to 
offer either a proscriptive or sanction for these technologies because that would 
discourage individuals from an opportunity to “wrestle theologically with big decisions” 
and to “consider again what they feel called to in the context of their commitments.”  
This priest felt that such wrestling was invaluable not only in deepening individuals’ 
relationships to God and their own sense of identity, but moreover, this wrestling was 
ecclesiologically important as well.  As she elaborated, “I see that what’s at stake is that 
this is an opportunity for faith communities to…not make it about black and white ethical 
decision making…I would see that as a failure of nerve and [un]willingness to walk into 
the messiness of the opportunity that this provides and say how do we accompany people 
through the discernment piece of this.”12 
This priest evidenced a sense that how the Church responded to the pastoral 
concerns of its parishioners had an effect on what the Church was, or, put differently, that 
the practices of the Church shaped its identity.13  This stance might be said to echo the 
traditional Episcopal belief that praying shapes believing (lex orandi, lex credendi).  In 
that construct, the liturgical practices of the Church are said to provide the framework for 
establishing doctrine, hence establishing a system where practice shapes theology.  This 
priest might be said to be utilizing lex orandi, lex credendi to somewhat broader ends: 
Instead of operating strictly within the bounds of liturgical practice, this priest seems to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 25, 2012. 
 
13 This ecclesiology seems to have a unidirectional focus between belief and practice, in contrast 
to Browning or Volf, who argue that practice can shape belief while belief can shape practice.  Yet while 
this priest emphasized that practices could shape belief, she did not go so far as to say that belief could not 
shape practice.   
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imply that pastoral practices can similarly be utilized to shape the Church’s beliefs.  This 
orientation, therefore, bears distinctly practical theological overtones. 
Along the same lines, this priest felt that the “messiness” of human experience 
provided sufficient warrant for the denomination to avoid sanctioning or prohibiting third 
party procedures as a whole.  One could therefore say that this priest felt that the 
Church’s identity stemmed from being a collective body full of individuals who have—
simply by nature of their being human—“messy” lives.  To that end, the Church’s 
ecclesiology becomes defined by the parameters set by its diverse members instead of 
being defined through a philosophical or historical orientation towards what the Church 
ought to be that develops absent of human experience. Because of this ecclesiology, 
therefore, it became this priest’s perspective that her role was to help parishioners 
“wrestle” with which reproductive choice would be right for them.  In other words, this 
priest’s ecclesiology led her to develop what one might term a pastoral ethic of 
accompaniment through human messiness as opposed to an ethic that arose from the 
Church’s doctrinal statements. 
Mirroring the pastoral choice of this particular priest, a majority of priests 
consulted for this study felt strongly that their pastoral responsibility in conversations 
about these technologies was to cultivate individuals’ conscience and consciousness so 
that they could make decisions with greater awareness and a clearer sense of the impact 
of their choices.  Reflecting this goal, many described their pastoral responsibility in 
counseling sessions using language like, “My job is to make people think through 
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consequences, and think them through knowing God is with them in that”14 or “[I would] 
listen and help them sort out the myriad of information that they have already gathered 
and try to put it into some sort of perspective and organization in terms of finances and 
time and realistic expectations and what would suit their personality.”15 
These quotations illustrate how clergy felt responsible for cultivating individual 
conscience in their role as pastoral listeners.  One priest explained the theology that 
undergirded this practice.  She felt that because humans are fundamentally creative 
beings, part of a priest’s calling is to cultivate and empower the uniqueness of every 
person.  She rooted this theological anthropology in a reading of Genesis 1, stating that: 
Connected to all of this is the perception of God as creator and the understanding 
that we’re made in God’s image, and the bringing forth of new life is deeply 
connected to our identity as created beings and conscious beings that seek to imitate 
God.  And, I guess you know, the big question with assisted reproduction for many 
priests is when is it idolatry?  And when it is a sense of, “I deserve something?”  
And when is it coming from that deep longing and that deep sense of calling?16 
 
 The emphasis clergy placed upon developing a greater awareness of individuals’ 
motives for considering these technologies also extended to how they understood their 
responsibilities in pastoral interactions with donors and surrogates.  One priest explained 
that if she were having a pastoral conversation with an egg donor, she would be “curious” 
about what “seems to be stirring them towards that and then just wanting to have an 
honest assessment of what it [assisted reproduction] means to them particularly as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
 
15 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 10, 2012. 
 
16 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
38	  
surrogate and an egg donor.”17  Likewise, another priest thought it was important to 
cultivate awareness as well as the individual conscience of third parties, so that they were 
fully informed of the many dimensions in their choice to help create a family.  This priest 
explained that, 
With a girl donating her eggs, I would have her consider her goals of having 
children and how that might effect her getting pregnant—women who are 20 don’t 
realize how hard it will be later and that they have a finite number [of eggs].  I want 
them to do something with consciousness and intention: Do you know what you’re 
doing?  Have you weighed the ramifications, and can you sleep at night?  Can you 
make peace with this, and if so, prayerfully go forward.18 
 
This quotation, like the one prior to it, illustrates how this priest was unwilling to issue a 
mandate on the inherent value or ethics of donation, but rather preferred to assess the 
practice on a case-by-case basis, through the perspective of the individual with whom she 
was working.  In this way, the mindset with which these priests approached conversations 
with third parties mirrored the mindset they applied when working with those considering 
using assisted reproduction to become parents. 
Another priest imagined that he would bring a similar mindset to bear upon a 
conversation with a woman considering becoming a surrogate.  Specifically, he felt it was 
his pastoral responsibility to help a surrogate parse out the reasons she wanted to 
participate as well as to consider the ramifications of the “emotional ups and downs” 
involved in conception, pregnancy, and the aftermath of “knowing that the fruit of that 
process isn’t going to be yours to care for.”  Likewise, in counseling a sperm or egg 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 25, 2012. 
 
18 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
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donor, this priest said the kinds of questions he would ask would be designed to elicit 
whether and to what extent the donor thought through the reasons for his or her 
participation as well as the long-term ramifications of it.  “What will it be like if you ever 
find out that this person is your child?” would be one question he would want to ask.  He 
also felt it was important to ask donors to explain their own discernment process: 
Pastorally or theologically, yeah, I’d want to know what’s behind your willingness 
to do this.  Is it a general sense of benevolence?  Are you doing this for a 
friend?...Are you getting paid?  And if so, what does it mean for that to be your 
motivation instead of a general altruism or a sense of call potentially that one 
might, well, feel called to bring about someone’s parenthood?19 
 
Like the other priests consulted above, this priest felt that questions such as these were 
important in discerning whether an individuals’ choice to be a donor or surrogate 
stemmed from a “deep sense of calling” that ultimately would enrich their own lives as 
well as their relationship to God and the wider community.20  To that end, clergy were 
unwilling to proscribe or sanction donation and surrogacy a priori but rather felt that 
these were sensitive and complex possibilities whose value needed to be considered a 
posteriori on an individual basis.  
Use of Biblical Stories in Pastoral Conversations 
 When asked whether there were biblical stories that might guide their 
conversations with intended parents, donors, and surrogates considering engaging in 
assisted reproduction, many priests hesitated to turn to the Bible.  As one clergy person 
stated: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 29, 2012. 
 
20 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
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PRIEST: I cover methods of assisted reproduction routinely as part of marriage 
counseling.  I have talked with people who are using those methods attempting to 
have children but not someone considering them.  I don’t think I would draw on 
biblical resources.   
 
DT: Why do you say that? 
 
PRIEST: First of all, I don’t tend to have a preselected group of texts for anything, 
but when I discuss this with people during premarital counseling, it’s in a general 
ethical framework of non-exploitative behavior.21 
 
This priest elaborated that her hesitancy to turn to biblical stories rooted itself in the way 
she approached these texts: From her perspective, the historical context of the Bible 
needed to be considered when interpreting its contents, and this context was not one in 
which the current technology used in assisted reproduction existed.  Hence, the Bible was 
not an appropriate resource to turn to for models concerning assisted reproduction, 
though the Bible did have wisdom to offer to intended parents, donors, and surrogates 
about the broader themes or questions raised by assisted reproduction.  As this priest 
explained it: 
Any application of the Scripture directly or the major theologians in the tradition 
has to be done with awareness that these were written at a time when these 
procedures didn’t exist.  And there’s a real danger of using these theologians and 
scriptural passages and applying them to today.  These procedures didn’t exist 
back then, and even the understanding of marriage changed over time.  I would 
argue that I think the definition of what a marriage is changed the day 
contraception became reasonably reliable; the world where sex equals baby hasn’t 
been the world we’ve lived in for thirty or forty years, so translating these historic 
passages onto new technology is highly dangerous.  I don’t want to discount their 
wisdom, though.  But I think the wisdom is around what is a person, what is 
offspring, what is family, what is a baby, et cetera, and not around the technology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
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itself.22 
 
While this priest hesitated to turn to biblical sources because their historical 
context precluded the kinds of technologies currently used in assisted reproduction, other 
priests hesitated for different reasons.  One priest interviewed for this study felt that 
telling parishioners which stories to turn to and how to interpret them compromised their 
autonomous discernment when considering assisted reproduction.  Instead, this priest felt 
that it was preferable to ask questions that would help parishioners discover which 
biblical stories resonated with them: 
I would prefer to start with the person and say we have a rich tradition about birth 
narratives in the Old Testament and New Testament.  What are the ones that come 
to mind when you think of having a child, and why do those matter?  My preferred 
tactic would be not to offer up, “This is where you should think and go,” but [to] 
encourage that person to think of this moment of encounter and have them reflect 
alongside me.23 
 
In a similar vein, another priest used the language of “reason” to explain how she felt the 
Bible offered wisdom to parishioners considering becoming part of an assisted 
reproduction procedure: “In our tradition of The Episcopal Church, we believe God gifts 
us with memory, reason, and skill, and we can use reason to interpret Scripture, but I 
think that most people would say that The Episcopal Church doesn’t say that the Bible 
says anything pro or con assisted reproduction.  It leaves it up to any individual for him- 
or herself.”24 Evidenced in these quotations, then, one notices the same guiding principle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
 
23 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
 
24 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 27, 2012.  
Intriguingly, the phrase “memory, reason, and skill” harkens to a direct quotation from Eucharistic Prayer 
C in the Book of Common Prayer: “From the primal elements you brought forth the human race, and 
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that clergy said motivated their pastoral conversations with congregants, namely a focus 
on cultivating individual conscience.  Individual conscience, in other words, becomes a 
normative source of revelation for Episcopalians that is capable of guiding their biblical 
interpretation. 
 Along the same lines, several clergy felt it might be preferable to turn to the 
wisdom of those who participated in or experienced assisted reproduction, instead of the 
Bible, as a source of support.  “I would like them [theologians] to draw on the personal 
testimony of people who have chosen to use it and not use it,”25 one priest said.  Another 
priest bluntly stated that the wisdom of the many people involved in any given assisted 
reproduction procedure outdid anything that could be offered abstractly by those inside 
the Church:  
I think we should get doctors’ testimonies about their experience of what this is 
about.  Even now, we have an opportunity to ask questions to children about how 
they were conceived and what that identity feels like, if possible, because that, I 
think, is really what matters….We should also talk to donors—do they have any 
regrets?  Was it satisfying?  Are they nervous about being tracked down by 100 
children?  Forget all these pontificating theologians; it’s peoples’ stories that will 
make clear the outcome of these choices.26 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
blessed us with memory, reason, and skill. You made us the rulers of creation. But we turned against you, 
and betrayed  your trust; and we turned against one another” (1979 Book of Common Prayer, 370). 
Intriguingly, Eucharistic Prayer C is easily the most technologically-oriented Eucharistic prayer in the 
Prayer Book, in particular due to this reference: “At your command all things came to be: the vast expanse 
of interstellar space, galaxies, suns, the planets in their courses, and this fragile earth, our island home” 
(Ibid).  While it might be a stretch to imply that the priest quoted above was consciously harkening to this 
prayer and its technological overtones, it might still be an example of how praying a prayer like this one 
could at least subconsciously shape the priest’s beliefs about the role of “memory, reason, and skill” in 
reproductive technologies. 
 
25 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
 
26 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
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For better or worse, several priests echoed the sentiment above that theologians were 
“pontificating” and out of touch with the daily lives and needs of individuals, such as 
those who experience reproductive difficulties.  As a result, priests like this one felt that 
theological and biblical sources were ill-equipped to respond to such contemporary 
needs.  Instead, the lived experienced of individuals might serve as a better source of 
revelation. 
Yet though some priests hesitated to use the Bible as a guide or rubric for how to 
practice assisted reproduction, other priests pointed to specific stories that they felt 
offered insight to intended parents, donors, and surrogates.  Priests repeatedly mentioned 
the Genesis 1 command to “be fruitful and multiply” as an influential text.  Several also 
mentioned the book of Job as a reference intended parents could use to navigate the 
unexplained suffering or theodicy questions that could accompany infertility and 
reproductive loss.   
However, priests most commonly referenced the Sarah and Hagar story (Gen. 16, 
21) and the relationship between Rachel and Leah (Gen. 29-35) as texts that 
acknowledge, “that sometimes things are easy and sometimes there is struggle.”27  Many 
felt that these stories were most helpful to modern day members of the Church not 
because they provided a model for praxis but because they evidenced unhealthy 
paradigms for engaging in assisted reproduction: Clergy felt that the jealousy, 
competition, and rancor that characterized the relationships between the individuals in 
these pericopes should not be imitated by Christians today.  In contrast, they named 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 6, 2012. 
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Hannah and Elizabeth as healthier role models because of their faithfulness during the 
experience of infertility, and they also referenced texts such as the Sermon on the Mount 
(Matt. 5-7), the Sermon on the Plain (Luke 6), Micah 6, Mark 3, and the Summary of the 
Law (Matt. 22:35-40; Mk. 12:28-34; Luke 10:25-28) as texts that guided their 
overarching theology of assisted reproduction because of how these texts broadly 
referenced what it means be in relationship with God and neighbor.  
 Finally, several priests were intrigued by Mary’s conception of Jesus and saw it as 
the most compelling paradigm for discussing assisted reproduction with contemporary 
members of the Church.  One priest also saw in the story of Mary’s conception a model 
for donors and surrogates.  This priest felt that Gabriel or the Holy Spirit might be the 
closest analogy the Bible offers to the role third-parties play in modern day assisted 
reproduction.  Gabriel and the Holy Spirit, he felt, might provide a loose image or guide 
for those considering acting as egg donors, sperm donors, or surrogates.  He thought it 
would be worth considering the following in a pastoral conversation: 
Are there parties who are somehow instrumental to another person having a child 
instrumentally?  The only person I think of is Gabriel, but I don’t think of it 
instrumentally.  “The Holy Spirit will come about [sic] you.” (Luke 1:35)…I don’t 
understand the mechanics of that, but that’s not a bad way to start into a 
conversation [by referencing the Holy Spirit].  Not to have a conversation about 
the duel natures of Christ, but that’s an interesting way to get into it—was there a 
lucky spermatozoa that got to be in that process?  Hey, it gets into the mystery of 
incarnation.  But in a way, that could be an interesting way to frame it with 
somebody, that you get to participate in a literal way in an incarnation on someone 
else’s behalf like the Holy Spirit.  Not the same kind of incarnation, but still 
something becoming flesh.28 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 29, 2012. 
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This priest felt that the Holy Spirit could serve as a useful metaphor or guiding image for 
those considering engaging in reproductive technologies, thereby forging a potential 
theological link between the ancient images of the Bible and processes like sperm or egg 
donation, which were beyond the scope of biblical times.  While this priest referred to the 
incarnation as a paradigmatic text that could aid in a pastoral discussion with a donor or 
surrogate, other priests commented on the way that this biblical story expresses the 
complexity and mystery of third party assisted reproduction.  As with contemporary 
technologies, Mary’s pregnancy raises up questions about what it meant to be a parent 
and what defines a parent in a way that differs from other unconventional pregnancies in 
the Bible, in part because of the role of a ‘third party’—the Holy Spirit.  One priest felt 
that Mary and Joseph’s experience of becoming parents had elements of mystery, 
“crisis,” and “unexpected surprise,” that might resonate with intended parents who turn to 
third party assisted reproduction after finding out they cannot have children.29  Another 
priest stated that the incarnation raised questions about parenthood that might resonate 
with intended parents, but was also careful to add that even if the story of Jesus’ birth 
might prove insightful, the Bible still presented challenges as a source of wisdom in 
which to root a theology of third party reproduction: 
Mary gave birth to a child she had responsibility for raising that hardly ever fit in 
and never felt like he belonged to her for maybe more than ten seconds for all sorts 
of good reasons….The genealogy of Jesus is really about, well, there’s nothing 
normal going on there.  There just isn’t, and we should take heart in that, that God 
doesn’t necessarily work in these middle class normal ways that we expect 
everything to work, and so we’ve got bits and pieces of that…but sometimes we’re 
pioneering things in which the tradition doesn’t speak and those are hard places to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
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stand as a Church because we are people of the Book and our tradition informs us 
by and large so well, and is so, for the most part, gracious and helpful, but not 
always.30 
 
This quotation perhaps best summarizes the way clergy viewed the Bible as a source that 
might undergird pastoral conversations or an Episcopal practical theology of third party 
assisted reproduction.  While the priests consulted for this study admitted that the Bible 
could potentially be a source of wisdom with regard to third party reproduction, many 
clergy hesitated to say that biblical stories always served in that way.  Instead, they 
acknowledged that while they may offer pastoral or theological insight, it is still the case 
that when using assisted reproduction, Episcopalians are “pioneering things in which the 
tradition doesn’t speak,” which means that the Bible may be “gracious and helpful, but 
not always.”31 
Authority of The Episcopal Church 
Just as clergy felt it was their calling to help congregants cultivate their individual 
conscience, they likewise felt that it was the Church’s responsibility to do the same.  To 
that end, none of the clergy consulted for this study wanted The Episcopal Church to 
issue a resolution about the proper use of third party reproduction for several reasons.  
First, because assisted reproduction is complex.  Second, because The Episcopal Church 
is not a doctrinal tradition, and third, because of the value The Episcopal Church places 
on the concept of via media.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
 
31 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
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  To begin, the priests interviewed for this study felt that the issues raised by 
assisted reproduction were too complex to be condensed into a resolution that permitted 
or prohibited their use.  Moreover, because clergy felt that the danger of assisted 
reproductive technologies lay not in their inherent value but rather in the attitude with 
which they were used, it did not make sense to them to reduce the complex motivations 
and feelings of intended parents into a resolution that allowed or rejected assisted 
reproduction on the whole.  Put differently, the priests felt that issuing a blanket 
statement on these technologies was not realistic given the subtleties inherent in their 
practice.  As one priest said: “We have to get away from a black and white ethics, 
because in the modern world most of our ethical decisions are nuanced and based on 
shades of gray rather than black and white.  Anyone who thinks we can make black and 
white moral decisions is whistling in the wind.”32 
 Clergy were also uninterested in The Episcopal Church issuing a resolution 
condemning or allowing these procedures because they did not see their denomination as 
a fundamentally doctrinal one.  “I’m not looking for a doctrine,” one priest said.  “I’m not 
looking for narrow guidelines.  I guess what I would hope for would be a continuing 
openness and an ability to embrace a wide range of possibility.”33  This priest’s sentiment 
seemed to be pervasive throughout the interviews.  Comments such as, “I don’t think of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 4, 2012. 
 
33 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
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us as a doctrinal tradition,”34 and, “The theologians I’m most excited by are those who 
aren’t doctrinaire”35 were common across interviewees. 
 When asked to elaborate, clergy expressed several reasons why they found value 
in a non-doctrinal tradition.  Some highlighted the role of liturgy for Episcopalians, citing 
the worship of the Church as the locus where beliefs were formulated.  Emphasizing the 
theological concept of lex orandi, lex credendi, these priests felt that the theology of The 
Episcopal Church was worked out not within systematic theological treatises but in the 
pews, in the prayers and songs of the community.   
Others recognized that, for Episcopalians, revelation comes through what 
founding theologian Richard Hooker termed the “three-legged stool” of Scripture, 
reason—of which experience is seen as a subcategory—and tradition.  Because 
Episcopalians recognize that knowledge about God can come from any of these three 
sources, and that each may be used to interpret the other, priests did not believe that the 
tradition of the Church alone would be a sufficient source of revelation.  The way one 
priest explained this was that, “Things like the three-legged stool become theological 
expressions that we might use that are a real simple symbol that show we bring different 
strains together as we do theological discernment.”36 
 In other words, priests did not expect that the wisdom offered by the traditions of 
the Church would take the form of injunctions issued in isolation from Scripture and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
 
35 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
36 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
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tradition but rather hoped they would take the form of “theological discernment” 
accomplished alongside and through them.  This meant that, ecclesiologically, the 
traditions of the Church are not unchangeable, but rather, as a layperson discerns a call to 
the priesthood or an adult discerns a call to parenthood, so the Church discerns its 
theology over time.  Pivotal to that, priests generally felt that a mutually critical 
correlative relationship existed between Church and world, such that since the Church 
was capable of theological discernment, it was intended to be a dynamic structure whose 
wisdom could inform the world and also be informed by the wisdom of the world.  As 
one priest said, she thought it was important that the wisdom offered by the Church was,  
always pushing and pressing and questioning what used to be, also in terms of 
history and scientific advancement.  That doesn’t create a chasm between us and 
God but draws us closer to God and brings us to new frontiers and deepens our 
understanding of who we’re meant to be.37   
 
Or, as another priest explained, while there is great strength in a Church whose 
ecclesiology is rooted in dynamic interactions with human experience, there is great 
danger when the Church isolates itself from human experience or perceives its identity as 
one that has normative value over human experience instead of being in correlative 
conversation with it.  As this priest stated: 
The Church needs to respond to what is happening in human’s lives, not what they 
wish would happen or what would happen a thousand years ago.  Unfortunately, 
the churches in general look like simple, power-seeking control agents, because 
instead of seeking viable theologies for what’s occurring in the lives of real people, 
they’re saying you have to live like people lived a hundred years ago, and it’s not 
going to work that way, and churches are abrogating their responsibility to lead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
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and counsel, and that means people leave the church.38 
 
 Finally, while priests like this one found great value in a dynamic ecclesiology in 
which tradition and human experience could be correlated without one being normatively 
superior to the other, they likewise felt that it would be unrealistic to expect The 
Episcopal Church to offer a prescriptive on third party assisted reproduction practices 
because the denomination often prides itself upon being a tradition that holds conflicting 
views in tension, something that the early part of this chapter explored.  Indeed, many 
contemporary Episcopalians believe that a primary goal of the Church is to uphold the 
value of both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism through the Aristotelian philosophy 
of via media or “middle road.”39  To that end, Episcopal clergy are trained to consider 
different perspectives and be open to their value, always with the goal of seeking a via 
media that might embrace the fullest truth possible.  Hence, when asked what they 
thought the theology of assisted reproduction currently held by The Episcopal Church 
was, clergy responded with answers such as, “My guess is there are varying opinions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 4, 2012. 
 
39 While many contemporary Episcopalians feel that the via media is a historically entrenched 
dynamic within the Church, Mark Chapman takes issue with this assertion in his historical overview of the 
Church of England.  Writing about the seventeenth-century Church, Chapman explains, “The somewhat 
hackneyed understanding of the Church of England as a via media thus needs serious qualification…. The 
English church was portrayed as a ship sailing in the dangerous narrows of the clear water between 
extremes on either side.  Nevertheless, references to the via media, however, are infrequent, and it does not 
seem to have been associated with ‘Anglicanism’ as a particular ideology…. In later developments of this 
sort of model, much has been made of the so-called via media.  This sees Anglicanism as a kind of ‘bridge 
church’ between protestants and Roman Catholics, which is something that would certainly have surprised 
the solidly protestant theologians of Elizabethan England, even if there is possibly an element of truth with 
regard to Elizabeth I’s own religion.”  Chapman, 161-2. 
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under the Episcopal umbrella,”40 “I would think it’s the standard, ‘You need to consider 
all the angles,’”41 and “I’d like to believe the Church has a hand’s off approach and 
recognizes what Christian love is and what the call to parenthood is.”42 
While clergy accurately predicted that the General Convention resolutions that 
currently exist on assisted reproduction reflect “varying opinions” and “all angles” to the 
extent that they conflict one another, it is worth noting that only two of the clergy 
consulted for this study were familiar with these resolutions.  The remaining clergy were 
unaware that General Convention had issued resolutions on assisted reproduction—third 
party or otherwise—and some were patently uninterested in knowing what they were.  
One priest, who had counseled a parishioner on assisted reproduction, stated that it 
wasn’t “necessary to bulk myself up with everything The Episcopal Church said on the 
topic,”43 while another priest, when asked about the denomination’s theology of assisted 
reproduction said, “I just don’t pick up the Blue Book [which states General Convention 
resolutions] and go and look and say, ‘Gee, what’s going on today?’  So I don’t know.”44 
 While these priests’ approach to the General Convention resolutions might seem 
flippant or disrespectful, clergy did not view it that way.  From their perspective, because 
the Church’s role was to cultivate individual conscience, it would not have been a natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
 
41 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
42 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 4, 2012. 
 
43 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 25, 2012. 
 
44 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
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response to seek out a mandate issued by the Church to learn what behaviors or practices 
ought to be adopted by parishioners.  Instead, the natural response would be to consult 
the individual conscience that the Church sought to empower.  In other words, priests felt 
that one of the strengths of The Episcopal Church was the way in which its liturgy, 
hierarchy and bureaucracy treasured the cultivation of individual conscience and were in 
the service of it.  As one priest explained: 
I can understand the appeal of a church that makes your decisions for you: It’s a 
difficult age and making decisions is hard, so it would be helpful to have someone 
say, “Do it this way; the Bible says so.”  But it’s one of our greatest strengths that 
we don’t do that.  We still occupy the sensible middle, and I don’t think the Church 
is going to make any statement against any of these reproductive methods….  The 
Church is leaving this up to conscience.45 
 
Clergy Concerns 
While the priests consulted for this study unanimously affirmed that there was 
nothing inherently immoral or wrong with assisted reproduction, many expressed 
reservations about the ways that people used it.  These concerns could be clustered into 
five categories: 1. Concerns about the role of adoption; 2. Concerns about population 
control; 3. Concerns about ‘playing God’; 4. Concerns about money; 5. Concerns about 
the destruction of embryos.   
While it is not the goal of this chapter to analyze the data presented by clergy, 
what can be said at this juncture is that all of these concerns explicitly touch upon how 
participants in assisted reproduction relate to God and their neighbor in community.  
Insofar as these concerns were themed around relationship, then, one might go so far as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, pone interview, June 4, 2012. 
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to say that there were not five specific concerns but rather one meta concern that emerged 
amongst clergy: that assisted reproduction could challenge the stewardship of 
relationships between God and neighbor. 
Concerns about the Role of Adoption 
 Priests were keenly aware of adoption language in both the New Testament and 
the prayer book, and felt that this language was important when thinking about a theology 
of human reproduction generally as well as assisted reproduction specifically.46  Several 
referred to Ephesians 1:5 and Galatians 4:5—where Paul states that we are adopted in 
Christ—and they used that adoption metaphor to describe the relationship between God 
and humans.  They also noted that the Book of Common Prayer affirms this metaphor for 
God-human relationships in several of its liturgies: The Collect for Christmas Day states 
that, “We…have been born again and made your children by adoption and grace,”47 
while the celebrant at the liturgy for Holy Baptism concludes the service by saying, “All 
praise and thanks to you, most merciful Father, for adopting us as your own children.”48  
Likewise, the liturgy entitled, “A Thanksgiving for the Birth or Adoption of a Child,” 
twice makes mention of adoption by God, once stating that a parent adopting a child 
receives the child as “God has made us his children by adoption and grace,” and, later in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Interviews by author, phone interviews, May 27, 2012, May 29, 2012, and June 13, 2012 
respectively. 
 
47 1979 Book of Common Prayer Readers Edition, 213. 
 
48 Ibid., 311. 
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the service, stating that in baptism, Christians are adopted by God.49  This connection 
between baptism and adoption is reiterated in the Catechism section on Holy Baptism, 
which defines the sacrament foremost in terms of the adoption relationship:  
Q. What is Holy Baptism?  
A. Holy Baptism is the sacrament by which God adopts us as children and makes us 
members of Christ’s Body, the Church, and inheritors of the kingdom of God.50 
 
 Aware of how Paul and the prayer book writers highlight the adoption 
relationship as a prototype for understanding the relationship between God and humans, 
priests felt that it was important to consider how adoption factored into any theology that 
had to do with parent-child relationships.  One priest said that the emphasis placed upon 
adoption in the Episcopal tradition led him to wonder what is “behind this drive…that we 
must have children who are biologically ours as opposed to adopting” and felt that “this 
drive” needed to be explored more fully to develop a theology around the practices of 
both assisted reproduction and reproduction through intercourse.51 
Another priest felt that if adoption was how God primarily related to humans, then 
adoption needed to receive primacy in inter-human relations as well.  This priest noted 
that if humans were striving to fashion themselves in the image of God, and if God, as the 
Ephesians 1 and Galatians 4 letters state, adopts us in Christ, then the real question 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid., 441, 445.  It is intriguing to observe that the prayer book seems inconsistent on exactly 
who is adopted by God: The concluding blessing at the service entitled, “A Thanksgiving for the Birth or 
Adoption of a Child” implies that only the baptized are adopted by God.  The other texts are more 
ambiguous, referring to those adopted as “we.” 
 
50 Ibid., 858.  See also Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, 
May 29, 2012. 
 
51 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
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becomes why adoption isn’t the preferred way to create a family.  As this priest 
summarized: 
The Church is being a bit disingenuous about what it really believes and practices 
with respect to our spiritual adoption by God and the practice of adoption. If 
adoption is so reflective of God's love—and I think it is—then the Church ought to 
commend it to all couples, not just those who can't bear children without assistance. 
They've got the order of commendation all wrong. It should not be: 1. Try to have 
kids 2. If you can't, consider adoption 3. Be careful about this sketchy new 
technology.  But [instead it should be]: 1. Consider adoption, then 2. Consider 
having biological children, assisted or otherwise.52 
 
While the abovementioned priests relied heavily upon Pauline letters to ground 
their theology of adoption, another priest turned to the Gospels and noted how Jesus 
places familial emphasis upon non-biological relationships.  This priest theorized that 
Jesus does not define family by blood but by a commitment to hearing and following 
God’s will (Mark 3:31-35; Matt. 12:46-50; Luke 8:19-21).  These biblical texts informed 
how this priest used adoption language to explain that Christians are asked to be family to 
one another regardless of biological kinship: Just as the Gospels encourage Christians to 
form family bonds between others who may not share a blood tie, so adoption forms 
“networks of relationships amongst strangers.”53 
 From a more praxis-based perspective, many of the clergy expressed concerns 
that the existence of assisted reproduction drew attention away from children who needed 
a home.  Some felt that this was occurring because the adoption process was less 
appealing for intended parents than assisted reproduction was.  Clergy were aware that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 10, 2012. 
 
53 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
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from the perspective of intended parents, assisted reproduction offered more freedom—or 
perhaps perceived control over reproduction—than adoption did: Whereas in assisted 
reproduction, intended parents had freedom to evaluate third parties, clinics, and doctors 
and choose the options they felt most comfortable with, in adoption, the system reversed 
itself.  Adoption agencies interviewed intended parents to assess their suitability.  
Additionally, from the perspective of intended parents, adoption took a great deal of time 
and money and did not result in the birth of biologically-related children.  It also carried 
with it uncertain outcomes—the threat that a biological parent could try to take a child 
back or the risk that the child might have health problems all dissuaded intended parents 
from starting an adoption process.54  Moreover, some domestic and international adoption 
agencies will not allow same-sex, transgender, or single individuals to adopt, essentially 
closing off that option to members of those communities who want to be parents. 
 In light of the challenges posed by the adoption process, several clergy felt that 
what was really at stake ultimately had nothing to do with the ethics or practices of 
assisted reproduction but rather the availability of adoption and the existence of a process 
so complicated that it dissuaded people from using it.  As one priest stated: 
It’s impossible to have an easy time adopting a child.  It should be as easy as buying 
a kid in Costco, but there should be more support for women willing to go through a 
pregnancy and give up their child.  If abortion and a life of hardship are their two 
options, obviously, abortion is the option.  That steers women into not going 
through with the pregnancies.  But adoption is another alternative to assisted 
reproduction, so if we’re going to talk about that, adoption should factor in in terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
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of supporting that and making it more available.55 
 
While provocative, it is worthwhile to interpret this priest’s comment that adoption 
“should be as easy as buying a kid at Costco” as harkening to the complexities that 
accompany the process.  Given the uncertainty, expense, and legal concerns that are part 
of the procedure, as well as the interviews intended parents must undergo to assess their 
own fitness to raise a child—an event that is notably absent in assisted reproduction and 
biological birth—this priest felt that adoption as currently practiced in American society 
was immensely important and yet perceived as too cumbersome for many to undertake.   
Mindful of the intimidating complexity of adoption, therefore, priests like this one felt 
that it was important to make sure that its value was not overlooked in pastoral 
conversations. For instance, one priest, who had adopted a child, felt it was important to 
mention adoption during pastoral conversations about assisted reproduction because 
sometimes intended parents had not fully considered it as an option.  Though this priest 
acknowledged that, “I have nothing but respect for people who choose” assisted 
reproduction, there was also a sense that intended parents often did not consider adoption 
because of its complexity, and so it was important to highlight its value, especially from a 
faith-based perspective.56 
Concerns about Population Control 
A second theme that emerged during the interviews with Episcopal clergy was 
their awareness of the choice to reproduce and how that choice affected the global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
 
56 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
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community.  Several mentioned the Genesis 1 commandment to be fruitful and multiply 
during the interview, citing tension between that command and global overpopulation: 
Genesis, they noted, encourages adults to birth children.  It implies that reproduction is 
foundational to human anthropology, and there is no prohibition concerning the methods 
of reproduction or the number of children an adult should have.  Indeed, nowhere in 
Genesis 1 is overpopulation hinted at, yielding, as priests noted, an inherent tension 
between the biblical source of revelation and the revelation of human experience, which 
repeatedly points to problems created by global overpopulation.   
The priests who named this tension did not offer resolutions to it, and many 
voiced ambivalence about how to proceed. One priest noted that the same kinds of 
technological advances that allow for assisted reproduction also cure once incurable 
diseases and extend human life to record lengths.  These scientific findings better the 
lives of many, and yet, they are also responsible for the global population increase.  This 
priest also noted that population increase creates “social and economic conundrums” 
because of the earth’s limited resources: Inadequate space in which to grow crops, 
restricted food and medicinal supplies, as well as unbalanced monetary distribution all 
gave this priest pause when he considered assisted reproduction, because, from his 
perspective, any creation of new life contributes to the problems created by global 
overpopulation.  However, having voiced his concerns about overpopulation, he also 
added, “The mandate in Scripture…[is] always to have more and more children because 
you want to populate a world.  I’m torn…Part of me wants to say that it’s time to cut 
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down...and then the question is do you want to balance the population on the backs of 
those who can’t have children.  I don’t want to do that either.”57 
Another priest voiced a similarly nuanced view of how the tension between 
Genesis 1:28 and the reality of overpopulation influenced how he thought about assisted 
reproduction, referencing a visit to India during which he had the opportunity to witness 
overpopulation and poverty in the city of Mumbai.  Reflecting on that trip and how it 
affected his view of assisted reproduction as well as his interpretation of Genesis 1, he 
cited the importance of what he termed “responsible reproduction”—which for him 
included the use of birth control as well as planned childbearing—to his way of thinking.  
As he put it, Genesis 1:28 did not negate the importance of “responsible parenting,” and 
so when assisted reproduction was not used in the service of responsible parenting, it 
became unhealthy for the global community.  Moreover, it became a theological issue 
from the perspective of stewardship.  As he put it, “I don’t think those lines about the 
stewardship of the earth mean, ‘Just go and have as many kids as you can,’ because that’s 
not good stewardship—population control unchecked depletes the earth’s resources and 
leads to our own self-destruction.”58 
This particular priest’s quotation suggests an awareness of how assisted 
reproduction not only potentially contributes to the problem of global overpopulation but 
also how overpopulation is a problem that affects the entire global community.  Put 
differently, priests concerned with the impact of assisted reproduction on overpopulation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
 
58 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
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demonstrated an awareness that reproduction was not a private, individual matter but 
rather one with communal ramifications.  Relationality in this context, therefore, meant 
cultivating relationships not only with one’s friends and family but also with the broader, 
global community, even if members of it were potentially strangers.  To that end, one 
priest linked reproduction to the global community by saying that,   
Maybe the biggest image is from Genesis, that we have been put in charge of the 
earth, and that’s a sacramental principle, and what we do makes all the difference 
and we have to come up with something that is good for both individual human 
beings and for the species.  Reproduction is not just a private matter; it never is.  It’s 
always about the community.  And maybe that’s the image…. if you don’t take Old 
Testament Scriptures as a mandate to go out and conquer the earth and subdue it, 
but understand all behavior has ramifications in the community, that we live in 
community and what the individual does has effects… We have to look at what the 
effects of our actions have on other human beings and life forms and the 
environment.59 
 
Concerns about ‘Playing God’ 
 No priest consulted for this study felt that there was something inherently 
immoral about assisted reproduction; however, their knowledge of its utilization gave 
them concerns about intended parents using assisted reproduction to take onto themselves 
creative responsibilities that they believed belonged to God alone. 
 For these clergy, ‘playing God’ was not synonymous with consciously making a 
decision to birth a child.  Hence, these priests did not feel that any adult who made a 
choice to create new life—perhaps by stopping birth control, by calculating when 
ovulation occurred, or even by using assisted reproduction—fell into this category.  The 
theology of these priests therefore contrasts with a theology such as that held by members 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
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of the Quiverfull movement, who believe that God has sole provenance over the creation 
of new life.  Translating their theology into theory-laden practice, members of the 
movement eschew all forms of reproductive assistance—including birth control, assisted 
reproduction, and abortion—on the grounds that only God has authority to decide when 
to create new life.  
In contrast to a theology like that held by Quiverfull practitioners, the Episcopal 
clergy consulted for this study did not perceive assisted reproduction as necessarily 
meddling with God’s creative authority.  Rather, they made a distinction between 
practicing assisted reproduction to conceive any child and practicing assisted 
reproduction to conceive a specific child.  Clergy cited selective reduction—the practice 
of aborting one or more fetuses in a multi-fetal pregnancy—and choosing specific 
characteristics including height, hair and eye color, sexual orientation, and gender as 
examples of ‘playing God’ that they found to be troublesome or inappropriate.  As one 
priest put it, “The danger [in assisted reproduction] is idolatry or playing God, and there’s 
a component to it that feels consumerist, and it’s not just wanting a child that comes with 
the randomness of, ‘God knows who this will be,’” but rather, ‘I want to order something 
out of a catalogue.’”60  In other words, the concern for this priest was not that technology 
might be used to create a family but rather that because reproductive technology is 
capable of manipulating genetics or the number of children produced, it allows for the 
commodification of human beings and the resulting family.  By so doing, individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
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who choose to utilize reproductive technologies to these ends are seeking powers of 
creation that, according to this priest, should be reserved for God alone. 
Along somewhat similar lines, another priest gave a specific example of how she 
saw one of her parishioners using assisted reproduction to ‘play God’ as well as why she 
perceived the parishioner’s practices as troublesome.  This parishioner hired a gestational 
surrogate, who gave birth to a baby with a very rare, terminal medical condition.  Doctors 
recognized the condition at birth but were unsure how long the infant would live, leaving 
the mother, in the words of the priest, “trying to figure out how to hold this baby.”  As the 
priest described it, the mother blamed the surrogate for the baby’s condition, though the 
illness was related to the child’s DNA and there was no evidence that actions of the 
gestational surrogate caused the illness.  The mother also had difficulty accepting the 
baby because, as the priest put it, “This child wasn’t what was expected but was still an 
incredibly beautiful baby.”61  As the infant’s life progressed, this priest discovered that 
the woman felt entitled to a healthy child because she paid the surrogate a large fee for 
her services.  This caused the woman to have, in the words of the priest, “this sense of 
control that she didn’t have a right to have in the first place, so when the baby arrived, 
she was mad because this was not what she paid for.”  The priest continued, explaining 
that: 
In the context I was pastoring—with wealthy people who are used to a consumer 
culture where if you pay for conception, you have greater control…[there] was a lot 
of talking about the love of Jesus and examples of the love of Jesus…[but it] got to 
the point that she was saying very cruel things about her baby that made me 
tempted to call social services.  I talked to her about Jesus saying, “Whose sin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 22, 2012. 
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caused this person’s blindness?” and Jesus saying, “No one.”  I was trying to help 
her to see because the baby really was amazing, but she couldn’t see it, because 
that’s not what she paid for….  The child did eventually die at a year and a half, and 
the sad thing was that most of her [the mother’s] friends and family breathed a sigh 
of relief because they knew she didn’t want it [the child]…  She could have had a 
year of enjoying this child but instead she resented it.62 
 
The pastoral example this priest shared during the interview illustrated what ‘playing 
God’ looked like in practice and why it’s so troublesome.  Specifically, the priest 
believed that the control the mother sought over the characteristics of the child who 
would become part of her life was not something that a person has “a right to have in the 
first place.”  In this way, this priest, like others consulted for this study, felt that while it 
could be beneficial for intended parents to utilize assisted reproduction, it was 
inappropriate to use it without the appreciation that life is always a gift, not of this world, 
but from God.  Likewise, using technology to obtain specific genetic characteristics 
troubled this priest because of the way it signified a denial of this gift.  Hence, this priest 
expressed a practical theology wherein assisted reproduction is not inherently 
inappropriate; however, using it in order to obtain a child with specific characteristics is, 
because it belies the theological assumption that all life is a gift from God.   
Following from this, the mother’s belief that her child needed to be healthy in 
order to have value or be lovable was theologically troubling for this priest and others, 
who felt strongly that all life is valuable.  Using John 9 as warrant, this priest grounded 
her belief in Jesus’ words, which for her signified that God treasured all life, regardless of 
a person’s physical abilities: As Jesus says in answer to the question of whether the man 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 22, 2012.  See 
also John 9:1-12. 
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was born blind because of his sins or his parents’, “‘Neither this man nor his parents 
sinned; he was born blind so that God’s works might be revealed in him” (John 9:3).63  
Using that statement to ground her theological anthropology, this priest interpreted Jesus 
as saying that difference or physical challenges do not undermine the overall goodness or 
value of a human life.  As a result, this priest felt that the negative judgment the 
parishioner inflicted upon her infant was antithetical to how Jesus would have his 
followers behave and believe in the world. 
Concerns about Stewardship 
While the priest mentioned above expressed concerns about the way her 
parishioner ‘played God’ when she utilized assisted reproduction, she also worried about 
this parishioner’s attitude towards stewardship, specifically the stewardship of money.  
Here is how she explained the way her parishioner interpreted the role of money in 
assisted reproduction: 
Having used her vast resources to have a surrogate and have an embryo implanted 
in the surrogate, and to pay the surrogate a lot of money because she had a lot of 
money, she had this sense of control that she didn’t have a right to have in the first 
place, so when the baby arrived, she was mad because this was not what she paid 
for.64 
 
This priest felt that the exchange of money in assisted reproduction between surrogate 
and intended parent made it easier for the mother to perceive the interaction in consumer 
terms—she paid money expecting a specific product, and when that product was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Unless otherwise noted, all biblical quotations come from The Harpercollins Study Bible: New 
Revised Standard Version, with the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books.  Wayne A. Meeks, Ed.  New 
York, NY: HarperOne, 1993. 
 
64 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 22, 2012. 
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delivered, she was dissatisfied, as one might be if, after buying raspberries at the grocery 
store, one opened the container at home and found they were covered in mold.  Yet this 
priest felt it was inappropriate to quantify the value of a life, because, as stated above, she 
felt Jesus valued all life equally.  Therefore, the exchange of money enabled—or, to use 
theological language, tempted—her parishioner to possess a theological anthropology 
that quantified life in a consumerist way that was antithetical to Christian faith values.  In 
other words, this priest objected to the mother’s belief that her economic privilege 
afforded her a kind of entitlement or agency over reproduction that no human being 
should have.  
This priest was not alone in citing money as a problematic part of the way that 
assisted reproduction was practiced.  Other clergy also felt troubled by the use of 
monetary resources in assisted reproduction, as well as how money became integrally 
entwined with a sense of ‘playing God.’  As one priest stated, “People have this 
presumption that we can get what we want particularly if we have enough money.”65  
This quotation echoes a similar one made by author Phoebe Potts, who wrote a graphic 
memoir about her struggles with infertility: 
I’ve been steeped in the 2 Great American myths: You can do it.  Cash is king.  
Combine the two and you get this easy-to-remember mantra: You can buy it!  With 
that logic long instilled in me, I’ve got a classic case of middle class entitlement…. 
I married a nice (partially) Jewish boy!  I recycle!  I vote!  I eat my greens!  I go to 
yoga!  I went to Smith!  I untangled my issues in therapy!  I worked for the poor!  
So….where’s my baby?66 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
66 Phoebe Potts, Good Eggs (New York: Harper, 2010), xvi-xix. 
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Many priests consulted for this study felt troubled by the outlook Phoebe Potts expressed, 
which they perceived as permeating the world of assisted reproduction.  Aware that most 
insurers do not cover costly procedures such as egg donation and surrogacy and aware 
that the price tag attached to these procedures is prohibitive for many American families, 
clergy felt that third party assisted reproduction raised a number of concerns about the 
appropriate stewardship of monetary resources.  As one priest described it, “It’s 
becoming an issue of Sarah and Hagar, because it’s not really [about] whether or not you 
can have children.  It’s if you have enough money, you can medically maneuver things so 
that you have a baby who is in some capacity yours or your spouse’s, so looking at 
reproduction as part of a larger story of justice and equality and God’s will…is an 
important conversation.”67 
Several other clergy echoed this priest’s belief that current practices in the United 
States tapped into a broader conversation about economic inequality and injustice within 
American society.  Some felt that because assisted reproduction was prohibitively 
expensive for most families, there needed to be increased insurance coverage or the cost 
of treatments needed to decrease so that the technologies could become more widely 
available.  In contrast, other clergy felt that the large quantity of money required could be 
more productively spent on other causes, such as making adoption more accessible and 
increasing funding for impoverished children or children in the foster care system. 
 Related to the monetary implications for stewardship and justice were concerns 
about monetary exploitation.  Clergy worried that doctors might take advantage of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
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wealthy individuals struggling with fertility issues for their own financial gain by offering 
conception services at higher prices or offering hope for a successful pregnancy without 
warrant.  One female priest who experienced infertility herself offered a specific example 
of this: Describing what she perceived as the challenges of assisted reproduction, she 
explained that she felt her fertility doctor did not appropriately manage “patients’ 
expectations.”  She went on to explain that she felt this kind of behavior exploited the 
hopes of those who wanted to conceive a child: “I think patients enter these procedures 
with a great degree of hope, and speaking from my own personal experience, my fertility 
doctor did not fully describe to me the chances—he wasn’t realistic about the chances of 
having a baby versus getting pregnant.”68  To that end, this priest felt that actions become 
sinful when those working in assisted reproduction clinics exploit the hopes of intended 
parents for their own financial gain.69 
 Clergy also voiced concerns about the monetary exploitation of third parties in 
assisted reproduction technology procedures.  Several worried that the money offered to 
them could lead to exploitation if donors and surrogates were “poorer, less educated, just 
less well-informed or more naïve.”70  Clergy felt particular concern for the exploitation of 
donors and surrogates in cases of medical tourism in countries like India.  Aware that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 27, 2012. 
 
69 The Episcopal Church defines sin as “the seeking of our own will instead of the will of God, 
thus distorting our relationship with God, with other people, and with all creation….Sin has power over us 
because we lose our liberty when our relationship with God is distorted.”  See 1979 Book of Common 
Prayer Readers Edition, 848-9.  More will be said about the relationship between sin and relationships in 
chapter three, though for now, suffice it to say that The Episcopal Church assumes a connection between 
the two: to sin is, de facto, not to be in right relationship with God and/or neighbor. 
 
70 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 10, 2012. 
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many donors and surrogates in India come from poor families and are oftentimes poorly 
educated and/or illiterate, clergy questioned whether offering these women money in 
exchange for use of their eggs or womb constituted exploitation.71   
That said, no priest consulted for this study went so far as to say that all gamete 
donation and surrogacy procedures constituted exploitation or that by nature, third party 
procedures were exploitative.  Indeed, many categorized donation and surrogacy in terms 
of gifting and relationship-building.  To that end, the priests interviewed for this study 
seemed to conclude that the healthy exercise of relationality calls individuals to a greater 
awareness of their interconnection and of their membership in both local and global 
communities.  This sense of interconnection therefore simultaneously calls humans to 
accountability, to name injustice and exploitation while also asking them to share or 
donate that which they can.  Thus, a fine line existed for clergy between exploitation and 
gifting or donation, between the exercise of abusive relationships and healthy ones.  More 
will be said about that distinction in both in this and future chapters of the dissertation. 
Concerns about the Destruction of Embryos 
 Many clergy felt that the most serious concern posed by assisted reproduction 
involved the use of embryos in medical procedures: Selective reduction, frozen embryos, 
discarded embryos, and embryos lost during the implantation process all troubled clergy, 
who felt that embryos sacrificed intentionally or unintentionally during assisted 
reproduction could constitute abortion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 10, 2012. 
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It is worth noting that none of the clergy who mentioned the intentional or 
unintentional destruction of embryos voiced endorsement or opposition to abortion 
generally, and their language concerning this phenomenon during assisted reproduction 
procedures tended to be cautious and subtle.  One priest, for instance, avoided voicing 
any kind of strident opinion, saying only that, “The greatest difficulty comes at the level 
at which you have kinds of procedures that can lead to a situation where you may have 
excess embryos where it may in some way shape or form encourage abortion.”72  Another 
priest said it was important to “think about sin and our understanding of being off course 
and the need for reconciliation, particularly as it may relate to embryos that that are 
discarded.”73  This priest did not choose to elaborate further on what “thinking about” sin 
and reconciliation looked like practically, nor would she definitely commit to whether sin 
and reconciliation were the proper theological lenses through which to discuss the 
discarding of embryos, choosing only to say that they “may relate” to the topic, and that 
this was ultimately a matter of individual conscience.  Another priest was similarly 
cautious, stating: 
The other thing we haven’t touched on but needs to be explored is that usually, and 
this is controversial, in order to have or conceive a child, there are always embryos 
that are fertilized and what happens to that….  When and where life begins…isn’t 
about viability but about what is our sense of sacred…it gets really complicated 
really fast.  But this needs to be touched upon, and it’s not because I have an ax to 
grind, but again, it’s our obligation as ordained people to have people think more 
than pragmatically or utilitarianally about the most precious issue we’ll ever face, 
which has to do with life and what it means and where it begins and where it is for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
73 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
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us.74 
 
Like the priest above, this priest raised up the discarding of embryos in assisted 
reproduction with caution, acknowledging that the issue was “controversial” and 
“complicated” while not taking a firm stance on what the theory or theory-laden praxes 
around the discarding of embryos should be or whether they constituted abortion.  
Indeed, this priest stressed that her role was not to adopt such a firm stance but rather to 
empower those entrusted to her care to think critically about an issue she understood to 
be complex and nuanced.  
It is worth noting that the cautious language with which priests like these 
discussed the intentional or unintentional destruction of embryos during reproductive 
technology procedures mirrors The Episcopal Church’s stance on abortion generally.  
The Episcopal Church maintains a cautious attitude towards abortion, affirming that all 
life is sacred, that abortion has an inherently “tragic dimension,” and that “the birth of a 
child is a joyous and solemn occasion.”  Yet in addition to these statements, the General 
Convention resolution on abortion also states that, “it is the legal right of every woman to 
have a medically safe abortion,” and that in cases where abortion is being considered,  
“members of this Church are urged to seek the dictates of their conscience in prayer, to 
seek the advice and counsel of members of the Christian community and where 
appropriate, the sacramental life of this Church,” including the sacrament of penance.75   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
 
75 Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, Detroit, 1988 (New York: General 
Convention, 1989), p. 683.  This statement was reaffirmed at the 1994 General Convention in Indianapolis.  
See Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, Indianapolis, 1994 (New York: General 
Convention, 1995), pp. 323-25.  For a statement on the use of penance following abortion, see General 
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To that end, one might interpret these resolutions as saying that The Episcopal 
Church holds a contradictory stance on abortion.  Yet from within the Church, the goal is 
not to contradict but rather to embrace the nuance and complexity of abortion and to 
mirror that within its own theology.  Likewise, the priests consulted for this study seem to 
attempt the same nuance in their stance regarding the destruction of embryos. 
Theological Guiding Principles 
  Though assisted reproduction has received limited attention within The Episcopal 
Church at large, the priests consulted for this study had a great deal to say about assisted 
reproduction praxes and the theological guiding principles involved in them, many of 
which implicitly or explicitly related to the nature of healthy relationships.  To that end, 
the inherently relational nature of human beings will be the first theological guiding 
principle discussed.  Immediately following, I will discuss the themes of the Trinity and 
mutual joy, specifically as they relate to the sacrament of marriage.  The final theological 
guiding principle to be discussed in this section is that of calling, specifically the 
vocational calling to parenthood and to being a third party participant. 
“We’re Created for Relationship”76 
 
The importance of God-human and inter-human relationships was a guiding 
theological principle for clergy as they considered both assisted reproduction specifically 
and their identity as Episcopalians more broadly.  According to one priest: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, Minneapolis, 1976 (New York: 
General Convention, 1977), p. C-3. 
 
76 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
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That’s the whole crux of faith and life lived in faith—it’s all about relationships.  
The whole biblical narrative is pointing us towards better relationships with each 
other and God and a consciousness that we’re not the center of the universe or 
community or family; each person counts in the equation….That’s the whole point 
of faith—to work on your relationships to reconciled, be at peace with each other, 
bring out the God in each person, recognize the divine spark in our neighbor and 
help them call it out.77 
 
Other clergy echoed this priest’s sense that cultivating relationships between God and 
neighbor was foundational to an Episcopalian’s faith life.  One priest stated,  “I’m of the 
school that God is everywhere, and we need the eyes to see, and everything we do is a 
response or rejection of the presence of the Divine in the earth, in each other.”78  
Likewise, another priest said, “Jesus says, when you cut it all out, ‘This is what it’s about.  
It’s about loving God and being completely immersed in God’s presence and out of that, 
having this kind of radical relationship with the people around you in your life.”’79   
 Priests extended this emphasis upon relationality to their definition of marriage.  
As one priest explained, marriage was a kind of “spiritual community,” while a second 
priest stated that the way that spouses relate to each other “preaches the Gospel” and 
functions as the embodiment or “essence of what God has given to us.”80  A third priest 
defined explained the theological significance of the marriage in greater detail, stating 
that relationships are grounded in the search to know and love God, and since humans are 
made in the image of God, what predicates that search is the desire to discover God in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
 
78 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
 
79 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
 
80 Interviews by author, phone interviews, May 30, 2012 and May 16, 2012 respectively. 
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another person (Gen. 1:26).  Hence, for this priest, marriage served as the relationship 
through which God might be most intimately known and discovered: 
It’s the community of the other in which you learn to serve God in the flesh of the 
other person, and so all decisions become rooted in what is that loving community 
that goes out from itself and goes into the other….My theology would come from 
the image of what marriage is as community and then you have to make the 
decisions within that community that are best for it and the world it is there to 
serve.81 
 
As this priest explained, a healthy relationship with one’s neighbor has an inherently 
outward-looking or, invoking Martin Buber, other-directed focus.  For him, there was a 
sense that what was learned inside of marriage about relationships was ultimately in the 
service of relationships outside of marriage, in the wider community.  Put differently, for 
this priest, the marriage relationship became a locus for practicing healthy relationships 
with one person, so that what was learned in the context of the marriage about 
relationships could ultimately be extended to all of one’s neighbors. 
A fourth priest shared this theology of relationship, and expanded upon how this 
outward-looking dimension related to parenthood.  As she understood it, couples 
practiced relating most intimately within marriage, and, only later, extended that 
relationship outward to their relationship with children.  In her own words: 
I believe that as human beings we’re created for relationship, and that marriage is 
one way of living fully into that in a particular way, by which two people 
accompany each other through life and are there as companions and support and to 
help each other flourish and become the people they’re meant to be and for the 
purpose of love.  We were created for love, and the primary purpose of marriage is 
not so that children may be born…but that it is a holy and desired outcome for some 
and maybe many married people.  Accompanying childbearing is the responsibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
74	  
of the parents to raise them to know God and to love God and neighbor.82 
 
For this priest, then, the context of family relationships becomes understood through the 
larger context of the human vocation: Because God created humans in order that they 
might develop relationships, one way that an individual may choose to manifest that 
calling through the parent-child relationship.  In other words, this priest echoes the 
sentiments of the three quoted previously in this section, each of who defined humans as 
essentially relational creatures.  Together, these four priests also emphasize that healthy 
relationships practiced in marriage may ultimately be extended and practiced within the 
wider community—including the community of any children they may choose to include 
in their family—at least in part because of the outward-focus of healthy relationships and 
the relational orientation of the human vocation. 
To that end, assisted reproduction becomes part of a wider conversation about the 
human calling to engage in relationships as well as the wider conversation about what it 
means to love one’s neighbor.  As one priest said, “Reproduction is not just a private 
matter; it never is.  It’s always about the community.”83  Another priest, reflecting on 
assisted reproduction specifically, said,  
It seems like the greatest benefits [of assisted reproduction] are that it brings us 
into the equation in a very active and involved way, and by us I mean the people 
involved in the relationship, their community, and the medical community, all of 
those people become participants in the process and to me that’s a great gift.  It’s 
not separating this [reproduction] from the other parts of our lives and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
83 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
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community.84 
 
Other priests, like this one, felt that one of the benefits of assisted reproduction was that it 
fostered a greater awareness of relationships and one’s dependence upon the wider 
community than reproduction through intercourse would.  Because those who use 
assisted reproduction must rely upon others—including medical professionals, donors, 
and surrogates—it fosters a greater awareness about the way that creating new life is 
never accomplished in isolation.  As one priest said, “To me the assisted—the word 
assisted just means that it’s calling the human community into collaboration with God in 
creation as participants.”85 
 To that end, priests felt that assisted reproduction could be a locus for practicing 
healthy relationships and learning about them in a unique way.  One priest felt that 
assisted reproduction could strengthen participants’ relationship to God: 
By considering the heavy weight of responsibility for entering into this relatively 
new area, it [assisted reproduction] can be done with a strong and grounded faith 
that through this process… can deepen our relationship with God as opposed to, 
“We don’t need God anymore.”86 
 
Another priest, however, felt that the complicated dynamics that exist between 
participants in assisted reproduction could make it difficult to engage in healthy 
relationships: Failure of fertility treatments could leave individuals struggling in their 
relationship to God.  The fertility of one partner and the infertility of the other could lead 
to an unequal power dynamic between them.  Likewise, the presence of a donor could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
 
85 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
 
86 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
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implicitly challenge the parenthood of the spouse who was not genetically related to the 
child and lead to an unhealthy relationship between the parents and the children, while a 
lack of acceptance of assisted reproduction could create strife between the family and the 
wider community.87 
 That said, many priests felt that assisted reproduction could lead people to engage 
in life-giving relationship practices, specifically through self-offering or self-giving 
behaviors.  One priest explained that when donors or surrogates were motivated by 
altruism or benevolence to participate in assisted reproduction, then such actions modeled 
an other-directed gifting that resonated with an Episcopal understanding of the kinds of 
relationships that one should engage in with God and neighbor.  Creating an analogy to 
blood donation, this priest said: 
I think about blood transfusions, which aren’t really biblical, but I have the 
capacity to give of something as intimate as my own body to permit another person 
to grow more fully into his or her life, and we’re called—the call to mission, the 
call to go out and meet another, to feed or clothe or minister to another, to share 
what you have so another person will survive another day.  This isn’t life or death 
for a person involved and yet, when you think about God’s will for a person to 
thrive from a love relationship, you could make an argument for giving without 
expectation of reward or personal benefit.  There’s something about the trust and 
faith in that kind of sacrifice for the potential new life, and also a sense of, a sense 
that this child will be raised to know and love God that, and that’s a risk worth 
taking.88 
Theological Guiding Principles Related to the Marriage Relationship 
While Episcopal clergy understood that not all who engage in assisted 
reproduction are married, the marriage liturgy—specifically the Exhortation, which refers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
 
88 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
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to marriage for the purpose of the “mutual joy” of the couple—and the Trinitarian 
characteristics of marriage became important loci through which to situate an overarching 
philosophy of relationship for assisted reproduction in part because many within The 
Episcopal Church see marriage as a primary environment to practice healthy relationships 
before extending them to other contexts.  As one priest said, marriage “is where you learn 
to do other relationships.”89 
However, before elucidating further on these theological guiding principles, it is 
important to provide some context for The Episcopal Church’s view of marriage and its 
general view of the relationship between marriage and parenthood.  The 2003 
consecration of Gene Robinson as bishop of New Hampshire inaugurated a global 
discussion among members of the Anglican Communion not only about the ordination of 
homosexuals but also about their ability to participate in other parts of the Church’s life, 
including whether it was possible to have their unions blessed.  In 2003—the same year 
that General Convention voted in favor of Gene Robinson’s consecration—deputees 
passed Resolution C051, which acknowledged the diversity of opinion within The 
Episcopal Church about how to handle same-sex blessings and left the decisions up to 
local dioceses about how to proceed.90  Following that resolution and Gene Robinson’s 
consecration, the Archbishop of Canterbury convened a commission to study the choices 
made by the 2003 General Convention.  That body, known as Lambeth Commission of 
the Episcopal Communion, communicated its findings in a text known as the Windsor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
 
90 General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, Minneapolis, 
2003 (New York: General Convention, 2004), p. 615f. 
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Report, which recommended a moratorium on both the blessing of same-sex unions and 
bishop consecrations and encouraged all those who participated in Gene Robinson’s 
consecration, “to consider in all conscience whether they should withdraw themselves 
from representative functions in the Anglican Communion.”91 
 However, because neither the Archbishop of Canterbury nor the Lambeth 
Commission of the Episcopal Communion hold legal authority over members of The 
Episcopal Church, the Windsor Report’s recommendations did not require any action on 
the part of Episcopalians, though in 2005, the bishops of The Episcopal Church—
collectively known as the House of Bishops—did agree to suspend any further 
consecrations of homosexual bishops until the 2006 General Convention convened and 
also agreed to refrain from recognizing same-sex blessings until that time as well.  The 
2009 General Convention then passed Resolution C056, which allowed same-sex 
blessings and authorized the development of a marriage rite for such blessings.92  
Deputees approved that rite at the 2012 General Convention in Resolution A049. 
 While that rite is now authorized for use throughout The Episcopal Church, it is 
important to note that it is not currently included in any publication of the 1979 Book of 
Common Prayer—which has not been revised since its publication—but rather is viewed 
as a supplementary liturgical text, like Enriching Our Worship.  Of particular relevance 
here, however, is that the rite acknowledges the possibility of children within a same-sex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Lambeth Commission of the Episcopal Communion, “The Windsor Report 2004,” Anglican 
Communion, March 12, 2014, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.anglicancommunion.org/windsor2004/. 92	  General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church, Anaheim, 
2009 (New York: General Convention, 2009), p. 780. 
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relationship and contains similar language to the marriage liturgy in the 1979 Prayer 
Book Exhortation concerning the importance of mutual joy—termed “mutual fidelity” in 
that service—to the health of the married couple.93  That said, a number of the Episcopal 
clergy consulted for this study were interviewed prior to the 2012 General Convention, 
meaning that they would have been aware that same-sex blessings were authorized on a 
diocesan basis—and may have even conducted such blessings themselves—but they 
likely did not make use of the new liturgy, which would not have been authorized at the 
time.  To that end, given The Episcopal Church’s authorization of same-sex blessings, it 
is appropriate to conclude that the comments about the Trinitarian characteristics of 
marriage and the purpose of marriage for “mutual joy” elucidated below are applicable to 
same-sex couples.  However, it is also important to note that there still exists a division 
about the status of same-sex unions, and it would therefore be remiss to say that all 
Episcopal clergy agree that such unions are permissible or that they would bless them.  
That said, a majority do support same-sex unions and support the incorporation of 
children that may become part of a same-sex couple’s family as a result. 
 A related question therefore becomes whether the findings below about third 
party reproduction are applicable to single individuals who choose to utilize assisted 
reproduction outside of the marriage relationship.  The Episcopal Church has never 
issued a resolution concerning single parenthood, and there are indications that the 
Church does not perceive marriage—heterosexual or otherwise—as the privileged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Standing Committee on Liturgy and Music, I Will Bless You and You Will Be a Blessing: 
Resources for the Witnessing and Blessing of a Lifelong Covenant in a Same-Sex Relationship (New York: 
Church Publishing Incorporated, 2013), 5. 
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environment in which to raise a child.  Most notably, in the service for the Thanksgiving 
for the Birth or Adoption of a Child, the Celebrant is to ask this question: “N. [and N.], do 
you take this child for your own?”  The response is: “Parent(s): I do.”94  Her the “N. [and 
N.] refer to the names of the parent or parents, with the brackets indicating an optional 
phrase, thereby meaning that the presence of a second parent is optional.  Likewise, the 
parenthetical “s” around the parental response similarly indicates that the presence of a 
second parent is optional.  The quotations from this liturgy might therefore be said to 
support the claim that The Episcopal Church perceives single parenthood to be of equal 
value to parenthood occurring within the confines of marriage. 
 That said, it is intriguing to note that marriage is assumed in the Church’s 
resolutions about assisted reproduction.  Both the 1982 and 1991 General Conventions 
issued resolutions about assisted reproduction that explicitly refer to marriage as the 
environment in which these procedures should take place, with the 1982 resolution 
stating that, “The Episcopal Church gives approval to usage of so-called ‘in vitro’ 
fertilization for the purpose of providing children in marriage” and the 1991 resolution 
stating that, “Married couples who are members of this Church, and who are considering 
the use of external fertilization and embryo transfer seek the advice of a qualified 
professional counselor and the pastoral counsel and care of this church and consider 
adoption as one of the options open to them.”95  However, these resolutions were also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Oxford University Press, 1979 Book of Common Prayer Readers Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2008), 440. 
 
95 Emphasis provided by author.  General Convention, Journal of the General Convention of The 
Episcopal Church, New Orleans, 1982 (New York: General Convention, 1983), p. C-158.	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crafted in a time when assisted reproduction was less common than it is today and the use 
of assisted reproduction among single individuals less common still, thereby making the 
assumption of marriage more understandable. 
 However, even accepting that justification, the Book of Common Prayer’s  
 
Exhortation to marriage itself assumes that the marriage relationship will be the locus for  
 
the birth of children.  As it states,  
 
The union of husband and wife in heart, body, and mind is intended by God for 
their mutual joy; for the help and comfort given one another in prosperity and 
adversity; and, when it is God's will, for the procreation of children and their 
nurture in the knowledge and love of the Lord.96  
 
It is these lines that will become the focus of one of the following two sections, as parsing 
their significance to the priests will be of assistance in explaining how they understand 
familial relationships in general.  But that said, it is important not to see these lines as a 
definitive signal that the denomination does not support single parenthood. Rather, what 
might best be said of them is that they argue that marriage may be for the purpose of 
procreation, but procreation is not necessarily for the purpose of marriage.  In support of 
such an argument, it is again appropriate to refer to the prayer book service entitled, 
“Thanksgiving for the Birth or Adoption of a Child,” where the Exhortation reads, “Dear 
Friends: The birth of a child is a joyous and solemn occasion in the life of a family.  It is 
also an occasion for rejoicing in Christian community.”97  In other words, the birth of 
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children is always an occasion to celebrate and give thanks to God, whatever the context 
of their birth.   
The reader would therefore do well to interpret the following section about the 
Trinity and mutual joy as providing context for how the priests viewed one relational 
microcosm—known as marriage—that provides an important locus through which to 
practice what it means to be in relationship generally.  Understanding how these priests 
processed the significance of the marriage relationship will then provide context for 
facilitating a broader conversation about other kinds of relationships.  It should not, 
however, be read with the assumption that heterosexual marriage is the only form of 
marriage endorsed by clergy or that clergy do not endorse single parenthood. 
Marriage as the Ultimate Trinitarian Relationship 
When asked to comment further on what the embodiment of healthy or life-giving 
relationality looked like, several priests began by exploring the way that the marriage 
relationship inherently mirrors the relationship between persons of the Trinity.  In 
marriage, these priests said that two individuals become one—as stated in Genesis 2:24 
and Mark 10:6-9, one of the suggested readings for the marriage liturgy—and yet, they 
maintain their individuality as well.  Therefore, like the persons of the Trinity, each 
member of a wedded couple maintains their unique personhood while also becoming part 
of a larger whole.  Indeed, one priest went so far as to say that marriage is, “the ultimate 
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image of the Trinity” that “we incarnate among us….The relationship between two 
people is a living out of the inner life of the Trinity.”98 
This priest went on to explain that marriage mirrored the Trinity not only because 
of the kind of relationship that existed between members of the couple but also because 
of the role that God played in the relationship.  As this priest explained it, God was 
always present in marriage, thereby constituting the third person who embraced or 
enveloped the couple, and rendering marriage a Trinity of three beings between whom 
there was a mutual indwelling or perichoretic dynamic.  The priest then went on to say 
that this mutual indwelling was not meant to be limited to the marriage relationship but 
rather, individuals who practiced this relationship in marriage could then mirror that way 
of relating to others in the wider community.  According to him, marriage, 
is where you learn to do other relationships—an intimate relationship is about 
seeing, touching, holding and serving God in the flesh in the other person as long as 
both people are doing it.  There’s a chance to really learn—that’s what’s meant by 
the incarnation of God; it’s what happens.  That which you learn in the most 
intimate relationships is what you do with everybody you can insofar as you can.  
Jesus did [this] with everybody, and it got him crucified so the lesson is that if 
you’re not ready for that, then judge how intimate you can be with each relationship 
and find the appropriateness of it but always push for that and move towards that, 
because right relationship understands the other as the presence of God.99 
 
Marriage for “Mutual Joy” 
  
When asked to comment on the 1979 Book of Common Prayer’s marriage service, 
many of the priests noted how a theological shift occurred with this iteration of the rite, a 
shift they perceived as present in the following lines from the prayer book: “The union of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
 
99 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
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husband and wife in heart, body, and mind is intended by God for their mutual joy; for 
the help and comfort given one another in prosperity and adversity; and, when it is God’s 
will, for the procreation of children and their nurture in the knowledge and love of the 
Lord.”100 
 The priests noted that these lines from the prayer book delineate three purposes of 
marriage, which, in order, are: 1. That God intends marriage for the “mutual joy” of those 
committed to it; 2. That the marriage relationship provides comfort and support 
throughout life; 3. That marriage allows for procreation when it is “God’s will.”  They 
also noted that this ordering differs from previous iterations, and therefore points towards 
a theology of marriage distinct from that espoused by the 1549, 1552, 1559 and 1662 
prayer books, which state in the Exhortation to the rite that the primary purpose of 
marriage is for the procreation of children.  As those marriage liturgies state: 
First, it [marriage] was ordained for the procreation of children, to be brought up 
in the fear and nurture of the Lord, and to the praise of his holy Name. 
Secondly, it was ordained for a remedy against sin, and to avoid fornication, that 
such persons as have not the gift of continency might marry, and keep themselves 
undefiled members of Christs body. 
Thirdly, It was ordained for the mutual society, help and comfort, that the one 
ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.101 
 
While the 1662 Book of Common Prayer—including the Solemnization of Marriage 
liturgy of which these words are a part—continues to be the official prayer book of the 
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101 The Book of Common Prayer: the Texts of 1549, 1559, and 1662, Brian Cummings, ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 435.  Note: This quotation comes from the 1662 Book of 
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Church of England, it is no longer used in the United States.  Following the 
Revolutionary War, the American branch of the Church became the first autonomous 
province in the Anglican Communion, and Church leaders revised the 1662 Book of 
Common Prayer, motivated by clauses requiring clergy to proclaim allegiance to the 
king, which were, post-independence, considered treasonous.  The resulting 1789 Book of 
Common Prayer was the first to remove the three purposes of marriage entirely.  Future 
revisions maintained this removal until the institution of the 1979 Book of Common 
Prayer, which reinstated the purposes of marriage, but with three substantial changes 
from the original intentions that indicated a shift in the denomination’s theology: 1. It 
removed language of sin and fornication; 2. It moved material concerning procreation 
from the top of the list to the bottom and added the clause, “when it is God’s will;” 3. It 
placed the “mutual joy” of the couple as the foremost purpose of marriage, thereby 
shifting emphasis away from the birth of children and towards the happiness of the 
wedded pair.102 
 Many of the priests interviewed for this dissertation felt that the restoration and 
rephrasing of the purposes of marriage indicated a shift in The Episcopal Church’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See also Hatchett, 429-30.  Hatchett writes that revisions made to the 1789 prayer book also 
omit the Eucharist from the rite and creates “an abridged rite which represented the old civil espousal, cut 
short before the sacramental reinforcement of the civil action.”  He also states that the 1979 Book of 
Common Prayer restores the three intentions for which marriage was ordained following a canon passed at 
General Convention in 1949 (Title 1, Canon 17, Section 3), which required couples to sign a declaration 
that included the three clauses.  This canon reorders the clauses from the early prayer books, so that the 
declaration states: “We believe it [marriage] is for the purpose of mutual fellowship, encouragement, and 
understanding, for the procreation (if it may be) of children, and their physical and spiritual nurture, for the 
safeguarding and benefit of society.”  This declaration became the basis for the current Exhortation in the 
1979 Book of Common Prayer.  Finally, Hatchett notes that while the change in order of the intentions 
occurred in 1949, objections to the primacy of procreation in earlier Exhortations began as early as 1551, 
with the publication of Martin Bucer’s treatise, Censura.  See pages 429-433. 
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theology of marriage, signifying that marriage was defined first by a commitment to 
cultivate the inner life of the couple and only later the couple’s relationship to the wider 
community, including their relationship to children who presumably had not yet been 
conceived.  This theology upended that of previous prayer books by explicitly 
encouraging the couple to invest in and care for themselves rather than defining their 
relationship through individuals who were not yet born.  As one priest summarized, “This 
is a broad definition that starts with the couple first and the children only at the end.”103  
The clergy also felt that these lines reflected a theology of marriage that was more 
inclusive than previous iterations of the prayer book which, while not a doctrinal source 
for Episcopalians, is about as close to such a thing as members have.  Specifically, they 
felt that it validated the relationships of older couples, couples that could not conceive, 
and those who chose to remain childless.104  In the words of one clergy person: 
The interesting thing historically [is that] in the older marriage services, the 
intention…was only for the procreation of children, and marriage was only defined 
as that.  It was the wisdom of the new prayer book to remind us that the business of 
mutual joy and support in prosperity and adversity is central.  The old book used to 
say, ‘a remedy for sin,’ which meant that if you’re going to do the dirty deed, at 
least do it for the procreation of children.  So clearly The Episcopal Church is 
broadening the definition of marriage to be a partnership between two people 
which, if it is God’s will—it is not exclusively for nor are you guaranteed that you 
are able to have children in that, nor would everybody want to.  If two 65 year olds 
marry, it would be kind of absurd, on the surface of it, without some kind of radical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 4, 2012. 
 
104 One clergy person interviewed for this dissertation felt the sentence created flexibility for 
validating same-sex unions.  As this priest stated, “This definition is very helpful when we look at same-sex 
marriages, because it affirms the reasons why couples may be together who may not want or cannot have 
children.”  Phone interview on June 4, 2012.  
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intervention, to think that will lead to procreation.105 
 
While clergy who commented on this theological shift unanimously affirmed the 
emphasis placed upon the “mutual joy” of the couple, they diverged in their interpretation 
of the wording of the third purpose for marriage delineated by the 1979 Book of Common 
Prayer, that marriage exists, “when it is God’s will, for the procreation of children and 
their nurture in the knowledge and love of the Lord.”106   
Specifically, some clergy voiced concerns about the words “God’s will.”  These 
priests felt that the words implicitly pressured couples to have children.  As one priest 
said, “What I hear when I read that is pressure to [have children] even though it says if, 
‘It is God’s will.’  There’s an expectation that that’s a normal part of a marriage.  That 
it’s in there and not bracketed or optional feels like pressure to me, feels like pressure to 
have children, whether or not it’s God’s will.”107  This priest was not alone in wishing to 
bracket the phrase “when it is God’s will,” a move that would signal the words were 
optional within the liturgy and could be omitted depending upon the pastoral needs of the 
couple and their community.  Several other priests stated that though the words weren’t 
bracketed, they had omitted them when it seemed pastorally appropriate, as in cases of 
older couples, couples who wanted to remain childless, or couples who could not have 
children. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
 
106 1979 Book of Common Prayer Readers Edition, 423. 
 
107 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 6, 2012. 
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Several priests also voiced particular dissatisfaction with the phrase in regard to 
this latter group who had fertility problems.  A prominent feature of their concern was the 
idea that the words “God’s will” signaled a kind of infertility determinism, or, put 
differently, they signaled that when infertility and reproductive loss did occur, that these 
were willed by God, much as God willed Job’s suffering.  The priests who voiced 
discontent with this phrase felt strongly that God did not will infertility or reproductive 
loss, and therefore, these words could potentially misinform couples who might interpret 
them in this way.  As one priest explained it: 
I’ve grown to interpret it [the phrase “God’s will”] more negatively than it 
probably was intended.  It’s not sensitive to people who can’t have children, and 
then they can chalk it up as God’s will.  I find it offensive, and I would prefer not 
to say it when I do weddings.  I would strike the phrase, “When it is God’s will.”  I 
would just say, “Marriage is also for the procreation of children.”  I don’t have that 
kind of theology that God gives and takes away.  Of course, God gives and takes 
away everything or nothing, but when we say it like that, it can be very damaging 
or painful for couples who find they can’t conceive, and given the technology 
available, you know, it can be possible in many different ways.108 
 
Building on this concern, another priest felt that this phrase signaled God was casting 
judgment upon couples by denying them children.  In this way, the phrase implied that 
the inability to carry a child to term was deserved, perhaps a punishment for previous sins 
or judgment cast upon the health of the couple.  This priest felt that this kind of theology 
was both unrealistic as well as pastorally insensitive.  As the priest explained it, “I hear 
the prayer book saying it must not be God’s will for you, and that’s deeply disturbing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
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disheartening to me, that God would choose, and I just don’t believe God makes it 
happen that way, that God chooses.  I wish it were in brackets or not there at all.”109 
In contrast, several priests affirmed the phrase “when it is God’s will.”  These 
clergy felt the phrase acknowledged God’s involvement in the life of the couple generally 
and in regards to procreation specifically.  Speaking of marriage broadly, several priests 
explained that the love of the marriage relationship mirrors the love God offers to people: 
It is intimate, joyful, and adoring.  To that end, the phrase, “when it is God’s will” 
implicitly affirms God’s presence in all aspects of the relationship, including procreation, 
and encourages the couple to mirror the love of God for them in their love towards one 
another. This love, in turn, becomes the model for the kind of love offered to another in 
parenthood.  As one priest put it: 
The gifts of love that God bestows upon us and the calling of two people into a 
committed relationship is about the nitty gritty and about having found someone 
that takes the same delight in you or a measure of delight in you that our Creator 
takes in us, that we are God’s beloved and that the liturgy celebrates that we found 
some echo or reflection of that in another person.  We are made in God’s image.  In 
that, there’s a sense in which the procreation of children is again another echo, 
another iteration or reflection of that same great love and delight and joy.110 
 
While this priest felt that the phrase “God’s will” signified a theology of marriage 
that highlighted an anthropology rooted in Genesis 1:26—as imagines Dei (images of 
God), humans could practice caring for another as beloved within the marriage 
relationship—other priests found theological value in the phrase not only for marriage 
generally, but for infertility and reproductive loss specifically.  These priests felt that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 6, 2012. 
 
110 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 25, 2012. 
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phrase could provide comfort in cases of infertility or reproductive loss: Reversing the 
value placed upon the infertility determinism described above, this group of priests 
suggested that the phrase highlighted the value of “the ultimate providence of God,” 
within the life of the couple.111  To that end, that infertility or reproductive loss were the 
will of God could offer meaning and purpose to the couple’s suffering instead of leaving 
them with the unanswered question of why this particular suffering occurred.  It is also 
interesting to note that these priests voiced no opposition to assisted reproduction, seeing 
that its use could likewise be God’s will for the couple.  Indeed, several saw the existence 
of technology to assist infertile couples as one way to manifest God’s will, arguing that 
God was present in medical technology as much as in the process of natural 
conception.112  Hence, the phrase “God’s will” provided a framework not only for 
understanding why infertility and reproductive loss occurred but also how to move 
forward in its aftermath. 
Finally, priests who affirmed this phrase felt that it provided the basis for a less 
rigid definition of marriage—such as the one traditionally espoused by Anglicanism—
where procreation was the first order of the marriage relationship.  As one priest said, 
including the phrase “when it is God’s will:” 
Takes the church beyond the older concept that you get married and have babies, 
and by putting the context of whether you have children within the context of God’s 
will—that’s flexible because God works through people.  This allows a couple who 
chooses not to have children to say we didn’t feel called to do it.113 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
112 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
113 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 4, 2012. 
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It is intriguing to note here that the terms “God’s will” and “called” are not strictly 
synonymous, though the priest quotes them in relation to one another.  What God wills 
for an individual may be experienced through a felt sense of calling or it may not.  In 
contrast, a calling or vocation is generally assumed to be part of God’s will, though this 
relies upon an assumption that experience is a reliable source of revelation and on the 
subjective observation of individuals and their community to hear, interpret, and validate 
the call.  By incorporating the language of “God’s will,” therefore, one might say that the 
possibility of parenthood as a calling emerges, though it does not necessarily imply that 
God’s will for parenthood will necessarily be experienced that way.  That language of 
call, however, did explicitly become prominent during conversations with clergy, as the 
section below will explain. 
The Calling of Parents and Third Parties 
 The language of “calling” that the priest above used was a common theme that 
emerged among the interviewees.  A majority of the priests interviewed for this study 
applied the language of a calling—historically reserved to describe the vocation of clergy 
exclusively—to parenthood.  One priest described how parenthood could provide for 
adults the “fulfillment of their lives as faithful people and children of God,” while others 
described parenthood as a “holy call” or “vocation.”114  In this way, many of the priests 
who participated understood parenthood not as an assumed part of an adult’s identity but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Interviews by author, phone interviews, May 25, 2012, July 5, 2012, June 13, 2012, and June 4, 
2012 respectively. 
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rather as one of many possibilities to which God called them.  As one priest, who chose 
not to have children, explained: 
PRIEST: Human reproduction is a gift of God.  I do not think of it as an 
imperative…. 
 
DT: Why don’t you see this as an imperative? 
 
PRIEST: I myself have chosen not to have children, but I feel that having children 
is a choice that parents should be able to make and for which they should receive 
the full support of society and the Church.  I do not believe it is a sin to choose not 
to have them; I don’t believe it is inferior to other forms of creativity.  I mean 
obviously all over Scripture it says children are a blessing, but I also know an awful 
lot of people who are not good at parenting them or who don’t want more [children] 
or who have enough or who don’t feel called to it.115 
 
According to this priest, creativity was an essential part of the theological anthropological 
enterprise, such that each person might be said to fundamentally be called to creative 
undertakings.  Raising children could therefore be one manifestation of that creativity, 
but it was not the exclusive manifestation of it. As a result, then, becoming a parent 
should not be an assumed part of human identity but rather one of many callings that an 
adult might discern for his or her life.   
Other priests also expressed a similar belief that parenthood was a calling and 
described the form that calling could take as well as how robust it could be.  One of the 
most poignant expressions of how compelling this call to parenthood could be came from 
a female priest who was a mother herself.  Though she had not experienced infertility, 
this priest described the calling she felt towards parenthood and how she saw this calling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
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manifest itself in women who struggled with infertility and reproductive loss, both in the 
Bible and in contemporary culture.  In her own words: 
Even though it’s not easy to explain, the biological component of just hungering to 
bear a child is real, and as a woman who experienced it myself, there’s a lot in the 
Bible that expresses women’s own voices about that hunger and that need that goes 
beyond social status or fulfilling a societal expectation for your reason for being.  
There’s something integral to my identity as a woman that is connected to also 
being a mother, and not just the emotional bond but something cellular, physical, 
and it’s not true for everyone, but it can take over your life if it is true, and it can 
become a source of dying in an otherwise healthy, fruitful life and distance you 
from other people and God, and you see that in other women—when a woman’s 
womb is closed or she can’t conceive.116 
 
This particular priest was one of many who felt that infertility and reproductive loss were 
not signs against the calling to parenthood.  Indeed, all of the priests consulted for this 
study felt there was nothing inherently wrong with the use of assisted reproduction and 
that it could be a transformative tool that could enable individuals to fulfill their calling to 
parenthood, despite the capabilities of their bodies.  Many also felt that scientific 
advances were not necessarily antithetical to God’s will or hopes, but rather that they 
could be used in the service of helping intended parents fulfill their calling to become the 
people God intended for them to be.117  Summarizing the feelings of other priests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
117 As one priest summarized, “None of these are inherently right or wrong, even sexual practices, 
but the main thing is starting with sex, that this is an intense form of communication between two people 
and depending on what you do, it may become sinful.  Treating one inappropriately what have you.  A lack 
of consideration or care for one another.  But when it comes to this stuff, it’s not like one is supposed to 
feel guilty if one feels, ‘I really don’t want to adopt,’ or ‘I really want to adopt a child that’s of my 
heritage.’  It’s about where you two are and what you can handle going forward and the stressful part is that 
hopefully the two of you can be on the same page on these issues.  It can be quite stressful if someone says 
that they want to adopt from China but my spouse doesn’t want to do this.  In the same way, the stress of 
even just having a couple doing in vitro and to acknowledge the stress for the two of them if she gets shot 
up with all these hormones, and the pressure of going month to month and how much this is costing, what 
kind of a toll it’s taking on them.  It’s a lot.  It’s not like we go in, they take our stuff, they swirl it around in 
a dish and voila, we have a baby nine months later.  It’s quite, quite stressful.“ Interview with an Episcopal 
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consulted for this study, the priest quoted above added that assisted reproduction could 
help provide: 
the fulfillment of their [the couple’s] lives as faithful people and children of 
God….I believe it’s God’s will for some people who are infertile or who are unable 
to conceive naturally or without external help, that it’s God’s will for them to be 
parents, so I would say that I would make an argument for assisted reproduction in 
those cases….There is room to make the case that this is the will of God.118 
 
Along those same lines, a number of clergy explained assisted reproduction using 
“gifting” language.  One priest stated that, “science progress is a gift from God,” from 
whence the imaginative ways humans create life echoes God’s creative generativity in 
Genesis 1.119  Another categorized donors and surrogates as gift-givers, explaining that 
the gift of egg, sperm, and a womb that they offered were not only “supremely generous 
gifts” in and of themselves but that the ability of these men and women to offer their 
reproductive capabilities with no strings attached and oftentimes anonymously was 
perhaps an even greater gift, one that was almost sacrificial because they showed an 
ability to “love enough to let go” of a life they had at least partially created.120 
The Gift of Human Reproduction 
 
Similarly, priests categorized human reproduction generally as a gift and 
considered assisted reproduction as part of that; as one priest quoted earlier in this chapter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
118 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
119 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
 
120 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 13, 2012. 
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stated, ”Human reproduction is a gift of God.”121  Another referred to the prayer book 
liturgy entitled, “Thanksgiving for the Birth or Adoption of a Child,” which states 
explicitly that children are a gift from God, and in light of that, this priest felt that 
assisted reproduction was one of “many gifts we’ve been given” and part of that gift was, 
“the knowledge and skill to help couples.”122  Likewise, a third priest explained that there 
was mystery and uncertainty in assisted reproduction and yet, the outcome of it was still a 
gift, even if an unanticipated one.  Commenting upon the practice of selective 
reduction—when fertility doctors purposefully abort one or more fertilized embryos that 
have been implanted into a woman’s uterus because the intended parents do not want to 
carry all the fertilized embryos to term—this priest felt it was important to interpret that 
experience by foremost remembering that what was offered by assisted reproduction was 
a gift: 
In a situation where a couple is considering an abortion to reduce, I would go back 
to the marriage rite and what is God’s will—you’ve come to this technical place 
and God gave you this gift of more children than you wanted, and guess what?  
You’re not in control even though you think you are.  So how do you respond to 
this gift, even if it’s not the gift you anticipated?123 
 
This priest’s quotation raises an intriguing paradox when thinking about the theological 
interface of gifting, grace, and control.  From an Episcopal perspective at least, one might 
assume that gifting is always an act of grace and always out of human control, given the 
Catechism’s definition of grace as “God’s favor toward us, unearned and undeserved; by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
 
122 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 6, 2012. See 
also 1979 Book of Common Prayer Readers Edition, 440-1, 443.   
 
123 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
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grace God forgives our sins, enlightens our minds, stirs our hearts, and strengthens our 
wills.”124  To offer something that is “unearned and undeserved” certainly seems to 
qualify as a gift, thereby making God’s grace an act of divine gifting.  Likewise, to give 
something “unearned and undeserved” seems to be an offer made due in no part to the 
control exerted by the receiver.   
Yet what if the gift given is not the one that the individual desired?  In such a 
situation, a gift would run contrary to the desires and agency–and thereby control—of the 
receiver.  The phenomenon that the priest describes above exemplifies that sometimes a 
gift is not wanted, or, put into the language of the Catechism, sometimes a gift is not 
perceived to enlighten one’s mine or stir one’s heart.  In such a situation, then, how is one 
to reason theologically about the value of such gifts or in this case, the value of such a 
technology?   
 Though this priest described this paradox through reference to selective abortion, 
the theological crux of the issue may be said to be one that permeates the world of third 
party reproduction.  Technology that allows for third party procedures may be perceived 
to be a gift offered to humans for the purpose of starting families; however, it may also be 
an undesirable one for parents who would have preferred to start families without 
intervention or the involvement of a donor or surrogate.  What does that mean, then, 
when we speak of the ultimate value of third party reproduction?  Likewise, a healthy 
adult may have the ability to function as a donor or surrogate to someone in need, but just 
because they can participate in that role, does that require them to?  After all, a 
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requirement to give one’s body seems tantamount to slavery, and indeed, the offering of 
one’s body in the service of reproduction has led some experts to voice opposition to 
donation and surrogacy entirely.  And yet, if a donor or surrogate genuinely desires to 
participate in such a procedure—as the priests suggest they might—then it may not be 
appropriate to frame or evaluate their participation in the same way as if they were 
coerced to do so.  
Such questions have implications for doctrine and the practice of human 
relationships in third party assisted reproduction.  Phrased differently, who we are, who 
God is, how God relates to us and how we relate to each other are all at stake.  Because 
the goal of this chapter is not to primarily be interpretive, however, such questions cannot 
be answered here, though they will become the focus of what lies ahead. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to describe the operative theologies of third party assisted 
reproduction held by Episcopal clergy, as well as the sources that narrate that theology.  
In order to accomplish that goal, this chapter first considered how priests understand their 
role in pastoral conversations with those considering assisted reproduction either to 
become parents or to serve as donors or surrogates.  It explored the role of the priest as 
cultivator of individual conscience, and it also became clear—as the priests discussed the 
roles of Scripture and the institutional Church—that they hoped these sources would 
serve the same role.  Second, it considered five concerns expressed by clergy across the 
interviews about assisted reproduction.  These concerns related to the role of adoption, 
population control, playing God, money, and the destruction of embryos.  Finally, it 
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outlined the guiding principles voiced by the priests interviewed for this study, namely 
human relationality, the Trinity, mutual joy, and the vocational calling to parenthood.  
The priests interviewed for this study felt that assisted reproduction touched upon 
theological and practical questions that were at the heart of a life lived in faith.  They also 
felt that they were questions worth asking in order to gain a deeper understanding of who 
God is, who we are intended to become, and how we can relate to the Divine and to our 
neighbor.  As one priest said, “These questions are really foundational kinds of questions.  
That’s what it’s all about.  And Jesus says when you cut it all out, ‘This is what it’s all 
about: It’s about loving God and being completely immersed in God’s presence and out 
of that, having this kind of radical relationship with the people around you in your 
life.’”125 
The relational dynamic that emerged explicitly or implicitly throughout much of 
this chapter will be the focus of later chapters, which will analyze this data using 
Episcopal, womanist, and feminist theologians as conversation partners.  Like the priests 
interviewed for this study, these thinkers place healthy and life-giving relationships as a 
cornerstone of their thinking.  As the priest quoted above said, praxes of third party 
assisted reproduction raise a certain set of questions about relationships, but the answers 
to those questions may yield wisdom that extends far beyond its practices.  As she put it: 
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“To me the word assisted—the word assisted just means that it’s calling the human 
community into collaboration with God in creation.”126 	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CHAPTER THREE 
F.D. MAURICE AND DAVID H. SMITH ON COMMUNITY 
IN THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION 
 
“Salvation is found in true community; damnation in isolation; sin involves the 
pretense of radical independence.”1 —David H. Smith 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I analyzed data from interviews conducted with Episcopal 
priests throughout the United States to present a picture of how these leaders reason about 
third party assisted reproduction.  Specifically, through interviews, I sought to present a 
comprehensive view of how this group understands the theological significance of third 
party assisted reproduction, what narratives, pastoral and theological themes guide clergy 
in their pastoral conversations about third party reproduction, and what further practical 
theological work they felt was necessary to promote healthy relationships throughout the 
procedures.  
This chapter builds upon the work of the prior by considering how third party 
reproduction troubles models of community and relationships from an Episcopal 
theological perspective.  In undertaking this task, I will reflect on the work of historic 
Anglican theologian Frederick Dennison Maurice and contemporary Episcopal ethicist 
David H. Smith. 
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Of pivotal relevance to this chapter will be the strain of Anglican thought known 
as incarnational theology, a framework developed in the nineteenth-century by Frederick 
Dennison Maurice.  Known for emphasizing the salvific value of the entirety of Jesus’ 
life, incarnational theology stresses that revelation of God’s self may occur through lived 
experience, especially in relationships between individuals.  Indeed, in The Kingdom of 
Christ, Maurice particularly privileges family relationships as the primary locus for 
God’s self-revelation as well as the primary set of relationships by which humans may 
discover who God intends for them to be.  That family relationships play such a pivotal 
role for Maurice will become a focus of this chapter. 
Over a hundred years later, contemporary ethicist David H. Smith applied the 
work of Maurice and other Anglican voices in order to develop an ethics of assisted 
reproduction for Anglicans in his book Health and Medicine in the Anglican Tradition.  
While Smith’s work may be said to have strongly incarnational elements, unlike Maurice, 
he does not rely as heavily upon the family as a locus of revelation or the primary site by 
which humans may model healthy relationships.  Rather, Smith concerns himself with 
how third party assisted reproduction troubles loyalty between spouses, creating an 
unequal system where one spouse receives a good—namely a biological relationship with 
the child—that is denied to the other. 
By invoking these two scholars, my goal is to query what is at stake for the family 
community, given the questions about the identity and function of the family that the 
existence of third party assisted reproduction raises.  In light of Maurice’s argument that 
the family is a means through which we come to know and manifest the Church and the 
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Kingdom of God, I am also tangentially interested in the implication for the definition of 
the ecclesial community, given the variations on the biological family model that third 
party reproduction produces.  Turning to the work of David H. Smith, I will discuss 
Smith’s conception of loyalty as the exchange of concrete goods in equal quantities and 
its significance to his overall ethics of assisted reproduction.  
For both of these authors, incarnational theology looms large, framing their view 
of family, marriage, and assisted reproduction.  For both, therefore, relationships become 
a central way to cultivate knowledge of and a relationship with the Divine.  To that end, 
this chapter implicitly highlights the role of incarnational theology to Episcopalians 
overall, emphasizing that God reveals God’s self within relationships, offering deeper 
and more sustained knowledge of not only family relationships but also of the 
relationships God hopes for the wider covenanted community.  
Frederick Denison Maurice and God Revealed in the Community of the Family 
Frederick Denison Maurice was born in 1805 in Suffolk, England, the son of a 
Unitarian minister.  As a child, his family unanimously participated in the Unitarian 
denomination; however, following the death of his sister, Maurice’s mother converted to 
Anglicanism, causing a variety of religious arguments to erupt between his parents.  After 
attending Cambridge, Maurice too began to question his religious commitments and 
decided to follow in his mother’s footsteps and convert.  He later sought ordination, 
enrolled in a classics degree at Oxford, and was ordained in 1834. In addition to a variety 
of pastoral positions, Maurice worked as a professor of theology—as well as English 
literature and history—at King’s College, London. 
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Maurice is known primarily for developing within Anglicanism a strain of 
thought known as incarnational theology, which postulates that Jesus procured salvation 
through not just the cross or resurrection or even a combination of the two but rather 
through the incarnation itself.  Central to this theology is the assumption that through the 
act of taking flesh, God became able to participate in the human experience of 
incarnation—which includes suffering—to model redemption.  Likewise, by taking flesh, 
humans were afforded a unique model to guide them as they seek to live in God’s image. 
At stake in incarnational theology is God’s identity as it relates to the locus and 
function of salvation. For Maurice, Jesus does not procure salvation via a single moment 
but rather participates in a salvific process that begins at his birth and culminates in his 
resurrection.  Fundamental to incarnational theology, therefore, is the assumption that 
while God offers self-revelation through the act of creation generally, it is through the act 
of creating Jesus specifically—who Maurice subscribes to as the unique amalgam of God 
and humanity—that God communicates what it means to live into God’s image and, as 
such, to experience salvation.   
Maurice relies upon inter-human and divine-human relationships to ground 
incarnational theology, for within his theological system he assumes that salvation is 
achieved through one’s relationship to the embodied Jesus and Jesus’ embodied 
experiences.  By proxy, because humans are made in God’s image, incarnational thought 
emphasizes the importance of relationships between humans as a way to know God and 
God’s will for them.  Hence, relationships loom large in Maurice’s writings, where he 
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prominently and repeatedly suggests that it is only through relationships that humans can 
come to know God.  As he writes in The Kingdom of Christ: 
Human relationships are not artificial types of something divine, but are actually 
the means, and the only means, through which man ascends to any knowledge of 
the divine—and that every breach of a human relation, as it implies a violation of 
the higher law, so also is a hindrance and barrier to the perception of that higher 
law—the drawing a veil between the spirit of a man and his God.2 
 
From this quotation, one notes the primacy Maurice affords to relationships as a 
source of revelation: While he holds the Bible, Church tradition, and reason in high 
regard, they are nonetheless subservient to the experience of relationships themselves 
when it comes to learning about or discovering who God is. 
Ergo, for Maurice, relationships come to function as the foundation through 
which to interpret other sources of revelation, including Scripture.  This use of 
relationships as an interpretive framework is particularly prominent in his reading of the 
Ten Commandments.  Here Maurice argues that the Commandments rest upon relational 
permissives or proscriptives: Of the first—that there is only one God who shall not be 
overshadowed by other gods—he writes that it “presumes that the Jews had been brought 
out of Egypt by an unseen Being.  He is their deliverer and Lord; as such they are to 
acknowledge Him.”3  In other words, from Maurice’s perspective, this commandment is 
predicated upon the assumption of a particular kind of divine-human relationship where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Frederick Denison Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ; or Hints Respecting the Principles, 
Constitution, and Ordinances of The Catholic Church (New York: D. Appleton & Co, 1843), Nabu Public 
Domain Reprint, 226. 
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the former functions as deliverer and the latter functions as a thankful receiver of 
deliverance. 
Turning to the second, Maurice elaborates upon the dynamics of the divine-
human relationship, interpreting the prohibition against idols by stating that because 
humans by nature need worship for a ritualized form of relating to God, this need may 
manifest itself in a misplaced relationship with idols that can be created, seen, and held.  
Hence, the second commandment encourages men and women to forego relationships 
with idols and, instead, encourages ritualized “relationship between the worshipers and 
the Invisible Lord.”4  In turn, this commandment also suggests that because of humans’ 
misplaced relational commitment to idols, God established a “government exercised by 
Him from generation to generation” in order to judge the worship of those who cultivated 
a relationship with concrete idols as opposed to one with the Invisible Lord.5 
Maurice continues in this vein, exegeting each commandment to explore its 
relational basis.  Proceeding through the latter half of the commandments, Maurice 
argues that the sixth—thou shalt not murder—“presumes the existence of a community” 
and that this community is defined by a commitment to maintaining relationships by 
respecting the life of each member.6  To be in relationship, then, requires that one not 
eradicate the existence of the other.   Likewise, the seventh—thou shalt not commit 
adultery—assumes the existence of a certain kind of monogamous sexual relationship 	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5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid. 
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termed marriage.  The ninth—the commandment to not bear false witness—assumes that 
relationships between humans may manifest themselves via a justice system before which 
witness, false or otherwise, might be given.7   
Finally, the tenth, in its prohibition against coveting that which belongs to one’s 
neighbor, in some ways summarizes the assumption that undergirds the latter half of the 
commandments.  According to Maurice, all human relations are grounded by a “bond of 
Neighborhood.”8  Though Maurice does not define the specifics of what this bond entails, 
he does make two remarks concerning the bond, the first being that coveting that which 
belongs to one’s neighbor violates it and the second being that this bond grounds the 
other commandments.9 
The way Maurice weaves relationship as the binding precept of the Ten 
Commandments eventually becomes foundational within contemporary documents 
utilized by The Episcopal Church.  Echoing Maurice’s work, the 1979 Book of Common 
Prayer defines healthy relationships with God and neighbor using the Ten 
Commandments and the Great Commandments as a guide.  Hence, according to its 
Catechism, the purpose of the Commandments is, “to define our relationship with God 
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and neighbors.”10  The Catechism then utilizes the first four commandments and the First 
Great Commandment to explain how humans should be in relationship with God, stating: 
Q. What is our duty to God? 
A. Our duty is to believe and trust in God; 
 I   To know and obey God and to bring others to know him; 
 II    To put nothing in the place of God; 
 III   To show God respect in thought, word, and deed; 
 IV And to set aside regular times for worship, prayer, and the study of          
     God’s ways.11 
 
Likewise, it references the remaining commandments—framed by the Second 
Great Commandment—to define the parameters for relationships with one’s neighbor: 
Q. What is our duty to our neighbors? 
A. Our duty to our neighbors is to love them as ourselves, and to do to other  
     people as we wish them to do to us; 
  V To love, honor, and help our parents and family; to honor those in  
   authority, and to meet their just demands; 
  VI To show respect for the life God has given us;  
  VII To use all our bodily desires as God intended; 
  VIII To be honest and fair in our dealings; to seek justice, freedom, and the  
   necessities of life for all people, and to use our talents and possessions  
   as ones who must answer for them to God; 
  IX To speak the truth, and not to mislead others by our silence; 
  X To resist temptations to envy, greed, and jealousy; to rejoice in other  
   people’s gifts and graces; and to do our duty for the love of God, who  
   has called us into fellowship with him.12 
 
In this way, one sees how Maurice’s high regard for relationships as a source of 
revelation continues to influence the Episcopal community today.  Additionally, while 
relationships provide a lens through which Maurice interprets all the commandments, it is 	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his reading of the fifth that is of particular relevance to this project.  It is here that he 
asserts the primacy of family relationships.  It is also here that Maurice argues that the 
command to honor one’s parents is predicated upon the assumption of the existence of 
family relations, especially fatherly relations.  As Maurice writes, “The fifth presumes the 
existence of the Paternal Relation, and treats the respect for it as the condition of abiding 
in the land given to the nation.”13 
Maurice’s interpretation of this commandment harkens back to God’s covenant 
with Abraham, which Maurice perceives as having a familial foundation.  To that end, 
the family relationships that form the basis for God’s promises to Israel become essential 
to how Maurice maps his doctrine of God—God is fundamentally a being who desires 
relationships with humans, and not just with humans as individuals but with humans in 
the community of the family.  In Maurice’s own words: 
This covenant is said to be with a family: with a man doubtless in the first 
instance—but with a man expressly and emphatically as the head of a family.  
The very terms of the covenant, and every promise that it held forth, was 
inseparably associated with the hope of a posterity.14   
 
In other words, God’s covenant with Abraham—and in turn with the nation of 
Israel—was with a family of people, a father, a mother, and children down through the 
generations.  To that end, the essence of how God relates to humans is grounded within 
community: God does not de facto relate to individuals in isolation but rather, God de 
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facto relates to individuals through the community of the family, which, to Maurice’s 
mind, is patriarchally grounded. 
While Maurice’s emphasis upon family relationships has implications for his 
doctrine of God, it likewise becomes essential to his formulation of human anthropology: 
Families are meant to exist as a primary means through which God covenants with and 
remains in community with humanity.  This anthropology extends through Maurice’s 
interpretation of the covenant with the people of Israel as he sees it depicted in the 
Hebrew Bible and into his interpretation of the second covenant developed in the New 
Testament and continued in the Church.  As W. Merlin Davies summarizes: “Maurice 
reiterates this again and again.  The family is the cradle of the Church.  The Church is a 
family.  The Kingdom itself is a family.”15 
Maurice’s Family-Based Theological Anthropology 
In order to understand fully the significance of the family from Maurice’s 
perspective, it is necessary to delve deeper into his anthropology.  Fundamental to that 
anthropology are two conditions, which Maurice terms “circumstance” and 
“relationship.”  Circumstances are non-essential attributes that humans perceive or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 W. Merlin Davies, An Introduction to F. D. Maurice's Theology (London: SPCK, 1964), 147. 
Davies reading highlights the way in which Maurice continually stresses the family as the relational vehicle 
through which humans come to know God.  Davies purports what drives Maurice an interpretation that 
privileges family relationships is at least in part rooted in Maurice’s family’s relationship to religion itself.  
Specifically, the faith-based dissension that characterized his parents’ relationship led Maurice to become 
wary of any act that overemphasized autonomy at the expense of the family; having witnessed arguments 
and discord between his parents because of their differing religious affiliations and loyalties, Maurice 
became wary of “the great dangers of an individual or subjective type of religion” (144).15  As a result, he 
emphasizes repeatedly in The Kingdom of Christ that family relationships moor the Christian project in a 
fundamental way.  As Davies summarizes, for Maurice, “The ground of all is in family 
relationships…Family life is basic to God’s order for humanity and is itself the cradle of the Church” (144). 
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experience, that may pass or change with time and that involve those things that people 
“see, or hear, or handle, or smell.”  Maurice goes on to reference circumstances where, 
“we speak of a man having a bad digestion or a bad hearing,” but we do not say that a 
man is bad digestion or bad hearing.16  Thus, circumstances are external to the essence of 
an individual, or invoking Aristotle, one might loosely correlate Maurice’s terminology 
of “circumstance” with Aristotle’s term “accidents.”  
By contrast, pivotal to Maurice and the contemporary Episcopal Church—which 
continues to be strongly influenced by his theology—is the premise that human 
relationships are “the means, and the only means, through which man ascends to any 
knowledge of the divine.”  In turn, for Maurice, the locus of familial relationships is the 
paradigmatic arena through which to obtain this knowledge.  Moreover, from Maurice’s 
perspective, family relationships are the counterpoint to a person’s circumstances, 
defining what a person essentially is as opposed to what he or she has, desires, or wants.  
For Maurice, then, the essence of each individual human is based within a specific set of 
family relationships, such that it is in turn impossible to be a human without being a 
member of a family.  Consequences are therefore dire, according to Maurice, when 
humans refuse to acknowledge these family relationships.  He writes that,  
The family state is the natural one for man; and accordingly we speak of the 
affections which correspond to this state, as especially natural affections.  But it 
should be remembered that we use another phrase which is apparently 
inconsistent with this; we describe the savage condition, that is to say, the one in 
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which man is striving to be independent, as the natural state of society.17 
 
Hence, relationships are defined by, “What we are; ‘I am a son,’ ‘I am a 
brother.’”18  Relationships do not define what humans have but rather what they 
essentially are, or put into Aristotelian terms, relationships determine the person’s 
substance as opposed to his or her accidental properties.  Hence, if relationships define a 
person’s core, to be unaware of them or to refuse to acknowledge them would be to 
refuse to acknowledge the very basis of identity itself because, for Maurice, it is 
impossible to be a human without being in relationship.  It is therefore not realistic for a 
person to act “as if he were not in a relation in which nevertheless he is, and must 
remain” precisely because, from Maurice’s perspective, no human being exists in 
isolation.19  To deny the reality that one necessarily exists within a network of 
relationships is therefore to deny the essence of what it means to be a human. 
Here one sees Maurice strike a dichotomy between autonomy and familial 
relationships: To acknowledge one’s family bonds is to exist as God intended humans to 
exist, but to deny them is to deny the very essence of what God hopes for humans to be.  
This accords with Maurice’s interpretation of the fifth commandment, where he 
postulates that it is necessary to honor one’s parent because humans are meant to be in 
family relationships, just as God is meant to be a parent to humanity itself.  Such 
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imitation is therefore to be imago Dei, to be imitating God in order to be in God’s image 
and to grow into God’s likeness as delineated by Genesis 1:26.20 
Relationship Denial as Sin 
Following from this constructive anthropology, Maurice utilizes the dichotomy he 
developed between individuality and familial relationships as a starting point for his 
understanding of sin, which he defines as a denial of relationality in order to exercise 
self-will. Referencing the Hebrew Bible to make this argument, Maurice postulates that 
the text’s primary guiding principle is God’s covenant with the Abrahamic family.  To 
that end, one recalls that Maurice writes: 
[The reader] would feel that the call of Abraham, the promise made to him and to 
his seed, and the seal of it which was given him, were most significant parts of 
this record.  But one thought would strike him above all—This covenant is said to 
be with a family: with a man doubtless in the first instance—but with a man 
expressly and emphatically as the head of a family.  The very terms of the 
covenant, and every promise that it held forth, was inseparably associated with the 
hope of a posterity.21   
 
Maurice therefore suggests that preserving the covenant requires preserving a 
familial relationship with God whereas denying it is constitutive of sin.  Again, he refers 
to the Hebrew Bible and the Abrahamic family to explain why sin is best understood as a 
denial of relationship and how Abraham’s progeny models sin for the world: 
According then to the Jewish Scriptures, the Abrahamic family, though cut off by 
their covenant from the other families of the earth, was so cut off expressly that it 
might bear witness for the true order of the world; for that order against which all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid., 426. 
 
21 Ibid., 221. 
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sensible idolatry, and all independent choice or self-will is rebellion.22 
 
As this quotation illustrates, confluent with Maurice’s definition of sin as the 
denial of relationship is sin as the exercise of self-will.  To that extent, the exercise of 
independence—the purposeful separating of oneself from all relationships but especially 
from familial ones—constitutes sin because it denies the very essence of human identity, 
which is to be in familial relationship with God and creation.  Put differently, if human 
relationships are, as Maurice writes, “the means, and the only means” to know God, then 
denying human relationships violates God’s wish for humanity, which is predicated upon 
an intimate rapport between the Divine and creation.23  Likewise, if the family is to be the 
primary mechanism through which relationships are cultivated, then denying those 
relationships becomes particularly damaging. 
To explain what the denial of inter-human relationships looks like in practice, 
Maurice offers the example of how the biblical monarchs related to their subjects.  Here 
Maurice describes “Asiatic”—non-biblical—monarchs who adopted a parental way of 
relating to their subjects.  Maurice perceives this kind of parental relationship as salutary 
and beneficial to both parties.  In contrast, referring to a Deuteronomic interpretation of 
the biblical kingship, Maurice writes that the Hebrew Bible kings had a tendency to 
perceive themselves in not only this salutary parental role but also as the embodiment of 
that which they perceived God to be—an object of adoration and worship that existed as 
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an autonomous being.24  From Maurice’s perspective, the irony is that the kings’ 
perception of God as an autonomous being who exists apart from relationships is 
antithetical to the God in whom Maurice believes, namely, the one who desires 
relationships with humans in their familial communities.  Therefore, the kings model 
what sin as autonomy looks like in practice. 
Moreover, Maurice argues that the kings’ inaccurate doctrine of God impacted 
how they both related to God and to their subjects.  Maurice explains that by fashioning 
themselves as autonomous, the Hebrew Bible kings denied themselves relationships with 
their subjects and denied their subjects’ very humanity, as humans are essentially 
relational creatures.  As a result, the Hebrew kings did not foster the kind of family 
relationships upon which God places such value.  In turn, because subjects were taught to 
see the king as an autonomous being, they did not cultivate relationships with him; this 
became the basis for their own idolatrous practices.  Maurice argues that ultimately this 
combination led to authoritarian and abusive behavior on the part of the monarch: 
The power of the monarch not having any safe ground to rest upon, soon becomes 
reverenced merely as power.  No conscience of a law, which they ought to obey, is 
called forth in the minds of the subjects or the monarch; he may have kindly 
affections towards them, which may be reciprocated, but that is all.  There is 
nothing to preserve the existence and sanctity of the family relationship, upon 
which the sovereign authority is built: nothing to resist the tendency to natural 
worship, which destroys it: nothing to hinder the monarch from believing that he 
reigns by his own right.  Hence, these so-called patriarchal governments, besides 
that they awaken neither the energies of the human intellect nor the perception of 
right and wrong, soon are changed into the direct contraries of that which they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In this way, Maurice strikes a contrast between who he understands God to be—one who is in a 
parental relationship with humanity—and the God that the biblical kings believed in, who is an object to be 
worshiped rather than a being with whom one is in relationship. 
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profess to be.  The father becomes an oppressor of his own people, a conqueror of 
others; all idea of the invisible is swallowed up in a reverence for him.  Ultimately 
he is looked up to as the God of gods and the Lord of lords.25  
 
What Maurice aims to explain by way of this illustration is how family 
relationships function in terms of checks-and-balances against the kind of autonomous 
behavior that is not intended for humanity and that can facilitate idolatry; when 
communities function as families—or strive to function as families—they are less likely 
to adopt autonomous and idolatrous philosophies and behaviors.   
Yet Maurice’s example also implies the irony that even when humans seek to 
disengage from relationships, the idea that they can successfully do so is illusory.  They 
may transform the nature or dimensions of the relationship, but they cannot entirely sever 
it.  Hence, referencing the biblical monarchs Maurice describes above, one observes how 
the monarch’s relationship to his people shifts from a familial one to one where he 
functions as oppressor or conqueror while the subjects revere or despise him.  The 
monarch’s sin of autonomy or overly exercising self-will therefore transfers itself onto 
subjects through their idolatrous response to him.  Sin, in turn, becomes corporate, 
communicated through distorted—rather than salutary—relationships.   
In other words, even by denying a relationship, one still participates in it, just in a 
different way.  What Maurice seems to be saying, therefore, is that just as, “human 
relationships are not artificial types of something divine, but are actually the means, and 
the only means, through which man ascends to any knowledge of the divine,” so also are 
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human relationships the means through which humans descend to knowledge of sin.26  
Phrased differently, if human relationships are the primary means by which humans come 
to know God, then denying a relationship with another being becomes an act of denying 
God’s self.  It therefore becomes possible to say that this act of denial constitutes an act 
of sin, a point that will become pivotal to the later discussion of third party reproductive 
relationships, many of which are currently anonymous. 
Maurice’s incarnational theology and the primacy he affords relationships 
continues to play a substantive role in the contemporary Episcopal Church.  As with the 
Ten Commandments above, The Episcopal Church continues to echo Maurice’s 
interpretation of sin in its contemporary Catechism, which asserts that sin is the distortion 
or misuse of relationships with God and neighbor.  To that end, the Catechism in the 
1979 Book of Common Prayer states that sin is, “the seeking of our own will instead of 
the will of God, thus distorting our relationship with God, with other people, and with all 
creation.”27  Likewise, the Catechism explains the significance of Jesus’ sacrifice on the 
cross in relational terms, stating that it facilitated reconciliation between humans and 
God: 
Q. What is the great importance of Jesus’ suffering and death? 
A. By his obedience, even to suffering and death, Jesus made the offering 
which we could not make; in him we are freed from the power of sin and reconciled 
to God.28 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 226. 
 
27 Oxford University Press, 1979 Book of Common Prayer Readers Edition, 845, 848. 
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In these two quotations, one sees that the contemporary Episcopal Church continues to be 
influenced by the way that Maurice fashions a worldview through the primacy afforded 
to relationships.   
The Ecclesiological Implications of Maurice’s Theology of Relationships 
As Maurice argues, humans, in their essence, are intended to be members of a 
family.  Yet they are tempted from birth to assert their own self-will, their own 
independence, and to practice idolatry as a result.  When they do so, they forsake the 
Church for the world, for as Maurice understands it, one cannot be a member of both 
institutions.29  Indeed, Maurice strikes a dichotomy between those familial relationships 
that allow humans to ascend to knowledge of the divine (the Church) and those that 
eschew such relationships because of the value placed upon self-will and independence 
(the world).  He therefore situates this dichotomy between Church and world within what 
he terms “two possible forms of a universal society, one of which is destructive of the 
family and national principle, the other the expansion of them.”30 
 It is within this dichotomy in the universal society that Maurice’s ecclesiology 
develops.  Exploring the relationship between Church and world, Maurice suggests that 
there is within humans an innate tendency to desire those precepts that guide the world, to 
value self-will and autonomy above the cultivation of familial relations—hence, sin.  
Maurice explains that such tendencies are always threatening to dominate those of the 
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Church, so that, “when they become predominant there ceases to be any recognition of 
men as related to a Being above them, any recognition of them as possessing a common 
humanity.”31  In contrast, the Church functions as a witness to the transformative of 
power of familial relationships, such that it stands against the values of the world rather 
than as a complement to them.  To that end, the family becomes the locus where humans 
practice being Church so that they can then extend those relational praxes to the wider 
ecclesial community.  The family also becomes the locus for practicing relationships that 
may be antithetical to those of the world, such that the difference between Church and 
world is manifest in the relational microcosm known as the family. 
Key to Maurice’s ecclesiology, then, is a belief that the Church is defined by its 
ability to witness to the transformative power of familial relationships because of the way 
that familial relationships are the means by which humans come to know God.  In 
addition, Maurice’s distinction between Church and world makes clear that he sees the 
two as mutually exclusive: The Church is not a subset of the world nor is the world a 
subset of the Church, nor, can it even be said, is there a Venn diagram-style overlap 
between the two.  From Maurice’s perspective, both are guided by different values such 
that to pledge allegiance to one is necessarily to deny allegiance to the other. 
Indeed, Maurice goes so far as to assert that the division between Church and 
world is a division predicated upon what humans are in their essence intended to be and 
what they are tempted to become from birth.  To that end, Maurice is making an 
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essentialist anthropological statement that is intricately tied to his ecclesiology: Humans 
are meant to be members of a family, of the Church, though they may be tempted from 
birth to forsake the Church for the world through the assertion of self-will, independence 
or idolatrous practices.32  In this regard, one observes Maurice again asserting that 
humans are relational creatures, reinforcing the premise that God intends for humans 
particularly to be members of families, for family relationships to be a primary and 
powerful means through which to attain knowledge of the Divine. 
It is perhaps worth noting at this juncture that Maurice does not believe that the 
Church and world need hold conflicting value systems or that these value systems cannot 
be eradicated.  Rather, as long as the institution Maurice terms the world privileges 
idolatry, autonomy and self-will, it will necessarily be in conflict with the Church.  Yet 
Maurice holds out hope that this will not always be the case.  However, he also 
recognizes conversely that it is possible for the reverse to happen.  As he asks: “What, if 
they [the Church] should not maintain the principle of family relationship, or retain a 
collection of the higher principle involved in it?  What, if the world should find its way 
into the Church?”33 
 To answer this question, Maurice returns to the story of Abraham, because he 
argues that the origin of the Church is predicated within Abraham’s family and his 
familial relationship to God.  In his own words, “That there is a God related to men and 
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made known to men through their human relations, this was the faith of Abraham, the 
beginner of the Church on earth.”34  Proceeding through the other biblical patriarchs, 
Maurice queries what might have happened if these individuals forsook familial 
relationships for the values that define the world.  Specifically focusing on Joseph, 
Maurice writes that having been separated from his family, the patriarch could have lived 
the entirety of his life in isolation from his biological family, never revealing himself to 
them during their time in Egypt.  Had Joseph chosen to live this way, Maurice writes, 
“He would have founded a society which was built upon choice, not upon relationship.”35   
However, Maurice writes, this is not what Joseph chose to do; he instead forgave 
his brothers and half-brothers and continued in relationship with them.  Maurice argues 
this occurred because the Abrahamic family was set apart to function as an example of 
God’s hope for humanity; hence, they were intended to embrace family relationships, to 
eschew autonomy, self-will and the practice of idolatry that separates humans from God.  
In turn, the world receives a model from which to adopt the same practices and values.  
As Maurice explains: 
We found this help in the documents which compose our Bible.  These documents 
profess to reveal a constitution, which is declared to be the divine constitution for 
man.  It is revealed first to a particular family, then to a particular nation, then, 
through that family and nation, to mankind.  But this revelation is a history.  The 
acts of this family and this nation, and the acts by which their possession becomes 
an universal one, embody the discovery.  The oppositions which arise without and 
within this family and nation to the principle upon which they are founded, explain 
to us the contradiction between the will of man and the order in which he is placed.  	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They make us conscious of the existence of two societies, one formed in 
accordance with the order of God, the other based on self-will.36 
 
 Finally, as with his interpretation of the Hebrew Bible patriarchs, Maurice turns to 
Christ to argue for him as head of a family, much as his interpretation of the fifth 
commandment presented God in a parental role.  In this way, Maurice fashions the 
Church as a family bound not by birth parents but by Christ as parent.  As he explains:  
If his [Jesus Christ’s] greatest purpose was to bind men together in one family, if 
the office of which He entered when He ascended on high, was that of Head and 
overseer of this family; if all his other acts and services to men are implied and 
presupposed in this, one must conceive the highest office of his servants would be 
to exhibit Him in this character, and so to make it known that his kingdom was a 
real kingdom, and one that ruleth over all.37  
 It was not till He was just leaving them that the commission was given, “Go ye 
into all nations,” and the promise, “Lo I am with you always even unto the end of 
the world.”  And it was not till He had ascended on high that the powers for 
fulfilling this commission were confirmed, that a sign was given for the existence 
of a union which the distinctions of nations and language could not break, that 
they were declared to be the pillars of a universal church.38 
 
Here one observes Maurice using family relationships to motivate or ground his 
ecclesiology, and one notes how family relationships become fundamental for the Church 
God intends for humanity to embrace in order to realize the eschatological Kingdom: To 
nurture family relationships facilitates the manifestation of this Kingdom.  To deny them 
is a rejection of this Kingdom as well as a rejection of the inter-human relationships and 
the God-human relationships upon which its existence is predicated. 
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Maurice, the Family, and Third Party Assisted Reproduction 
Family relationships are foundational for Maurice’s theological worldview: 
personal and communal identity, one’s relationship with God, sin, and ecclesiology all 
hinge upon the awareness and cultivation of familial relationships.  Yet what happens 
when challenges are posed to the traditional family unit of which Maurice assumes the 
existence?   
The involvement of a third party in the procreation process raises a number of 
questions for those participating in such procedures about the identity and dynamics of 
the family.  Indeed, when one considers the realities of third party reproduction in the 
United States, it becomes evident that contemporary practices are not primarily 
concerned with cultivating relationships between intended parents, third parties and 
children, nor are they interested in cultivating the kind of familial relationships upon 
which Maurice places so much importance.  Instead, practices like anonymity and 
secrecy prevent the cultivation of relationships and in fact may be said to perpetuate what 
might be termed, in Maurice’s language, an idolization of the biological family. 
By way of example, a majority of third party procedures—especially those that 
involve donated gametes—remain anonymous in the United States, though most clinics 
offer the option of known procedures.  During anonymous procedures, third parties and 
intended parents never interact, thereby meaning that relationships between them never 
develop.  According to psychologist William D. Petok and ethicists Michelle L. 
McGowan and Leah Wilson, anonymous gamete donation tends to be the norm in the 
United States for a variety of reasons including a desire to maintain secrecy about the 
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child’s genetic origins and an interest in protecting the donor’s privacy.39  Yet, while 
medical professionals in the United States—where a majority of gamete donations remain 
anonymous—generally accept these reasons for anonymous donation, they are less 
commonly accepted in Oceania and Europe, where several countries have implemented 
laws outlawing anonymous donation on the grounds that children deserve access to their 
genetic origins.40 
While one motivation for outlawing anonymous donation is that it prevents children 
from gaining important genetic information, another might be that relationships between 
third parties and intended parents who choose to practice anonymously do not develop 
during the course of the procedures.  This is particularly troublesome if one accepts 
Maurice’s premises about the importance of relationships theologically, for the practice 
of anonymity would thereby become an instance of relationship denial or sin.  Maurice’s 
abstract theological concerns about relationship are further reinforced by contemporary 
data that stresses that cultivating relationships during a third party procedure can be 
beneficial to all involved parties.  Ethnographer Elly Teman, for instance, comments that 
encouraging intended parents and third parties to develop relationships helps all 
participants to feel validated during the procedures and prevents commodification of the 
reproductive process.  However, American clinics currently do not prioritize such 
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relationship cultivation.  As Teman explains specifically in relation to surrogacy, “Many 
U.S. commercial agencies explicitly formulate the contractual agreement in terms of a 
business contract and ‘educate’ their surrogates to view surrogacy as a paid job.”41 
While the contractual arrangement between the third party and intended parents in 
the United States is intended to place boundaries around the kinds of interactions that 
exist between the two parties, thereby lessening the possibility of conflict, another 
consequence of the arrangement may be a decision on the part of the parents not to 
disclose the child’s origins.  Parents may choose to make this choice for a variety of 
reasons, including privacy concerns, fears that the lack of a genetic relationship would 
upset the child, that it would threaten the identity of the parents, that a lack of genetic 
information about a donor would upset the child, that the knowledge would disrupt 
relationships between the parents and the child, or that the information is irrelevant 
because parenthood is a social contract and not a biological one.42  It may also arise 
because of parents’ own cognitions about the third party.  Writing about embryo 
donation—a technology whereby intended parents donate unused embryos from a 
previous procedure, thereby resulting in a child from donated egg and sperm—social 
scientists in the United Kingdom found that parents rarely thought about or talked about 	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University of California Press, 2010), 204.  See also page 198. 
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the donors with their spouse.43  Intriguingly, studies have also found that children 
conceived via these procedures are less likely to be told of their origins than children 
brought into a family via adoption.  However, like the trajectory of adoption—where 
disclosure rates were historically low but have been recently on the rise—it is becoming 
more common for American parents to disclose third party use, though this appears to be 
a more recent choice.44 
While parents may already be inclined not to disclose to their children for a number 
of reasons, non-disclosure may be further reinforced by implicit American medical 
practices, though the American Society for Reproductive Medicine does encourage 
disclosure.  Ethicist Paul Lauritzen, for instance, explains that individual doctors do not 
necessarily encourage parents to tell their children about the use of assisted reproduction 
procedures.  He also cites that only 50% of physicians keep records of which donor has 
contributed genetic material to specific parents, making it difficult to locate that donor at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Fiona MacCallum, “Embryo donation parents’ attitudes towards donors: comparison with 
adoption,” Human Reproduction 24, no. 3 (2009): 517–23. 
 
44 Embryo donation raises additional questions about disclosure rates, as intended parents who utilize 
donated embryos may find themselves raising children with no biological connection to them, thereby 
making the biological relationship with these children akin to adoption.  To date, minimal studies with 
Americans have been conducted on disclosure rates; however, lawyer and ethicist Lindsay Childress-Beatty 
cites British research which found that, “only one-third of the embryo-donation couples had told, or were 
planning to tell, the child about his or her origins, in contrast to 100% of the adoption couples and 93% of 
the IVF couples. Almost 43% of the embryo-donation parents were not planning on disclosing to the 
child….A relatively low level of disclosure in spite of being given counseling concerning the advantages of 
disclosure was also found in a Finnish sample. Lindsay Childress-Beatty, “Embryo Donation: 
Psychological Aspects,” 116-7. 
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a later date.45  Likewise, memoirist Peggy Orenstein recounts that when she and her 
husband visited an infertility clinic, she observed how her doctor subtly suggested that 
she and her husband might want to keep the use of assisted reproduction a secret:  
Janet’s [the doctor] office was two stories above the street, furnished with a 
featureless desk and chairs.  “Would you like me to close the blinds?” she asked as 
we sat down.  We glanced at the office building across the street.  Steven’s eyes 
narrowed.  “Why would we want you to do that?” 
  “Well, some people…” She trailed off, seeming uncomfortable…. 
  Apparently, we’d entered the dark back alley of science.  More than thirteen 
thousand women used donor eggs that year, but most would never tell—not their 
families, not their friends, not even the child.  Secrecy had never crossed our minds; 
we’d agreed with minimal discussion that a person has the right to know his or her 
origins….If we didn’t tell, we’d have to let a daughter believe she was at risk of 
breast cancer because I’d had it.  And what about the pediatrician?  My 
obstetrician?  Any divulgence would be a risk.  I couldn’t imagine building a 
healthy relationship with my child on a foundation of deception.46 
 
Here one could make the argument that Orenstein’s doctor encourages her and her 
husband to make something of an idol out of the biological family, the illusion of which 
must be maintained even at the expense of the truth of the child’s origins.  Yet there is an 
irony inherent to such practices: In order to become parents, infertile couples turn to 
surrogates or donors, but after the assistance of these individuals, their involvement must 
be hidden for caretakers to maintain their identity and status as parents.  Thus, it seems as 
if these parents are communicating—via the practice of secrecy—that they are not in fact 
true parents because the use of the donor or surrogate precludes them from being as such.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Paul Lauritzen, Pursuing Parenthood: Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1993).  84.   
 
46 Peggy Orenstein, Waiting for Daisy: A Tale of Two Continents, Three Religions, Five Infertility 
Doctors, an Oscar, an Atomic Bomb, a Romantic Night, and One Woman’s Quest to Become a Mother 
(New York: Bloomsbury), 177-8.  
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As a result, one might hypothesize that when individuals privilege practices like 
secrecy, they do so because of a reverence for the biological family that essentially 
amounts to idolatry.  Indeed, that idolization causes them to overlook what might be in 
the best interest not only of their future children but of the third party and of themselves: 
The internal relationship between spouses, the parents’ relationship with the resulting 
child, and their relationship with the third party may all be negatively impacted by the 
choice to keep a child’s origins secret, thereby lending further credence to Maurice’s 
concerns about relationship denial.  Reinforcing these concerns, psychologists Amanda J. 
Turner and Adrian Coyle found that teenagers and adults who discovered that they were 
conceived with donated genetic material experienced a number of detrimental cognitions 
and feelings, including mistrust, abandonment by medical professionals who advocated 
non-disclosure, and a sense of frustration or loss that they could not obtain donor 
information.  In regard to this final issue, writing on the legal aspects of sperm donation, 
Stephanie O. Corley and Maxwell Mehlman explain that, “Children conceived with the 
use of anonymous sperm are likened to adoptive children, and studies have shown that 
insecurities arise in adoptees because of the lack of information about the child’s 
biological parent(s).”47  Turner and Coyle therefore suggest that individuals told at a later 
date about the involvement of a third party subsequently experience themselves as 
different from the family who raised them.48  Reinforcing this data, Petok explains that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Stephanie O. Corley and Maxwell Mehlman, “Sperm Donation: Legal Aspects,” in Third Party 
Reproduction: A Comprehensive Guide, ed. James M. Goldfarb (New York: Springer, 2013), 154. 
 
48 Amanda J. Turner and Adrian Coyle, “What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity 
experiences of adults conceived by donor insemination and the implications for counseling 
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children of sperm donors who discover the use of the donor later in life “can experience a 
disruption of identity. In essence, they are not the persons they assumed they were.”49  As 
a result, he argues that, “Openness produces better psychological results for children 
conceived with donor sperm and for the families in which they are raised.”50  One might 
make similar arguments for other types of third party involvement. 
The picture that this data combines to paint is one that suggests that third party 
practices in the United States do not primarily concern themselves with cultivating 
relationships between intended parents, third parties, and potential children, nor are they 
primarily interested in fostering the familial relationships that are so important to 
Maurice.51  Rather, the concern seems to be with maintaining the identity and structure of 
the biological nuclear family above all else.  In other words, if Maurice is right that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and therapy,” Human Reproduction 15 (2000), 2041-51. 
 
49 Petok, “Sperm Donation: Psychological Aspects,” 165. 
 
50 Ibid. 166. 
 
51 Given current medical technology, the possibility that gamete donors can retain anonymity into 
the future may be decreasing with the advent of websites that track DNA, including sites such as the Donor 
Sibling Registry—which allows children of donors to use their DNA to find half-siblings who share the 
same donor—and Family Tree DNA, a site that helps individuals locate biological relatives.  These 
websites not only allow children to find half-siblings, but they also help children locate their egg or sperm 
donor.  See Susan L. Crockin and Lauren M. Nussbaum, “Embryo Donation: Legal Aspects,” in Third 
Party Reproduction: A Comprehensive Guide, ed. James M. Goldfarb (New York: Springer, 2013), 105.  
For examples of children of donors who have used sites like these to locate their donors, see Rachel 
Lehmann-Haupt, “Are Sperm Donors Really Anonymous Anymore?  DNA Testing Makes Them Easy to 
Trace,” Slate, March 1, 2010, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2010/02/are_sperm_donors_really_anonymous_anymore.h
tml (accessed November 11, 2013).    See also “Lost Then Found,” produced by Mary Harris, On the 
Media, National Public Radio, October 18, 2013, http://www.onthemedia.org/story/lost-then-
found/transcript/ (accessed October 19, 2013).  For more on the possibility of anonymous sperm donors 
being discovered in film, see Delivery Man.  Film.  Directed by Ken Scott, New York: DreamWorks, 2013 
and Starbuck.  Film.  Directed by Ken Scott, Montreal: Caramel Films, 2011.  See also The Kids are All 
Right.  Film.  Directed by Lisa Cholodenko, Los Angeles: Focus Features, 2010. 
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“human relationships are not artificial types of something divine, but are actually the 
means, and the only means, through which man ascends to any knowledge of the divine,” 
then his work poses a provocative challenge to current practices.52  Namely, it challenges 
practitioners to place a premium on relationships, including relationships with third 
parties.   
That said, the data also poses a challenge back to Maurice, who assumes that 
biological families are the only possible permutation for family creation.  Recognizing 
that such technologies were beyond the scope of Maurice’s time, one might nonetheless 
critique him for his own overemphasis—or perhaps even idolization—of the biological 
family unit.  For to the extent that Maurice assumes biological family relationships are 
the most central locus for discovering the Divine, he closes off the possibility for more 
varied conceptions of family, a more diverse sphere of revelatory relationships, and, in 
turn, new experiences of God.  To that end, the very existence of third party procedures 
and the different configurations of relationships they inaugurate with regard to the 
concept of family presses for a wider sphere of accountability and responsibility between 
individuals than what Maurice envisions.  In turn, insofar as the family functions—as 
Maurice argues—as a metaphor for the Kingdom of Christ and the Church, then the 
existence of third party reproduction presents the opportunity to develop a more inclusive 
and less insular understanding of these communities as well. 
I therefore conclude that Maurice’s incarnational theology and contemporary third 
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party practices encounter one another in ways that demand a rethinking of the 
assumptions that undergird each.  Maurice’s emphasis upon relationships encourages 
Christians to consider whether current third party assisted reproduction practices within 
the United States prevent the manifestation of the kinds of communities that Maurice 
hopes they will inaugurate.  He therefore presses the American third party reproductive 
community to change its very approach to reproduction: Instead of asking whether there 
should be a relationship between intended parents, children, and the third party, 
Maurice’s work leads to the question of what kind of relationships should exist between 
these individuals.  Conversely, while Maurice promotes relationships as the means 
through which humans come to know the Divine, his emphasis is primarily upon 
biological family relationships of which the third party and possibly even the future child 
might not be a part, such as in situations where the child is the result of both an egg and 
sperm donor, or in cases of adoption.  As a result, the very existence of third party 
practices challenge Maurice’s own privileging of the biological family as the 
paradigmatic relational community. 
David H. Smith on Community and Loyalty in Third Party Assisted  
Reproduction 
 David H. Smith is a contemporary medical ethicist who roots his work in the 
Anglican tradition, specifically relying upon thinkers like F.D. Maurice to ground his 
conclusions.  Smith is particularly interested in ethical issues surrounding the beginning 
and end of life and writes at length about how Anglicans might formulate an ethics of 
assisted reproduction in his book Health and Medicine in the Anglican Communion. 
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 Relying upon the work of Richard Hooker and, more prominently, F.D. Maurice, 
community becomes an important theme for Smith as he seeks to understand and 
formulate an Anglican response to the kinds of suffering that characterize beginning and 
end of life decisions.53  To that end, Smith predicates his arguments upon a guiding 
theological principle that he believes is fundamental to the Anglican tradition, namely 
that through Jesus’ suffering, God identified with human pain.  In this way, Smith 
harkens to F.D. Maurice’s incarnational theological premise that God’s embodiment 
allows for solidarity and human identification with the Divine.  For Smith, therefore, 
relying upon incarnational principles cashes out in how he frames the problem of 
suffering from a theological perspective.  As he writes, “The suffering of God in Christ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 It may be helpful here to distinguish between the terms “Anglican” and “Episcopal.”  The latter 
term refers to the branch of the Anglican Communion primarily located in the United States known as The 
Episcopal Church.  In contrast, the former term has historically been utilized in two ways.  First, it may 
refer to the Church of England; second, it may reference the worldwide federation of independent national 
churches, known as the Anglican Communion, that acknowledges the Archbishop of Canterbury as its 
titular head.  Within this federation, there is no legally binding synod or hierarchy that has authority over 
the separate national churches, including the Archbishop of Canterbury. 
Since the consecration of Gene Robinson—the first openly gay bishop in The Episcopal Church—
back in 2003, the term “Anglican” has taken on a third definition in the United States that refers to 
conservative churches who were formerly members of The Episcopal Church but who have separated to 
form their own denomination called the Anglican Church in North America.  This organization is not 
formerly associated with either The Episcopal Church or the global Anglican Communion, though it does 
maintain full communion with certain other historically conservative Anglican Communion churches, 
namely those in Sudan, Uganda, and Nigeria.  Because David H. Smith penned Health and Medicine in the 
Anglican Communion in 1986, prior to this split, this third category would not have been relevant.  To that 
end, when Smith writes about the “Anglican tradition,” he is referring to the historic body of literature and 
church traditions that originated in England and eventually became the basis for various independent 
national churches.  Finally, it is worth noting that Smith identifies as an Episcopalian, though within the 
context of Health and Medicine in the Anglican Communion, he seems to use the terms “Episcopal” and 
“Anglican” interchangeably.  This would have been a more common occurrence in 1986 than it would be 
today, due to the aforementioned political shift. 
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must be acknowledged.  Thus one part of the Anglican response to suffering is to affirm 
that the sufferer is not alone.”54 
Echoing the importance of solidarity within Maurice’s incarnational theology, 
Smith’s application of the concept to suffering leads him to embrace two further 
conclusions that become essential to his ethics.  The first of these is that suffering is 
inevitable.  To that end, Smith suggests that medical practitioners should not seek the end 
of suffering but rather should seek to respond to suffering in a way that is loyal to those 
in pain.  Confluent with the first assumption is the second, which involves Smith 
grounding the inevitability of suffering in Maurice’s incarnational theology as he 
explains its impact upon an understanding of salvation.  In his own words: 
The salvation that is made possible by the incarnation does not fundamentally 
consist of bringing suffering to an end.  Rather, salvation involves God’s 
participation in suffering, to establish community between suffering humankind 
and himself.  Salvation does not mean an end to suffering; it means an end to 
isolated suffering.  So far as we can tell, suffering will continue forever.55 
 
Essential to Smith’s ethics, then, is both the belief that suffering cannot be eradicated and 
the belief that an ethical response to suffering involves some kind of community or, 
invoking Moltmann’s vocabulary, solidarity.  Smith locates the warrant for his relational 
emphasis in the work of Maurice and Hooker, both of whom understand the cultivation of 
community as essential to the Anglican theological project.  To that end, it is perhaps no 
surprise that he summarizes his own understanding of salvation and damnation in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 David Smith, Health and Medicine in the Anglican Communion (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 
7. 
 
55 Ibid., 8. 
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same terms Maurice uses, stating that, “Salvation is found in true community; damnation 
in isolation; sin involves the pretense of radical independence.”56 
  Smith suggests that community and solidarity manifest themselves in the 
enactment of loyalty, both towards oneself and towards the other.57  The former 
concept—loyalty towards oneself—Smith terms fidelity.  Fidelity is loyalty to one’s 
temporal body, a commitment to its health and wholeness.58  The latter concept—which 
Smith simply terms loyalty—is inherently other-directed.  Hence, in its fullness, loyalty 
is both inclusive of the self and the other, making it inherently relational and essentially 
based in solidarity.  As Smith writes:  
Loyalty requires sticking with one’s friends through these modulations; more 
precisely it means expecting such changes—growth or decline—in a friend….In 
sum, loyalty to others requires concern for their bodily health, their personal 
particularities and their future prospects.  The point could be made negatively: I 
betray one to whom I should be loyal, if I do not act for the sake of her health, if I 
am not particularly responsive to her unique complex of needs and cares, if I do 
not leave her room to maneuver, change, and blossom.59 
 
Initially, it might seem as if Smith’s language of loyalty echoes something of Maurice’s 
writings: Maurice too advocated for family members to respond to the “unique complex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid., 10. 
 
57 Ibid., 84. Note: Smith does not define loyalty in this context.  In personal correspondence, Smith 
clarified that, “I think of loyalty as commitment to another, and a commitment that entails meeting the 
other's need. That commitment is not necessarily paternalistic, for the other has a right to respect and 
dignity, (e.g. the surrogate, the gamete donor, the child conceived through novel reproductive processes). A 
distinctive feature of loyalty is that it has staying power; it is not episodic.”  David H. Smith, e-mail 
message to author, November 1, 2012. 
 
58 David H. Smith, “Medical Loyalty: Dimensions and Problems of a Rich Idea” in Theology and 
Bioethics: Exploring the Foundations and Frontiers, ed. Earl E. Shelp (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1985), 279. 
 
59 Ibid., 279. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
134	  
of needs and cares” that each member presents, such that by coming to know each 
member of the family intimately, something of God’s identity would be revealed.  
However, Smith does not privilege the biological family—or any other formulation of 
family—in the same way that that Maurice does.  For Smith, the sphere of those to whom 
loyalty is owed is simultaneously both larger and smaller. 
 I will explain the larger sphere first.  For Smith, loyalty is not limited to the 
family but rather is a principle to be applied to the human community generally.  Hence, 
invoking the Golden Rule in Mark 12:30-31 and Matthew 22:36-40 as well as Matthew 
5:43-48, Smith explains that loyalty is not only owed to one’s family but also to one’s 
friends and neighbors as well as one’s enemies.  To provide richer detail of this concept, 
Smith references Reinhold Niebuhr’s concept of henotheism—a single, abiding cause to 
which one is loyal—and his contrasting concept of radical monotheism to explain his 
own expansive essence of loyalty: 
Henotheism tends to see only duties to members of one’s group, polytheism only 
limited duties insofar as particular values are shared.  In contrast: “in radical 
monotheism my neighbor is my companion in being; though he is my enemy in 
some less than universal context the requirement is to love him.”60 
 
To the extent, then, that Smith advocates for a definition of loyalty that resembles 
Niebuhr’s concept of radical monotheism, one might expect him to advocate for the use 
of third party procedures because of how these procedures could be predicated upon third 
parties manifesting loyalty towards one’s “companion in being,” namely intended parents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 H.R. Neibuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper, 1960), 34.  qtd. 
David H. Smith, “Medical Loyalty: Dimensions and Problems of a Rich Idea” in Theology and Bioethics: 
Exploring the Foundations and Frontiers, ed. Earl E. Shelp (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1985), 273. 
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and the resulting child.  Put into Smith’s own language, if loyalty requires acting for the 
sake of another’s health, responding to the unique cares and needs of others in order to 
allow them space to change and blossom, then for third parties to deny the gifts their 
bodies can offer to those seeking to start a family would be a denial of that loyalty.61 
Yet this is not how Smith’s ethical response develops.  Instead, it is here that we 
see Smith’s sphere of loyalty shrink not to the unit of the family but to the unit of the 
couple.  Smith opposes assisted reproduction procedures that involve third parties on two 
grounds, both of which stem from his question: “Is it important that the person with 
whom one makes a baby be the same as the person with whom one makes love?”62    
Smith’s short answer is that yes, it is important, because from his perspective, 
such procedures violate loyalty to one’s spouse.  By way of further explanation, Smith 
answers his own question by exploring whether it is morally appropriate to distinguish 
between what he terms the “human community of reproduction” and the “community of 
sexual love.”  To that end, he is curious about the implications of third party reproduction 
for the definition and manifestation of various forms of human community, though unlike 
F.D. Maurice, he does not see the nuclear family as emblematic of what community 
means.  Rather, Smith privileges forms of reproduction where the community of 
reproduction and the community of sexual love are identical.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 David H. Smith, “Medical Loyalty: Dimensions and Problems of a Rich Idea,” 279. 
 
62 David Smith, Health and Medicine in the Anglican Communion, 54. 
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Because of this, Smith has no qualms with assisted reproductive procedures where 
the gametes and gestational carrier remain within the couple—such as in vitro 
fertilization—because such procedures allow the community of reproduction and the 
community of sexual love to remain synonymous.  However, when procedures engage 
third party participants, then the human community of reproduction becomes a distinct 
entity from the community of sexual love, a distinction he finds problematic on two 
counts.63 
 First, Smith argues, third party assisted reproduction has implications for the way 
a child’s sense of self develops and, in turn, implications for what of the self can be 
known.  As he writes: 
Selfhood is always historical.  We develop a concept of ourselves and a sense of 
identity in relationship to persons around us.  Part of this development has to do 
with knowing what our relationship is to others.  In the “normal” case one 
understands this very well.  My identity is that of the child of a specific set of 
parents and the grandchild of four grandparents.  I think of myself as embodied, 
and embodied with physical material that is specific; it comes from those roots 
with all their twists, turns and resilience’s.  I know the characteristic vices (and 
perhaps a few virtues); I know the common causes of death; I know of myopia 
and bad teeth and several hundred other things too trivial and uninteresting to 
mention. 
 But they are not uninteresting to me, for they are constitutive of who I am.  The 
more I know my roots, the more I know myself.64  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid.  Note: While Smith does not perceive a distinction between the community of reproduction 
and the community of sexual love in in vitro fertilization, it could be argued that the doctors, nurses, and 
psychologists required to facilitate any assisted reproduction procedure could be considered members of the 
human community of reproduction, thereby rendering a distinction between the community of sexual love 
and the community of reproduction in any assisted reproduction procedure.   Smith does not comment on 
this point in his writings. 
 
64 Ibid., 83. 
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Smith goes on to argue that this distinction between “biological origins” and “family 
community” is significant because of the way that it creates a disparity between what 
Smith terms the “roots of self” and the “roots of body,” thereby creating a division within 
the child produced by third party reproduction that is not present within children whose 
life originated in an environment where the human community of reproduction and the 
community of sexual love were synonymous.  Ultimately at stake, then, Smith concludes, 
is the way that children born using third party reproduction query their sense of self, for 
he perceives that they will of necessity ask questions of the self in ways that others will 
not.65 
 Smith’s second objection has to do with the exercise of loyalty.  Here Smith is 
concerned with the way that loyalty to one’s spouse may be upended by assisted 
reproduction procedures that bring in a third party to complete tasks that—if all 
biological systems were functioning properly—could be completed within the couple 
itself.  (Please note that here Smith is referring to heterosexual couples.)  Smith explains 
what is at stake by way of the following analogy: Imagine that one person is given a sack 
of gold while another is given nothing.  Is it more appropriate for the person to keep the 
sack for himself or to share it?  Smith argues that the more “loyal choice” would be for 
the person to share the wealth so that each member may prosper, thereby operating from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ibid.  Here one notes the way Smith in which is operating from the assumption that the 
involvement of a third party necessarily correlates with a decreased understanding of one’s roots.  Yet this 
would only be the case if the third party were anonymous, for, presumably, if children knew the third party, 
they could learn about the way in which he or she contributed to their roots of body and self through 
questions or discoveries made within the context of the relationship.  Put differently, by presuming 
anonymity, Smith assumes third parties are not part of the child’s community.  If this were not the case, 
then the child would have access to the third party and, in turn, greater knowledge of his or her roots. 
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the assumption that it is better for each member of the marriage community to have a 
little than for one person to have a great deal while the other receives nothing. 
 Underlying Smith’s logic here is the assumption that loyalty within a relationship 
is A. valuable; B. can be reduced to single interactions, and C. can be contingent upon the 
exchange of concrete goods.  Hence, if one partner has gametes to contribute to 
procreation, then Smith’s understanding of the proper exercise of loyalty in such an 
instance necessitates that the other partner must have gametes to contribute as well.  
Smith therefore is not assuming that loyalty could involve the contribution of different 
goods of equal value—i.e. one partner might contribute gametes while another 
contributes a womb (assuming these are both of equal value)—or that loyalty might be 
established over time, through multiple interactions instead of individual ones. 
 The way that Smith defines and delineates the boundaries of loyalty within the 
couple therefore causes him to be deeply wary of any procedures where third parties 
become involved.  As he writes: 
We should examine the intentionality that underlies chosen reproduction with a 
nonlover.  Why would one feel that reproduction is so important that this step 
must be taken?  To make my bitter point let me focus on the intentionality of the 
partner whose gametes are plentiful and available—the one who is fertile.  I mean 
the woman in an AID [Artificial Insemination by Donor, as opposed to AIH or 
Artificial Insemination by Husband] situation or the man in a case of a 
contemplated egg donation.  This fertile partner is purchasing “authentic” (i.e. 
genetic) parenthood for himself or herself when that possibility is closed to the 
spouse.  That a loving sterile spouse will go along with this course I do not mean 
to deny or condemn, but I want to raise the question of why the fertile partner 
insists on having this good alone.  If the couple wants the social experience of 
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parenting, they can have it another wonderful way, i.e., through adoption.66  
 
Here Smith is reinforced by the clergy interviewed for this project, many of whom 
were aware of the potential power imbalances that could result in a third party assisted 
reproduction procedure, which were termed under the heading “playing God” in the prior 
chapter of this dissertation.  Some worried that if one parent contributed genetic material, 
that parent might see himself or herself as the ‘real parent,’ creating an unbalanced 
relationship between spouses.  Likewise, as noted above, one priest talked about how 
power factored into the way a mother related to her surrogate after the birth of a baby 
with a genetic defect.  That priest felt that the mother blamed the surrogate for the defect, 
though there was no evidence that the surrogate’s role could have contributed to the 
illness.67  Though they did not use the framework of loyalty to ground their comments, 
instances such as these led clergy to a conclusion similar to Smith’s, namely that third 
party assisted reproduction had potential to damage the relationships between spouses—
or between spouses and third parties. 
 Yet pace Smith, clergy did not conclude on the basis of these potential 
complications that intended parents should avoid such procedures.  The majority of 
clergy consulted for the study felt that the technologies themselves had no moral value; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ibid.  Here Smith’s internal logic seems somewhat inconsistent.  While he encourages infertile 
couples to consider adopting in response to the complications assisted reproductive technologies pose, 
elsewhere in the text, he writes, “Conceding that ceteris paribus it is more gratifying to conceive one’s own 
children than adopt them, the fertile partner faces a choice between reproduction in which my spouse and I 
are equal partners” (84).  Making this concession thereby sets up a double standard in which fertile parents 
may achieve a preferable good—biological children—that is denied to infertile parents.  Smith nowhere 
addresses this inconsistency, nor does he respond to texts within the Christian tradition that speak about the 
transformative role of adoption. 
 
67 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
140	  
rather, value varied depending on how participants utilized these technologies.  In the 
words of one priest: “None of these are inherently right or wrong, [but]… depending on 
what you do, it may become sinful.  Treating one inappropriately what have you.  A lack 
of consideration or care for one another.”68 
 To that end, the cultivation of relationships became a foundation upon which the 
priests grounded their thinking about the procedures and became a way to avoid the “lack 
of consideration or care for one another” that concerned the priest above.  Yet in contrast 
to Smith, this cultivation was not limited to the marriage relationship.  One example of a 
broader paradigm came by way of a priest who referenced Gabriel and the Holy Spirit.  
For this priest, these figures functioned as biblically-based models for what a relationship 
between third parties and intended parents might look like—similarly to Gabriel, donors 
and surrogates could play an essential role in the creation of a family as a bearer of hope 
and a bringer of change for the parents.  The third party therefore facilitates the 
incarnation of a new human being, but does so in a particularly relational way, just as 
Gabriel conversed with Mary about the birth of Jesus.  Likewise, this priest explained that 
the Holy Spirit was involved in the mystery of the incarnation by literally gifting Mary 
with a new life, just as third parties participate in creating a new life for intended parents 
to raise.69 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 16, 2012. 
 
69 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 29, 2012. 
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 The anecdote from this clergyperson is emblematic of how many of the priests 
consulted for this study perceived that the community of reproduction did not need to be 
synonymous with the community of sexual love.  Loyalty was therefore owed to a 
community that was broader than the couple or the biological family and more 
reminiscent of Smith’s first application of loyalty, which was applied to one’s 
companions in being.  So whereas Smith grounds his ethics of assisted reproduction in a 
definition of loyalty predicated upon the exchange of goods in equal quantity within the 
couple, priests grounded theirs in the cultivation, maintenance, and overall health of a 
broader sphere of relationships. 
As a result, clergy distinguished between the community of reproduction and the 
community of sexual love in a way that Smith did not.  The result, therefore, is that the 
clergy and Smith assign different spheres for loyalty, such that different practical 
responses emerge.  For the clergy, third party reproduction can be a healthy exercise of 
loyalty; for Smith, it cannot.   
Conclusion 
This chapter follows up where the previous chapter concluded by providing 
additional context for a practical theology of third party reproduction by referencing the 
scholarship of Anglican theologian Frederick Dennison Maurice and contemporary 
Episcopal ethicist David H. Smith.  Referencing Maurice’s incarnational theology as 
delineated in The Kingdom of Christ, I discussed how Maurice privileges family 
relationships as a primary locus for God’s self-revelation.  I also suggested that, for 
Maurice, family relationships become the primary set of relationships by which humans 
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may discover God’s intentions for them.  Turning to results from social scientific studies 
on disclosure rates and secrecy in third party procedures, I reinforced Maurice’s emphasis 
upon the primacy of relationships as a means of revelation, while challenging his 
assumption that the biological family was necessarily a superior sphere through which, as 
Maurice says, to ascend to knowledge of the Divine.  
Turning to the work of David H. Smith, I argued that his scholarship inherits the 
same incarnational principles developed by Maurice, though Smith does not rely as 
heavily upon the family as a source of revelation.  Instead, he turns to the concept of 
loyalty and queries whether loyalty between spouses is violated when third party assisted 
reproduction separates the community of reproduction from the community of sexual 
love.  Referencing the wisdom of Episcopal clergy, I noted how Smith’s view of loyalty 
contrasts with other possible manifestations of it, specifically noting how loyalty might 
extend beyond the couple or the family towards one’s neighbor and even, as Smith 
touches upon, towards one’s enemy.   
Much work remains to be done.  In order to develop a practical theology of third 
party reproduction for the Episcopal community, it is necessary, for instance, to explore 
the contours of contributions made by third parties as well as the theological implications 
that accompany them.  The work of Delores Williams will provide tremendous assistance 
in this task and will become the focus of the next chapter of the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
EMPOWERING THIRD PARTY ASSISTED REPRODUCTION  
THROUGH THE MINISTERIAL VISION OF 
DELORES WILLIAMS 
 
Surrogacy is a form of labor.  But it’s an exploitative one, similar to child labor and 
sweatshops driven by Western consumerism….I challenge the notion that within 
these vastly different power dynamics surrogates are truly volunteering their 
services, that hospitals are operating aboveboard when driven by a profit motive.1  –
Adoption Reform Advocate Usha Smerdon  
 
Introduction 
 
In season three of the Showtime series “Shameless,” characters Veronica Fisher 
(Shanola Hampton) and Kevin Ball (Steve Howey) decide to utilize a surrogate after 
learning that Veronica cannot have children.  They do not fit the profile of the 
stereotypical infertile couple: Neither has a college education, and they live together in a 
poor part of Chicago where Kevin owns a bar frequented by unemployed alcoholics.  So 
they decide to ask Veronica’s mother to be their surrogate, because she is amenable to 
carrying their child for free and willing to engage in intimate acts with Kevin, since 
neither he nor Veronica can afford to utilize medical technology to implant an embryo or 
sperm.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Usha Smerdon, qtd., Scott Carney, The Red Market (New York: William Morrow, 2011), 152. 
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After Veronica’s mother formally agrees to the arrangement, the couple begins a 
season-long series of awkward interactions between Veronica, her mother, and Kevin.  
Impregnation becomes more and more troublesome to Veronica as her mother does not 
become pregnant each month yet keeps wanting to ‘try’ with Kevin.  Meanwhile, Kevin 
begins to feel himself torn between two women, as he tries to create the child that 
Veronica desires by sleeping with her mother.  Unsurprisingly, relationships between all 
three parties sour significantly. 
“Shameless” is not isolated in its portrayal of troubled relationships between third 
parties and parents who desire a child.  Films like The Kids are All Right and Lifetime’s 
original movie The Surrogate document the treacherous relationship terrain of third party 
assisted reproduction.  Indeed, as this chapter will explain, clinics in the United States 
worry so much about dynamics between parties involved in assisted reproduction that 
many advocate for either scripted relationships or allow complete anonymity.  
Meanwhile, womanist theologian Delores Williams worries about how surrogacy in 
particular exploits third parties and, by proxy, how the lack of relationships between 
parties contributes to that exploitation. 
The goal of this chapter will be to put data from contemporary third party 
practices in the United States, India, and Israel into conversation with Williams’ work.  
Because scholarship to date has focused on surrogacy, a majority of commentary about 
third party assisted reproduction will focus on that particular form of participation, 
though insights are intended to encompass procedures that involve donors as well.  With 
particular attention to relationships between intended parents and third parties in these 
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contexts, I will question whether technologies like gamete donation and surrogacy by 
their nature lead to exploitation and abusive power dynamics or whether it is possible for 
participants using these technologies to cultivate healthy relationships with one another 
and to utilize these technologies to more positive and life giving ends that empower not 
only intended parents but also third parties. 
The Cost of Assisted Reproduction and Why Americans Use Indian  
Surrogates 
Third party assisted reproduction is expensive, and its cost is due to a number of 
factors: The number of technicians, doctors, surgical procedures, and medications 
involved in in vitro fertilization, egg donation, and surrogacy all account for the high cost 
of these procedures.2  By way of contrast, the National Infertility Association known as 
RESOLVE estimates the average cost for intrauterine inseminations that do not involve a 
donor or surrogate is $865.  The cost of in vitro fertilization without a donor or surrogate 
averages nearly ten times that amount: $8,158 without medication.3  Because most 
intended parents need more than one cycle of IUI or IVF—oftentimes needing three or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In contrast, artificial insemination remains less expensive, as no retrieval process is involved and 
some women do not take drugs to stimulate ovulation.  Rather, at the time they naturally ovulate, a 
technician inserts sperm—which may be sorted for quality—either into the intended mother’s cervix or 
uterus with the hope that fertilization will naturally occur. 
 
3 RESOLVE, “The Cost of Infertility Treatment,” http://www.resolve.org/family-building-
options/insurance_coverage/the-costs-of-infertility-treatment.html, RESOLVE: The National Infertility 
Association (accessed June 19, 2012). The American Association for Reproductive Medicine places the 
estimate higher, at $12,400, but does not specify whether the cost includes medication.  See American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine, “ASRM: Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility,” 
http://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012, American Society for Reproductive Medicine (accessed 
June 19, 2012). 
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more cycles to conceive—it is not usual for in vitro fertilization costs to reach well above 
$20,000 or $30,000 dollars, even when donors are not involved. 
If those price tags seem prohibitive for many Americans, costs for infertility 
treatments increase dramatically when they involve third parties, especially when the 
third party is a woman.  Whereas a sperm donor typically receives $50-75 dollars per 
donation and the cost incurred by intended parents approximates the average cost of an 
IVF procedure where genetic material comes from both parents ($8,158), the average cost 
of an egg donor cycle ranges from $15,000-$20,000, and donors usually receive an 
additional payment for their time and the taxation their bodies experience; the amount of 
that payment varies dramatically from one donor to another.  While an infertile woman’s 
sister, for instance, might donate her eggs for free, other intended parents pay up to 
$100,000 to use a donor with a high SAT score, Ivy-League education, certain genetic 
characteristics, and musical and/or athletic ability.4  Payment for egg donors is higher 
than payment to sperm donors because of the length of the process and the physical 
duress associated with it: Women must utilize hormones, be regularly monitored, and 
undergo a surgical procedure.  Medical complications may also occur at all stages of the 
egg donation process, with risks including infection, ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, 
and twisted ovaries. 
If the cost of utilizing an egg donor seems prohibitive for many American 
families, the cost of hiring a surrogate is even more intimidating, with the average cost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Divya Subrahmanyam, “‘Ivy League Egg Donor Wanted.”’  Yale Daily News, April 23, 2008, 
http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2008/04/23/ivy-league-egg-donor-wanted/ (accessed June 19, 2012). 
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for one cycle hovering at approximately $50,000, though it is not unusual for surrogacy 
costs to reach above $100,000.  Moreover, legal restrictions upon surrogacy vary by state, 
meaning that some parents live in states where surrogacy is legal, others live in states 
where it is outlawed, and still others live in states where the laws are murky.  As a result, 
those seeking to utilize surrogacy procedures may have the additional cost of having to 
travel to a state where surrogacy is legal and having to pay for their surrogate to travel as 
well.5   
One can therefore see how the cost of any third party procedure can quickly 
become exorbitant for the average American.  To meet rising costs, intended parents pay 
for treatments in a variety of ways: Some rely on insurance, though many insurers do not 
cover all treatment options.  Responding to the increased use of infertility treatments 
coupled with the cost of them, 15 states—Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
Texas, and West Virginia—now have infertility insurance mandates that require insurers 
to cover treatments to some extent, often covering artificial insemination or partially 
covering in vitro fertilization, while not providing for the cost of a donor or surrogate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Surrogacy is currently banned in Arizona and the District of Columbia while New York and 
Michigan void and penalize surrogacy.  Kentucky, North Dakota, and Louisiana all declare traditional 
surrogacy void but allow for gestational surrogacy, while Indiana and Nebraska declare all surrogacy 
arrangements void.  The state of Washington allows surrogacy but not monetary compensation to 
surrogates; Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and Virginia all have laws 
allowing but regulating surrogacy arrangements.  The remaining states not mentioned here do not have 
laws concerning surrogacy arrangements or have bills pending.  See Magdalina Gugucheva, Council for 
Responsible Genetics: Surrogacy in America (Cambridge, MA: Council for Responsible Genetics, 2010), 
29-40. 
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This means that donor and surrogate expenses fall to the intended parents to cover out of 
pocket. 
However, even if the intended parents are working with an insurer who covers 
treatments, this coverage may be negated by fertility clinics that do not take insurance.  
While some are able to apply to their insurance company for reimbursement or use the 
flex-spending programs their insurance company provides, others finance the procedures 
by depleting their savings accounts, borrowing money from relatives, dipping into their 
401(k) or other retirement savings, taking out a home equity loan or second mortgage, or 
taking on credit card debt.  Additionally, some clinics provide financing programs to help 
intended parents pay for their procedures over time. 
Even with such financing options, the cost of third party assisted reproduction 
remains prohibitive for many American families, making third party assisted 
reproduction primarily available to those in higher socio-economic brackets.  As a result, 
third party procedures are commonly perceived as a luxury, and those who utilize them 
are often stereotyped as entitled or out of touch because they feel that their wealth affords 
them the right to purchase whatever they desire but do not have—in this case, a family.  
Phoebe Potts, quoted earlier in this dissertation, bluntly summarizes this stereotype well 
in her graphic memoir, Good Eggs, which documents her own struggle with infertility: 
I’ve been steeped in the 2 Great American myths: You can do it.  Cash is king.  
Combine the two and you get this easy-to-remember mantra: You can buy it!  With 
that logic long instilled in me, I’ve got a classic case of middle class entitlement…. 
I married a nice (partially) Jewish boy!  I recycle!  I vote!  I eat my greens!  I go to 
yoga!  I went to Smith!  I untangled my issues in therapy!  I worked for the poor!  
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So….where’s my baby?6 
 
The quotation from Phoebe Potts touches upon a theme from the previous chapter, that 
one reason Americans may be inclined to participate in complicated medical procedures 
at such great financial cost is because of the privilege they afford the biological family.  
Most third party procedures allow at least one parent to maintain a genetic connection to 
the child, and because that genetic connection is so important, it is worth going to great 
lengths to obtain.  Here, therefore, one might say that intended parents come to third 
party reproduction with the assumption that the concept of ‘family’ is more fully manifest 
when there is a biological connection with one’s offspring.  Or, phrased differently, it 
also might be said that parents who utilize third party assisted reproduction see the 
biological connection with one’s child as a good worth having, even if the price tag is 
high.  As I will explicate below, that price is not only high financially, but it can also be 
high relationally as well. 
The Rise of Indian Medical Tourism and Its Contribution to Harmful Third  
Party Arrangements 
Concerns about the cost and legalities of third party procedures—especially 
surrogacy—have led an increasing number of Americans to engage in medical tourism, 
with many venturing to India, the primary destination for medical surrogacy tourism 
since 2002, when the country legalized commercial surrogacy.  In contrast to the cost of 
surrogacy in the United States, the full cost of surrogacy in India hovers under $15,000, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Phoebe Potts, Good Eggs (New York: Harper, 2010), xvi-xix. 
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saving Americans tens of thousands of dollars in expenses and making surrogacy more 
financially viable for a greater number of people. 
 Moreover, a lack of government oversight of surrogacy in India means that 
surrogates lack any legal precedent to keep the infant they carry, unlike in the United 
States, where many states have laws granting surrogates varying degrees of parental 
rights.  This appeals to many intended parents who worry their surrogate may lay claim 
on the child, as Mary Beth Whitehead did in the infamous Baby M. case, which 
established the first American legal ruling on surrogacy.7  In a similar vein, intended 
parents may also feel they have greater control over the actions of surrogates during the 
pregnancy than they might if the surrogate lived in the United States.  In the words of one 
intended mother:  
[In the United States] you have no idea if your surrogate mother is smoking, 
drinking alcohol, doing drugs. You don’t know what she’s doing. You have a third-
party agency as a mediator between the two of you, but there’s no one policing her 
in the sense that you don’t know what’s going on.8   
 
In India, however, intended parents can pay for surrogates to live in supervised housing 
throughout the duration of their pregnancy, which is relatively affordable when compared 
with the costs of living expenses for surrogates in the United States.  They also pay for 
them to be fed healthy meals and for hospital workers to monitor them so that they do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The case resolved with the State of New Jersey recognizing the surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead 
as Baby M.’s (Melissa Stern’s) legal guardian, though the judge granted custody to the intended parents—
Elizabeth and William Stern—on the grounds that they could provide a better home environment for Baby 
M.  The case remains the precedent for surrogacy rulings in New Jersey. 
 
8 Sunita Thakur, “Wombs for Rent,” Marketplace, 27 December 2007, 
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/life/wombs-rent-grows-india (accessed January 10, 2012). 
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smoke.  Practices such as these—accompanied by their lower costs—have led increasing 
numbers of intended parents to utilize Indian surrogates. 
International surrogacy to India has become a booming industry over the past 
decade because of the benefits afforded to parents.  However, to date, academic research 
into medical surrogacy tourism in India remains scant, given its recent advent and the 
lack of regulation by the Indian government.  What is clear is that foreigners benefit 
financially: Indian medical tourism has brought the cost of third party procedures down, 
rendering procedures like surrogacy more accessible to many who could not conceive on 
their own.9  As journalist Scott Carney writes, “Before India, only the American upper 
classes could afford a surrogate….Now it’s almost within reach of the middle class.”10 
However, critics respond that Indian medical tourism exploits the women who 
participate as third party participants, especially as surrogates.  Carney suggests that 
while Americans benefit from the decreased cost of surrogacy in India, surrogates may 
not.  Describing the Akanksha Infertility Clinic in Anand, India—a prominent infertility 
clinic made famous by its appearance on the “Oprah Winfrey Show”—Carney writes that 
the confinement program many foreigners pay for is tantamount to human slavery.  He 
displays a photograph of close to ten surrogates sharing a single bedroom, all relegated to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See “Donor Eggs.” American Pregnancy Association. June 19, 2012 (accessed June 19, 2012). 
http:/www.americanpregnancy.org/infertility/donoreggs.html. See also Ashe Adrienne and Rebecca 
Marmor, “Assisted Reproduction,” The Hastings Center, June 19, 2012, 
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/BriefingBook/Detail.aspx?id=2210 (accessed January 10, 
2012), and “Anticipated Costs for Gestational Surrogacy,” Circle Surrogacy, June 19, 2012, 
http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/costs (accessed June 19, 2012). 
 
10 Scott Carney, The Red Market (New York: William Morrow, 2011), 152. 
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thin mattresses, many lying in fetal positions with their hands over their heads as sun 
shines through a thinly curtained window.  He explains that their only source of 
entertainment in the homes is a single television that plays Indian soap operas, and that, 
They [surrogates] will spend their entire pregnancies under lock and key.  A 
watchman wearing an official-looking uniform and armed with a bamboo cane 
monitors everyone’s movements from the front gate.  Visits by family members are 
limited but, in most cases, they are too poor to make the visit. 
 Outdoor exercise, even a walk around the block, is a no-go.  To get past the guard, 
the women must have an appointment at the clinic or special permission from their 
overseers.11 
 
In addition to the physical confinement, Carney describes dangerous medical practices to 
which surrogates subject themselves.  He writes that even though the medical risks are 
greater, surrogates normally undergo cesarean sections because they are faster than 
vaginal births and easier to schedule.  He also writes that the Akanksha Fertility Clinic 
regularly implants as many as five embryos into the surrogate, though the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine advises doctors to implant no more than three.  In 
cases where multiple embryos become viable, the Akanksha Clinic also may selectively 
reduce or abort without the permission of the intended parents or surrogate in order to 
increase the statistical chance of a live birth.12  Practices like these have led to 
conclusions like those of New York Times columnist Judith Warner, who writes, “What’s 
going on in India…feels like a step toward the kind of insane dehumanization that filled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 137. 
 
12 Ibid., 140, 147-8. 
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the dystopic [sic] fantasies of Aldous Huxley’s ‘Brave New World’ and Margaret 
Atwood’s ‘Handmaid’s Tale.’”13 
 Fertility clinics in India increase in number each year, and not all share the 
conditions of the Akanksha Clinic.  Some afford better care to their surrogates, and a 
growing awareness about the potential abuses to Indian surrogates may influence the 
choice of clinic foreigners utilize, ultimately precipitating reforms in the treatment of 
third party participants.   
Even so, Carney and others argue that such treatment reforms are not enough: 
They also query the complicated financial ethics of Indian medical surrogacy tourism.  
Because Indian surrogates tend to come from impoverished families, the $5,000-$7,000 
they get paid per cycle may be the equivalent of over a decade’s worth of the other forms 
of labor available to them.14  An American surrogate will get paid four to five times more 
than that; however, that amount does not approximate ten years worth of work in 
virtually any full-time American job, even at minimum wage.  By this comparative 
standard, therefore, one might say the Indian surrogate is better compensated.  However, 
Carney suggests an alternative method of assessment: Whereas in the United States, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Judith Warner, “Outsourced Wombs,” New York Times, January 3, 2008, accessed January 10, 
2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/03/outsourced-wombs/#h.  Though no studies have 
been conducted, one wonders whether neonates suffer as a result of scenarios in which surrogates are 
poorly treated, abused, or experiencing prolonged stress due to their treatment in the confinement program.  
It may be, for instance, that these children may have responses similar to those documented instances of 
intergenerational trauma, such as those exhibited in children of Holocaust survivors who experience trauma 
symptoms without ever experiencing trauma firsthand.  See Tamar Bauman, “The Intergenerational 
Transmission of Trauma Symptoms in Children of Holocaust Survivors” (PhD diss., Pace University, 
2003). 
 
14 Carney, 138-9. 
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surrogates may receive 50-75% of the total cost paid by parents for fertility treatments, 
the Indian surrogate only receives 33% of the total.15  By this rubric, the Indian surrogate 
is worse off than the American one.  This, in conjunction with the demographics of 
surrogates and the treatment afforded them by clinics, has led critics like Dr. Sadhna 
Arya, a gynecologist in Jaipur, to conclude that, “Surrogate mothers are from poor 
backgrounds and are hardly aware of their rights….  You have treated the surrogate 
mother like an object, used her as a factory.”16 
Meanwhile, others note that the foreign desire to pay less for surrogacy coupled 
with the demographic of the majority of Indian surrogates may create a toxic power 
dynamic where women who agree to be surrogates subject their bodies to the production 
of life not out of altruism but out of personal need.  To that end, As Usha Smerdon, the 
head of an adoption reform group, explains,  
Surrogacy is a form of labor.  But it’s an exploitative one, similar to child labor and 
sweatshops driven by Western consumerism….I challenge the notion that within 
these vastly different power dynamics surrogates are truly volunteering their 
services, that hospitals are operating aboveboard when driven by a profit motive.17 
 
As Smerdon hints, the sustainability of the Indian surrogacy system exists because of the 
demand from foreigners, especially Americans.  Americans desire a product, in this case 
a child, and the most cost-effective way to procure said product is by outsourcing its 
production.  In short, Indian infertility clinics ostensibly exist to create biologically-based 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 146. 
 
16 Sadhna Arya, qtd. Nilanjana S. Roy, “Protecting the Rights of Surrogate Mothers in India,” New 
York Times, October 4, 2011. 
 
17 Usha Smerdon, qtd., Carney, 146. 
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families and to create relationships between parents and children that may be life giving 
and transformative; however, one might make the argument that these clinics really exist 
to save Americans money, not to help them develop family relationships and certainly not 
to help them foster relationships with a third party participant.  As Indian surrogacy 
lawyer Amit Karkhanis states, “Foreigners are not coming here for their love of India.  
They are coming here to save money.”18 
To that end, the phenomenon of Indian medical surrogacy tourism raises the 
question of the power dynamics between intended parents and third parties and the 
potential for exploitation that exist in third party procedures in a particularly prominent 
way.  However, as I will explain below, the financial and relational power dynamics that 
medical tourism brings to the fore might also be said to be present within American third 
party procedures, with their manifestation taking a slightly more nuanced form. 
Class and Power Divides in Third Party Relationships 
Differences in social class and economics between third parties and intended 
parents further complicate the relational dynamics in both medical tourism and domestic 
instances of third party assisted reproduction.  As the above discussion highlighted, 
Indian surrogates usually come from radically different economic and social backgrounds 
from American intended parents.  A similar dynamic exists in domestic procedures as 
well.  In a chart describing 28 American heterosexual intended parent couples provided 
by cultural anthropologist Helena Ragoné, all of the fathers and all but two of their wives 
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had higher education degrees, and the average family salary for these couples exceeded 
$100,000.19  In contrast, in a similar chart of 28 surrogates provided by Ragoné, the 
average income of married surrogates was $38,700 while the average income of 
unmarried surrogates ranged from $16-24,000.20  Of these women, five had a college 
degree, one had an associate’s degree, and the remainder had a high school education or 
less.   
Data like Ragoné’s reinforces the general knowledge that third parties who 
participate in the procedures oftentimes do not share the same financial privilege as 
intended parents.  This is particularly true in cases that involve surrogates; egg and sperm 
donors tend to be assessed not only by their physical characteristics but also their 
intellectual, athletic, artistic, and professional achievements because of the assumption 
that their DNA may be one factor in those successes.  As a result, intended parents may 
be more likely to choose egg and sperm donors who, if they do not come from privileged 
backgrounds already, may ultimately come to find a place in them.  In contrast, 
gestational surrogates are chosen not by their looks or achievements but by their body’s 
ability to carry a child to term, so that a surrogate’s CV is far less important than 
evidence that she has birthed children either for herself or others before.  As a result, the 
social and economic disparities that may exist in all third party procedures are 
particularly prominent in gestational surrogacy, and the disparity between intended 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Helena Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1994), 90-91. 
 
20 Ibid., 54-5. 
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parents and surrogate raises the question of whether third party procedures on the whole 
exploit the bodies of desperate individuals, especially desperate women. 
Ragoné suggests that the way clinics interact with third parties further reinforces 
these power imbalances.  She explains that because clinic workers worry about the 
surrogate’s ability to part with the child at birth, they strive to find ways to prevent this 
scenario through their framing of the surrogate’s role.  This framing involves two stages: 
First, clinicians encourage the surrogate to see herself as a gift-giver who plays a crucial 
role in fulfilling couples’ lifelong dream of parenthood.  Second, clinicians impress upon 
surrogates that couples using their services have usually experienced intense emotional 
and physical strain due to their fertility problems.  Therefore, to keep the baby they birth 
would cause great suffering.  As she explains, 
Programs reiterate (most often through individual and group therapy sessions) that 
the surrogate has been entrusted with an enormous amount of power and 
responsibility.  Programs also facilitate a surrogate’s desire to part with the child 
by emphasizing just how crucial her contribution is to a couple’s future happiness.  
With this two-pronged approach of making the surrogate feel that if she kept the 
child she would destroy the lives of the couple, and fostering the idea that she has 
the power to make their lives joyous, a program encourages the surrogate’s wish to 
part with the child.21 
   
One might interpret these techniques to say that at best, clinics utilize adaptive strategies 
that will make the immanent separation of surrogate and infant easier for all involved 
parties.  At worst, however, it might be considered a form of social coercion where the 
creation of life is reduced to a business contract for the purpose of assuring that the 
product—here the baby—efficiently and successfully reaches the hands of the buyer, in 	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this case the intended parents.  In this scenario, one might say that the relational 
dimension between parents, surrogates, and third parties—what Ragoné calls the social 
contract—becomes subservient to the business arrangement, with implications for all 
involved parties. 
Techniques such as these therefore challenge whether the mechanisms utilized by 
clinics to develop healthy relationships between third parties and intended parents 
actually violate the formation of them.  Yet it would be reductive to suggest that the 
distortion of healthy third party relationships emerges only because of a power 
differential that privileges the intended parents.  One might make the reverse argument as 
well: Surrogates remain in high demand in the United States and abroad, as not only 
infertile heterosexual couples but also same-sex couples, transgender couples, and single 
intended parents seek to utilize their services.  Their sheer demand, therefore, gives them 
a degree of power.  Moreover, from their perspective, the surrogate’s ultimate power lies 
in her ability to provide what those in need lack and desperately desire—children.  As 
Ragoné writes,  
The issue of fertility thus serves as a leveling ground for perceived, if 
unacknowledged, inequalities between couples and surrogates.  I would suggest, 
tentatively, that all surrogates view their fertility to some extent as a resource that 
provides them with a decisive handicap or advantage in their relationship with the 
couple.  From the surrogate’s perspective, the couples’ material success pales in 
comparison to the unhappiness their infertility and ensuing state of childlessness 
create in their lives…..Couples, because their relationship to the surrogate is firmly 
centered on what is lacking in their lives, rather than on their economic, 
educational, and social privileges, are regarded in the surrogate context as 
individuals who are unfulfilled and faced with a tragic impediment to the attainment 
of complete happiness.  The issue of infertility thus serves as a pivotal and 
multifaceted issue in the surrogate arrangement, especially as it pertains to class 
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differences between couple and surrogate.22 
 
So while intended parents and clinics may perceive that they hold power over third party 
participants, the third party may hold quite a different perspective.  From a surrogates’ 
purview, the woman may view herself as having leverage in the arrangement such that 
she can threaten the intended parents with her ability to create and gift life just as they 
can exploit her on financial grounds.  One might therefore say that the surrogate’s 
greatest threat to parents is the possibility that she might decide to keep the child she 
births, and that gives her the ultimate power play.  Far from only being the object of 
exploitation, the third party, then, might be said to have just as much potential to destroy 
third party relationships as intended parents do. 
In light of the power both third parties and intended parents hold, and in light of 
the relational delicacy in any assisted reproduction procedure, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that clinics encourage specific communication patterns between the participants in 
known—also called open—procedures in the hopes of mitigating the possibility of abuse.  
Ragoné documents that in open surrogacy arrangements, clinics suggest that parents 
interact with their surrogates in a certain way, just as they help surrogates adopt a certain 
perspective on their own involvement.  Clinics may encourage intended parents to write 
letters to the surrogate, call her up, go with her to doctor’s visits or invite her to social 
events.  They may also suggest that intended parents thank the surrogate for her gift to 
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them.  These clinics therefore encourage participants to think of third party procedures as 
meaningful social contracts instead of purely business transactions.23  
Developing specific relational patterns is not the only way that clinics try to avoid 
harmful relational dynamics.  In contrast to encouraging intended parents and third 
parties to adopt certain relational scripts when interacting with one another, some clinics 
think it best to keep surrogates and intended parents separate and anonymous.  In these 
closed programs—the Drake program being a well-known example—intended parents 
and surrogates do not interact in order to negate the possibility that one or the other might 
misuse their own power.  These closed programs also bear resemblance to gamete 
donation procedures, a majority of which remain anonymous in the United States.  
Hence, in these third party procedures, the creation of life might be said to be reduced to 
a purely business transaction instead of a meaningful social contract.24 
Intriguingly, even in open surrogacy arrangements, Ragoné writes that clinics 
encourage surrogates and intended parents to terminate their relationship after the birth 
occurs, or, at most, to keep their communication to a minimum.  She postulates that this 
separation privileges intended parents, who perceive, 
Their surrogate as ‘the woman who is carrying our child,’ and once she gives birth, 
they are ready to begin parenting without her assistance.  The surrogate, however, 
relates to the couple more as friends with whom she feels a bond and from whom 
she has received gratitude, kindness, consideration, and respect; to the surrogate’s 
way of thinking, that relationship should not change or end once the child has been 
born, no matter how well she has been prepared for this eventuality by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 42. 
 
24 Ibid., 22. 
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program.25 
 
Here, therefore, one might interpret clinic practices to say that that even in open 
procedures that acknowledge the social dimension or contract of third party assisted 
reproduction, it is the business contract that ultimately receives privilege.  
The connection between intended parents and third party may also diminish after 
the infant’s birth in other ways as well: Many parents choose to keep the use of third 
party assisted reproduction a secret from their family, friends, and the resulting child, 
with the goal of maintaining the illusion that the procedures were not used.  In this way, 
parents erase the donor or surrogate from their reproductive story, and with that action, 
they also implicitly erase any relationship they may have had with that participant.  Yet 
by keeping a child’s origins secret, often due, as ethicist Paul Lauritzen suggests, to 
insecurities on the part of the infertile parent, it seems as if parents are trying to present a 
fertile self to the world at the expense of children—who are denied the truth of their 
origins—and third party participants, whose crucial role in creating life is no longer 
acknowledged.26   
Such secretive behavior may occur, in part, because of the societal stigma that 
intended parents feel accompanies their inability to carry life to term.27  It may also arise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid., 44. 
 
26 Paul Lauritzen, Pursuing Parenthood: Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 84-88. 
 
27 Alexander McFarlane and Bessel van der Kolk argue that trauma survivors in general keenly 
feel this societal stigma and are hesitant to publically acknowledge their experience because of the potential 
complications and additional suffering that can arise because of it.  This occurs, because, as they write, 
“Most victims who are conscious of the effects of trauma on their lives preserve their self-protective 
	   	   	  
	  
162	  
because of the very real pain that accompanies their experience of not being able to easily 
create a family, as the previous chapter described.  Even so, third party practices, 
especially the practice of international surrogacy, raise serious concerns about the kinds 
of relationships that result from these procedures and the potential for third party 
exploitation.  Yet as the next section on Israeli surrogacy demonstrates, not all third party 
procedures result in the same relational dynamics. 
A New Interpersonal Dynamic in Third Party Assisted Reproduction 
The literature in this chapter has shown how third party assisted reproduction can 
create toxic relationships between intended parents and the third party.  Seeking to avoid 
a toxic dynamic, I described how American clinics encourage third parties and intended 
parents to either adopt scripted ways of relating to one another or avoid contact 
altogether. 
Yet, what if third party relationships could be modeled differently, such that the 
experience of surrogacy or gamete donation became mutually enriching to all involved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instincts and are highly ambivalent about having people find out what happened to them.  For example, 
rape victims are usually aware that they run a great risk of not being believed, of being blamed, and of 
having their sexuality exposed and scrutinized….Since both victims and bystanders experience intense 
emotions when confronted by these behaviors [traumatic responses], they are likely to lose sight of the fact 
that they are rooted in a past trauma.  Instead, both will construct complex rationales to justify their 
reactions: elaborate grievances, in the case of the victims, and diagnostic constructs that invariable come to 
have a pejorative meaning, in the case of the bystanders.  These grievances and diagnoses are designed to 
return a sense of control to the parties involved; ironically, however, both are likely to perpetuate the 
trauma in the interpersonal realm, which is dichotomized in terms of dominance and submission.  After the 
breakdown of a healthy balance between collaboration and self-protective reserve, the resulting polarities 
assure that one person or group will be seen as powerful and the other as helpless.  The trauma will thus 
continue to be played out between helpless supplicants/victims/caregivers and 
predators/manipulators/oppressors.  Calling victims “survivors” is a euphemism that denies the reality of 
these dichotomies of powerlessness.” Alexander C. McFarlane and Bessel A. van der Kolk, “Trauma and 
its Challenge to Society,” in Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body, 
and Society, ed. Bessel A. van der Kolk, Alexander C. McFarlane, and Lars Weisaeth (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 1996), 31-33. 
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because of the relationships cultivated during the procedures?  The ethnographic research 
Elly Teman conducts on Israeli surrogacy describes such an arrangement.  Teman’s 
ethnographic study of surrogacy in Israel describes close relationships cultivated between 
third parties and intended parents that mutually empower each other.  While Teman 
describes certain patterns that surrogates and intended parents adopt during the course of 
the pregnancy, it is important to note at the start that contrary to the scripted interactions I 
described earlier in the chapter, clinics do not seek to script or circumscribe the 
interactions between the surrogate and intended parent as they do in an American context.  
Rather, Teman’s ethnographic research describes patterns that naturally arise as the 
relationship between the third party and intended parents develops. 
While Teman does dedicate time to describing the relationship between intended 
father and surrogate, she is particularly interested in how the intended mother and 
surrogate relate to one another during and after pregnancy.  In particular, Teman notes a 
variety of praxes and communication patterns that emerge between intended mother and 
surrogate that become empowering and identity-defining for both.   
In particular, Teman describes a process she terms the “shifting-body,” which gets 
enacted through a variety of praxes utilized by surrogates and intended mothers as they 
work together to create a family.  According to Teman, “the shifting body” is broadly 
defined as the process used by surrogates to distance themselves from the fetuses they 
carry while simultaneously transferring a maternal identity to the mother; the intended 
mother, for her part, also adopts praxes to reinforce these goals and to empower the 
surrogate.  As Teman defines it, this series of events involves a “shifting between the two 
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women…[of] social labels, identity-building processes,” and embodied “expressions of 
pregnancy.”28 
Surrogates and intended mothers in Israel enact a number of practices not 
common in the United States that empower and transform their identities.29  She 
describes surrogates who refuse to touch their bellies, instead encouraging the intended 
mother to touch it because she is the one who must bond with the child.  As Nina, one 
surrogate, recounts: “I only touch it [my belly] if I feel like she [the fetus] isn’t moving 
and I want to wake her up, to make sure that she is okay.”  When Teman asks Nina if she 
touched her belly when pregnant with her own children, she responds: “Of course.  I 
bonded with my children.  I touched them, caressed them all the time.”30  In this example, 
then, one observes that Nina takes concrete actions with her body that simultaneously 
distance her from the mothering role while empowering the intended mother to adopt it. 
Additionally, Teman describes visits to the doctor where surrogates encourage 
intended mothers to accompany them for examinations or ultrasounds.  These visits 
become opportunities for the surrogate to minimize her role as mother and instead help 
construct the intended mother’s future maternal identity.  One intended mother, Riki, 
describes how her surrogate would not allow doctors to begin procedures without her: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Elly Teman, Birthing a Mother: The Surrogate Body and the Pregnant Self, (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2010), 134. 
 
29 Teman suggests that perhaps because women who are surrogates in Israel must first be mothers 
of their own children, they understand the importance certain rituals can play in forming a maternal 
identity, and therefore, they want to be sensitive to how those rituals can empower the intended mother in 
her maternal identity while simultaneously empowering the surrogates’ role as hero. 
 
30 Ibid., 79. 
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“Even when I was thirty minutes late one time, she made him wait.  She said that this is 
Riki’s baby and that she had to be here.”31  
This process of the surrogate co-constructing a maternal identity for the intended 
mother continues at the time of birth.  One surrogate named Masha created a ritual to 
construct the intended mother’s maternal sense of self when she instructed medical staff 
to place the newborn on the intended mother’s belly instead of on top of her own.  
Unfortunately, when the birth occurred, the hospital staff laid the baby on her own belly, 
leading Masha to insist that they remove the baby because, “The baby has a mother and 
father.”32 
Through these examples, one notices the way in which the surrogate recognizes 
actions or rituals associated with maternal identity and consciously transfers them to the 
intended mother.  By distancing herself from these tasks—touching her pregnant belly or 
putting the baby on top of her belly post-birth—the surrogate simultaneously transfers a 
maternal identity onto the intended mother while cultivating a relationship with her in the 
process.  
Yet if the intended mother’s maternal sense of self is constructed through actions 
undertaken by the surrogate, the surrogate’s identity as a hero is also constructed through 
actions undertaken by the intended mother.  The surrogate, Teman explains, often sees 
herself on a “mission” to create families for childless couples, to create life, and to “make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 124. 
 
32 Ibid., 82. 
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her intended mother into a mother, and in symbolic form, to help this other woman carry 
out her duty to birth the nation.”33 The intended mother helps the surrogate begin to live 
into this heroic identity through practices such as gift-giving.  One surrogate named Orna 
explained to Teman how valuable it was when, after giving birth, the intended mother, 
“Didn’t even go to the girl.  She just strangled me with joy and hugs and kisses and 
everyone was crying.”34  This acknowledgement functioned as a gift that reinforced her 
identity as a hero, as someone who had given a priceless gift to the family.  Another 
surrogate named Lihi explained how her intended mother, Danit, showed how much she 
was valued throughout the pregnancy and afterwards:  
During each stage of the pregnancy, from the beginning to the end, from the first 
month to the ninth month, the most important thing to her was that I would be 
okay.  For everything she would come and ask [the doctor], okay, the kids are 
okay, “but what about Lihi?”  At every stage…When [the doctor] told us that we 
would probably be hospitalized, when my blood pressure escalated…the first thing 
she said was: “Who will be with Lihi’s daughters?”  She says, “Do you have 
groceries at home?”… 
  After the delivery, she was with me in the room to help me before anything else.  
She left her children and she was with me…She did more than necessary.  The first 
week, right after we left the hospital, that same night she called me.  She had a 
mess at home and they [the twins] didn’t eat and she didn’t know what to do with 
them, but her first phone call was to me.  Even more, the first Sabbath she told me, 
“You are coming over.”  I said, “I’m not.”  She said, “I won’t take no for an 
answer.”  It was for the circumcision ceremony [brit].  She said, “I am going to tell 
you when and where you will be there.” And we were a little late and they 
waited.35 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid., 264, 266. 
 
34 Ibid., 217. 
 
35 Ibid. 
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In addition to Lihi and Danit’s story, other surrogates explained how gifts from 
their intended families empowered them and validated their identities as heroes: One 
surrogate named Ye’ara told Teman about a verbal thank you from the intended father 
that became her most important gift.  Another surrogate named Miri talked about how her 
intended mother, Tamar, read her a thank you letter at a surprise party she organized 
several weeks after Miri gave birth.36  Tamar also described a powerful conversation with 
the father of the intended mother who told her, “You are G-d for us.”37 
These examples show how participants in third party assisted reproduction can 
use the procedure as an opportunity to empower their own individual identities, rather 
than as an opportunity to either deny or harm the other.  Hence, one observes a very 
different relational dynamic between surrogate and intended parent than to date has been 
presented in this chapter: Here, third party assisted reproduction seems to function more 
as an opportunity for individuals to cultivate relationships and identities that are healthier 
and more empowered than they would be otherwise.  
The Impact of Societal Support on Third Party Relationships 
Israeli society supports surrogates and intended mothers in their efforts to shift 
maternal identity in a variety of ways.  Reproductive technology on the whole is 
promoted in Israel, and the Israeli government allows generous access to it under its 
national health insurance plan.  So while costs for surrogacy range from $50,000-120,000 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., 218. 
 
37 Ibid., 271. 
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in the United States, in Israel, the out-of-pocket expenses to intended parents is markedly 
less due to insurance support, and there are no limits on the number of attempts 
permitted.38 Accordingly, all Israeli citizens have access to third party assisted 
reproduction, as opposed to in the United States, where access is primarily available only 
to the upper classes.  This helps close the economic gap between third parties and 
intended parents that currently exists in the United States, though surrogates may still 
come from poorer backgrounds.39 
In addition to making assisted reproduction widely available and encouraging 
intended parents to utilize it, the Israeli government also enacts certain rituals that help 
delineate the identity of intended parents and surrogates in a positive way.  For instance, 
within 48 hours after the birth of the infant, the government requires a welfare officer to 
meet with the surrogate and parents to officially allow the surrogate to relinquish the 
child into the custody of the parents.  Surrogates and intended mothers find this step a 
helpful way to establish boundaries and familial roles. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Teman states that expenses for intended parents in Israel are made up of a surrogates’ fee of 
approximately $25,000 and psychological screenings, which cost approximately $1,800.  There may also be 
an agency fee, which can range up to $9,000, though agencies are not required nor do all intended parents 
use them.  Likewise, there may be a variety of extra fees that the government committee regulating 
surrogacy in Israel may require—which range up to $9,000—but these are refunded if not used.  At 
minimum, then, the cost of surrogacy is approximately $26,800, substantially less than the cost of 
surrogacy in the United States, though, if all the extra fees are included, the cost could approach $43,800.  
While even a $26,800 fee seems like it would render surrogacy prohibitive for most couples, Teman writes 
that, “No more than five couples I met could be characterized as wealthy; most had found creative ways to 
pay for surrogacy, including receiving loans from wealthy friends, using their parents’ life savings, taking 
out a special “surrogacy mortgage” from a mortgage bank, selling their car, selling their house and renting 
a smaller apartment, or living with their own parents during surrogacy to save on expenses.” Ibid., 24-5. 
 
39 Ibid., 52. 
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Medical personnel further support the delineation of roles in surrogacy 
relationships.  In her discussion of Riki—the intended mother who was late for her 
doctor’s appointment—Teman stresses that doctors in Israel have tight schedules, and so 
waiting for Riki when she was late would have been a challenge.  However, the doctor 
agreed to wait, thereby becoming what Teman labels a “co-constructer” or “confirmer” of 
the intended mother’s maternal identity.40  Likewise, Teman explains that after giving 
birth, hospital workers admit surrogates to women’s health units while they admit 
intended mothers to maternity wards.  Intended mothers are given arm bracelets that 
allow them to enter the nursery to see the infant, while surrogates are also given bracelets 
to admit them to the hospital, but they are not allowed in the nursery itself.  Hospital 
workers likewise offer intended mothers a bedroom in the maternity ward and a hospital 
gown to wear for the remainder in of their infant’s stay, thereby allowing them to inhabit 
the maternal experience they would have had if they had physically birthed the child.41 
The abovementioned praxes evidence how members of Israeli society—including 
doctors, nurses, and government officials—intentionally help both the surrogate and 
intended mother to enact delineated identities and productive relationships through 
practices relating to the “shifting body.”  Through practices that encourage the surrogate 
and intended mother to construct their desired identities without denying a relationship to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As of 2005, Israel’s ministry of health requires surrogates to be admitted to gynecological wards 
but only encourages intended mothers’ hospitalizations.  (However, because many hospitals want to attract 
business, they often absorb the cost of the intended mother’s stay or ask for a small amount of money 
[$100-150 per night] for the intended mother to stay in the hospital.) Teman, 123-4. 
 
41 Ibid., 187. 
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each other, healthy dynamics develop between the women.  The women’s maternal and 
heroic identities are thereby built using relational practices, while the society at large 
reinforces their roles.  Hence, in contrast to typical third party arrangements in the United 
States or India, here one notes society-wide structures that prevent the exploitation of 
surrogates and allow recognition of her gift while also permitting women desiring 
children to “give birth to themselves as mothers.”42  
Here one observes in stark relief a distinction between how third party assisted 
reproduction functions relationally in the Israeli context as opposed to in the American or 
Indian one.  The Israeli context seems to affirm the contributions of all involved parties, 
empowering both the surrogate and the intended parents in their respective roles so that 
the experience of surrogacy becomes a transformative moment for each involved party in 
a positive way.  Moreover, the Israeli system allows for the development of relationships 
between parties, rendering surrogacy into an event that is less a business or financial 
contract than a relational one.  Surrogacy therefore becomes predicated upon the 
acknowledgement of the contributions of all involved parties, such that the possibility of 
exploitation becomes mitigated by relationship cultivation, interpersonal 
acknowledgment, and the subsequent empowerment that follows.  In contrast, research 
provided earlier in this chapter showed how clinics in the American and Indian contexts 
often do not encourage third parties and intended parents to cultivate relationships with 
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one another, circumscribing interactions via scripting or anonymity.43  Some of these 
structures create environments that can reinforce dehumanization or abuse of third 
parties. 
As the next section of this chapter will demonstrate, womanist theologian Delores 
Williams shares these concerns for third party exploitation as she considers the 
theological consequences that arise from it.  With a focus on the historical context for 
surrogacy in black America, Williams encourages the contemporary American to 
consider the historical roots of third party reproduction in this country, and the cost it has 
inflicted on those who participate in it. 
Delores Williams on Surrogate Relationships 
 In her book, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk, 
Delores Williams makes it her mission to construct a womanist theology (or god-talk) 
rooted in the surrogate experiences of African-American women.44  Hagar’s life story 
becomes central to that task because Williams sees parallels between Hagar’s experiences 
and the experiences of African-American females both historically and in contemporary 
times.  From Williams’s perspective, Hagar is—like African-American women—a 
woman of African descent operating in a primarily non-African culture.45  She 
furthermore argues that both are formed by slavery and by surrogacy, though for African-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Teman did not document whether or not it was a common Israeli practice to meet gamete 
donors. 
 
44 Delores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books), 1993, 1. 
 
45 Ibid., 3. 
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American women, the experience of surrogacy may be of either the biological or the 
social-role type.  (In the former, surrogacy is literally the carrying of a child for another, 
as Hagar did; in contrast, social-role surrogacy is a metaphorical surrogacy where 
African-American women take roles onto themselves that others traditionally assume, 
such as when female slaves plowed the fields because there were not enough African-
American men to do so.)46 
 Because Williams focuses her work upon the experiences of African-American 
women and the legacy of slavery, some translation will be necessary in order to bring her 
insights into conversation with this particular project.  However, in order to do that, I 
must first provide some context for Williams’ arguments.  Williams begins with an 
exegesis of Hagar’s story in Genesis 16 and 21 in order to more fully strike a parallel 
between Hagar’s experiences and those of African-American women during and after the 
slave era.  That exegesis focuses on the exploitation Hagar experienced in her role as 
slave and surrogate, and it also interprets how she, Sarah, and Abraham responded.  Most 
relevant to this dissertation is how Williams explains Hagar’s role as Sarah and 
Abraham’s surrogate, and how undertaking that role changed her relationship with them.  
Williams summarizes that, “For Hagar, motherhood will be a coerced experience 
involving the violation of her body over which she, as a slave, has no control.”47 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid., 60. 
 
47 Ibid., 16. 
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At the risk of being reductive, Williams argues that Hagar wound up in such a 
trying surrogate scenario for two reasons: First, Hagar was Sarah’s slave and as a slave, 
she had no power.  Second, Sarah was desperate for a child and unable to conceive on her 
own.  As a result, Sarah gave Hagar to her husband Abraham, as was the custom when a 
wife could not conceive.  Referencing biblical scholar Gerhard von Rad, Williams 
explains that it was not unusual for a slave’s body to be used as a proxy for her barren 
mistress in matters of conception, with that proxy relationship culminating at delivery, 
when the slave birthed the child on the knees of her mistress, thereby transferring 
maternal responsibilities onto her.48  
According to Williams, the maternal transfer was not successful in the case of 
Sarah.  While the biblical text provides little context for interpreting why Sarah does not 
care for Ishmael as her own child, what does emerge is conflict between Sarah and her 
slave, Hagar, as soon as evidence of the pregnancy appears.  Hagar begins to look at 
Sarah with “contempt,” and Sarah responds by becoming angry with Hagar and throwing 
her into the wilderness (Gen. 16:4).  Though Hagar returns to Abraham’s fold and 
remains there until after Ishmael is born, relationships between the two women do not 
improve during Hagar’s pregnancy, nor does Sarah seem to identify as Ishmael’s mother 
after the infant’s birth.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid., 16.  See also Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, trans. John H. Marks (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1956), 186.  For additional information, see Phyllis Trible, Text of Terror: Literary-Feminist 
Readings of Biblical Narratives (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 12 and Claus Westermann, The 
Promise to the Fathers, trans. David E. Green (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 63-4. 
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When the Genesis narrative returns to Hagar’s story in chapter 21—after the birth 
of Sarah’s biological son Isaac—the reader learns that Sarah sees Isaac playing with 
Ishmael and demands that Abraham exile him and Hagar from their community.  
Williams suggests that Sarah’s response may have been motivated by fear of the 
economic consequences of Ishmael’s birth: Wives could not inherit money from their 
husbands in ancient Hebrew society.  Rather, the inheritance went to the woman’s 
firstborn son.  However, in cases such as Sarah’s, where a surrogate was used and a 
firstborn son was birthed through her body, it could be the case that this child would 
become the primary inheritor and leader of the family’s tribe, according to the right of 
primogeniture.  That would result in increased power for Ishmael and also for Hagar, at 
the expense of Sarah’s status.  Hence, both Hagar and Ishmael function as a threat to 
Sarah, especially after the birth of Isaac, who she perceives as the rightful inheritor.  As 
Williams reads the text, Sarah’s feelings towards Hagar actually intimate something 
about her maternal relationship with Ishmael, 
If Ishmael could claim his right of primogeniture, Hagar’s power and status could 
only increase.  Most of what is presented in the text suggests that Ishmael was the 
son of Abraham and Hagar was regarded as mother, since Sarah appears not to have 
taken him…This concern of Sarah’s about inheritance seems to reinforce the idea 
that she has not accepted Ishmael and thus could not expect the care from him that 
adopted children were supposed to render their parents in their old age.49 
 
Responding to her insecurity, Sarah again demands that Hagar and Ishmael leave her 
community, and this time, the two depart permanently into the wilderness.  With barely 
any resources—save a skin of water and some bread—and no one to ask for help, Hagar 	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becomes despondent.  The Genesis writer recounts that, “When the skin was gone, she 
[Hagar] cast the child [Ishmael] under one of the bushes.  Then she went and sat down 
opposite him a good way off… And as she sat opposite him, she lifted up her voice and 
wept” (Gen. 21:15-6). 
 Calling upon the biblical scholarship of Roland de Vaux, Williams argues that 
Hagar’s despondency occurs at least in part because of how family relationships 
manifested themselves in ancient Hebrew culture.  According to de Vaux, family 
relationships provided protection to individuals, who might otherwise be vulnerable on 
their own: To be part of a family—or a ‘house’—was to share not only blood ties but also 
security.  Hence, should conflict emerge with outsiders, any given member of a house 
would have the support of their family, thereby offering them greater protection than they 
could secure for themselves alone.  According to de Vaux, slaves who were part of a 
house also received protection from members of it, which meant that Hagar would have 
had the security of Abraham’s house during her time as Sarah’s slave.  However, once 
Sarah abandoned her to the wilderness, Hagar would have found herself without those 
relationships at a time when she might have needed them most, should she have 
encountered hostile nomads or other tribes making their way through the wilderness.  As 
de Vaux summarizes, “to be without family is to be without protection.”50 
 As a result, Williams suggests that when Hagar found herself and Ishmael in the 
desert, she not only had to worry about how they would procure meals and shelter in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, trans. John McHugh (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1961), 85.  Qtd. Williams, 30. 
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hostile environment, but she also would have been aware that she no longer had the 
protection that affiliation with a family or house provided.  De Vaux suggests that 
nomadic desert life, such as the life Hagar and Ishmael found themselves in, usually 
required that one affiliate and form relationships with a new family in order to survive; 
however, Williams responds that this would have been a challenge for Hagar because of 
her inferior status as a woman and a slave.  It therefore becomes Ishmael’s responsibility 
to procure for them this affiliation, which Williams argues did not occur.  Instead, 
Williams offers a different interpretation of Ishmael’s future based upon her reading of 
Gen. 21:17-21.  In those verses, the reader learns that God speaks to Hagar, telling her to 
pick her son up, and God subsequently remains with Ishmael, who grows in strength as 
an archer so that he and Hagar can survive in isolation in the desert.  As a final act, Hagar 
returns to Egypt to find a wife from her own cultural background for Ishmael.  Calling 
upon the biblical scholarship of Lee A. Starr, Williams postulates that the offspring from 
this relationship resulted in the founding of a new house, named not after a man—as was 
traditionally done—but after Hagar herself.  Hence, just as Midian founded the 
Midianites and Reuben the Reubenites, so Hagar founded a tribe called the Hagarites, 
creating a lasting legacy for herself in the form of a house.51 
 Though Williams acknowledges in footnote 45 to chapter one that “Modern 
biblical scholarship would question Starr’s observations,” she nonetheless relies heavily 
upon them to draw together her final exegetic conclusion—that collectively Genesis 16 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Lee Anna Starr, The Bible Status of Women (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1926), 
67.  See also Williams, 33. 
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and 21 “reveal the faith, hope and struggle with which an African slave woman worked 
through issues of survival, surrogacy, motherhood, rape, homelessness and economic and 
sexual oppression.”52  Hence, Hagar’s story becomes one in which a person in a state of 
powerlessness who lacks supportive human relationships becomes the founder of a new 
family because of her own initiative and God’s solidarity.  As the paradigmatic act of 
empowerment, Williams therefore suggests that it is significant that Hagar “steps into the 
usual male role of receiving a promise of numerous posterity” and that she receives the 
honor of naming Yahweh as El Roi in Genesis 16:13. 
While Williams ultimately demonstrates Hagar’s empowerment and God’s 
solidarity as the overarching conclusion to her narrative, she is careful to differentiate 
between the two times that Hagar leaves Abraham’s family and how they affect Hagar.  
Though Hagar’s second leave-taking ultimately results in her and Ishmael’s prosperity 
and demonstrates God’s solidarity and beneficence towards the duo, Williams argues that 
the first departure does not.  Contrasting with the feminist reading Elsa Tamez offers, 
Williams argues that Hagar returns to the house of Abraham in the first instance for the 
sake of survival and that this is not an instance of the God of liberation in action.  This 
creates a paradox between how God relates to Hagar in her two departures—in the first, 
God seems to be advocating for Hagar’s survival, while in the second, God’s solidarity 
with Hagar and Ishmael helps facilitate their flourishing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Williams, 33. 
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At stake in Williams’ acknowledgement of the two different ways God relates to 
Hagar is ultimately the kind of relationship God has with humans and the fundamental 
tenet of liberation theology that God relates to humans primarily as liberator of the 
oppressed.  Indeed, Williams reading of Genesis 16 troubles the liberating God when she 
suggests that God in this text advocates not for Hagar’s liberation but for her survival.  
Catherine Keller, interpreting Williams’ work, explicates further when she writes that, 
Williams’ theology of survival may seem like quite a come-down from the jubilant 
mood of liberation.  Survival might seem to come with a ‘mere’ front…Worse, 
God in Genesis 16 and 21 ‘sides with Sarah,’ Hagar’s oppressor, and affirms the 
covenant with Abraham at Hagar’s expense.  This is a tough-minded reading (and 
certainly tough for many of my students, among them African American women).  
Is the implication that God really is more invested in the Hebrew patriarch than in 
the African slave-woman?  That God really liberates some who are oppressed, but 
wills others to remain in slavery, as means to God’s own future needs?...This eye-
opening God does not liberate, directly intervene, or otherwise function as an 
efficient cause.  God opens our eyes that we may see—and then do what we can 
and need to do.”53    
 
If Williams’ reading of Hagar’s story primarily problematizes liberation theology, it also 
problematizes surrogacy.  While one might argue, as Williams seems to do at the 
conclusion of her exegesis, that surrogacy ultimately enables Hagar’s empowerment and 
affords her privileges normally offered only to men in the biblical text—such as the 
founding of a house and the naming of God—God’s interaction with Hagar during her 
first departure forces the reader to query this interpretation: Is surrogacy essentially 
negative because of the harm it immediately brings to Hagar?  Is it essentially positive 
because, in the end, God does assist in Hagar’s liberation and flourishing?  Or is it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Catherine Keller, “Delores Williams: Survival, Surrogacy, Sisterhood, Spirit,” Special Edition, 
Union Seminary Quarterly, Fall (2004): 86-7.  
 
	   	   	  
	  
179	  
essentially morally neutral, with its goodness or badness varying in specific instances and 
predicated upon how humans use it?  Taking as axiomatic that God relates to humans and 
that when humans are in relation to each other, they come to know God, the question 
might be rephrased this way: Is it possible for surrogacy relationships to be of a type that 
assists in personal human flourishing, interhuman flourishing, and one’s knowledge and 
relationship with God?  Turning to Catherine Keller’s reading of Williams, one might say 
that Williams is of two minds on this point: “Surrogacy is both the site of Hagar’s 
oppression and of her survival, her vision, and her ultimate wellbeing.  This shifty 
signifier of surrogacy indeed resembles the ‘productive ambivalence’ of postcolonial 
theory: possibility opens within oppression.”54 
 Any assessment Williams makes about surrogacy would be of direct interest to 
this project, insofar as that assessment may lend insight into whether healthy third party 
relationships are possible and what they might look like in a contemporary context.  Yet 
further complicating any clear assessment of surrogacy from Williams’ perspective is that 
while she seems at least partially to condone it in her interpretation of Hagar’s journey, 
she unequivocally condemns it later in her work when she discusses surrogacy over the 
course African American women’s history.  In order to explain Williams’ perspective 
more fully, I now turn to a discussion of her work on the various ways that surrogacy has 
and continues to manifest itself in African American women’s lives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid., 88. 
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Biological and Social-Role Surrogacy in the Antebellum and Postbellum United  
States 
One of the reasons that Williams undertakes her exegesis of Genesis 16 and 21 is 
because she hopes that her exploration of Hagar’s story will speak prophetically to the 
injustices experienced by historic and contemporary African American women who, like 
Hagar, find themselves suffering because of poverty, enslavement, sexual violence, and 
surrogacy.55  To make the parallel stronger, Williams provides greater detail about the 
way that African American women served—and continue to serve—in both literal and 
metaphoric surrogacy roles throughout the antebellum and postbellum periods. 
As stated above, Williams suggests there are two kinds of surrogacy, which she 
terms biological surrogacy and social-role surrogacy.  In biological surrogacy, one 
woman carries a child to term for another.  In social-role surrogacy, a black woman takes 
onto herself responsibilities that usually belong to someone else.  Williams argues that, to 
their detriment, both biological and social-role surrogacy take place in the lives of the 
antebellum and post-antebellum African American women, and with reference to social-
role surrogacy, Williams distinguishes between the two periods, utilizing the term 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Williams, 33.  Summarizing, Williams writes that, “The African-American community has 
taken Hagar’s story unto itself.  Hagar has “spoken” to generation after generation of black women because 
her story has been validated as true by suffering black people.  She and Ishmael together, as family, model 
many black families in which a lone woman/mother struggles to hold the family together in spite of the 
poverty to which ruling class economics consign it.  Hagar, like many black women, goes into the wide 
world to make a living for herself and her child, with only God by her side” (33).  Williams also uses her 
exegesis of Hagar to explore the ways in which Jesus serves as a surrogate or scapegoat for humanity on 
the cross in order to make her well-known argument that there is nothing salvific in the crucifixion itself.  
To that end, she writes that, “There is nothing divine in the blood of the cross” (167).  It will be beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to consider the relationship between salvation and surrogacy, though such a study 
is worthy of future research. 
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“coerced surrogacy” to refer to social-role surrogacy during slavery and “voluntary 
surrogacy” to refer to social-role surrogacy after it.56   
Though this dissertation deals primarily with biological surrogacy, spending a 
little time parsing Williams’ understanding of social-role surrogacy will be helpful in 
order to critically engage her work in the latter part of this chapter.  To that end, let us 
start with a discussion of social-role surrogacy in the antebellum period.  According to 
Williams, black women adopted a number of coerced surrogacy roles: They provided 
field labor when black men were unable to do so, engaging in manual labor that included 
hauling logs, harvesting crops, plowing fields, or assembling fences.57  In this capacity, 
black women literally substituted their bodies and their energy for the black men who 
traditionally adopted these roles.  In another form of coerced surrogacy, black women’s 
bodies became surrogates for white women’s in instances when white men raped them.  
As Williams explains it, 
This is the area in which slave women were forced to stand in place of white 
women and provide sexual pleasure for white male slave owners.  The Victorian 
ideal of true womanhood (for Anglo-American women) supported a consciousness 
which, in the area of sexual relations, imagined sex between free white men and 
their wives to be for the purpose of procreation rather than for pleasure.  Many 
white males turned to slave women for sexual pleasure and forced these women to 
fulfill needs that, according to racist ideology during the time, should have been 
fulfilled by white women.58 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid., 60. 
 
57 Ibid., 65. 
 
58 Ibid., 67. 
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Finally, in Williams’s third type of coerced surrogacy, black women engaged in nurturing 
roles that were traditionally fulfilled by white women, most paradigmatically in their role 
as mammies.  As mammy, the black woman became responsible for the domestic affairs 
of the house that were traditionally assumed by the plantation owner’s wife, 
responsibilities such as looking after children and supervising housekeeping.  Because of 
her many responsibilities, those on the plantation regarded the mammy as the most 
important member of the household slave staff, and they sometimes bowed or curtsied to 
her as they would to a white person.59  However, the respect afforded to mammies didn’t 
continue once they completed their working years.  Citing the work of historian Deborah 
Gray White, Williams explains that owners often neglected or abandoned mammies in 
their old age, as the experience of Frederick Douglass’s grandmother demonstrates.  
Douglass’s grandmother was cast out into the wilderness, much as Hagar was from 
Abraham’s family: 
This grandmother….lived to see her own children, grandchildren and great-
grandchildren sold away from her.  When she got too old to work, the slave owners 
whom she had so devoutly served built her a little hut in the woods and left her 
there to care for herself, even though she was very frail.60 
 
In addition to the three forms of coerced surrogacy Williams documents in the 
antebellum period, she describes surrogacy manifesting itself in another form that she 
terms “voluntary surrogacy,” or surrogacy in the postbellum period.  As Williams 
explains it, after the end of slavery, black women chose to continue engaging in acts of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid., 64.  See also Deborah Gray White, Ar’n’t I a Woman?: Female Slaves in the Plantation 
South (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1985), 49f. 
 
60 Williams 63-5.  See also White, 56. 
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literal or metaphoric surrogacy because of their social location and economic needs; their 
options were limited by their race, their sex, and their wallets, and as a result, black 
women continued to step into roles that were typically not associated with them.  Some 
worked in the fields beside their husbands, because, as sharecroppers, their husbands 
could not afford to hire another man to help; others worked in factories or managed 
farms.61  Hence, while black women were no longer being forced to engage in acts of 
surrogacy, many continued to feel pressed to do so because of the economic and social 
conditions under which they lived.  According to Williams,  
Certain social realities limited black women’s power to choose full emancipation 
from all surrogacy roles…These realities pressured black women to choose to 
continue in two surrogate roles: that of substituting female power and energy for 
male power and energy, and that of mammy.  However, the nature of the mammy 
role changed somewhat when it served black people instead of white families.62 
 
The data presented by Williams therefore casts both antebellum and postbellum 
surrogates into a position wherein they are commodified and dehumanized by those with 
power over them.  This is pivotal to Williams’ ultimate theological end: Her historical 
overview of both biological and social-role surrogacy ultimately leads her to conclude 
that surrogacy serves no positive end for black women, salvifically or otherwise.  In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid., 72-4. Still others found themselves victims of sexual assault and rape by white men who 
employed them; however, while Williams lumps these violations in with other forms of voluntary 
surrogacy, I find it difficult to reconcile any form of rape or sexual assault as “voluntary.”  To that end, it 
seems more reasonable to argue that sexual violations during the postbellum period might be more 
appropriately labeled “coerced surrogacy during the postbellum period.” Furthering my claim that such 
sexual violations were in no way “voluntary,” Bell Hooks explains that after slave women’s emancipation, 
“Black women were often…[pressed] into sexual liaisons with white employers who would threaten to fire 
them unless they capitulated to sexual demands.”  bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman? (Boston: South End Press, 
1981), 37.  Please note that I will not be including this form of surrogacy in the discussion of voluntary 
surrogacy that follows because of my objection to the heading under which Williams’ includes it. 
 
62 Ibid., 73. 
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contrast to her reading of the Hagar story—where she simultaneously suggests that 
surrogacy was harmful though acknowledging that its outcome ultimately offered some 
positive value to Hagar—here she is unambiguous in her reading.  She writes 
unequivocally that, 
One thing is certain.  Surrogacy has been a negative force in African-American 
women’s lives.  It has been used by both men and women of the ruling class, as 
well as by some black men, to keep black women in the service of other people’s 
needs and goals.63 
 
Having summarized her perspective on surrogacy during the antebellum and 
postbellum periods, Williams closes the chapter by commenting for the first time on 
modern day surrogacy practices and how they may affect the lives of black women.  She 
brings to the fore the possibility that the history of black women’s exploitation through 
surrogacy practices will perpetuate itself in the contemporary age, and because Williams 
published Sisters in the Wilderness in 1993, before the widespread use of gestational or 
international surrogacy, one now reads her work as hauntingly prophetic.  Commenting 
on the not-yet common practices of embryo transfers and international surrogacy and the 
potential these technologies have for exploitation, she quotes ethicist Elizabeth 
Bettenhausen, inserting her own commentary into the quotation:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid., 81.  Catherine Keller offers an alternate reading of Williams when she writes that, 
“Williams cannot in these terms simply reject surrogacy as evil; it is the imposition of surrogacy and its 
injustices that she rejects” (90).  Keller here seems to be extrapolating Williams’ interpretation of the Hagar 
story to her conclusions about surrogacy on the whole without considering her reading of coerced and 
voluntary surrogacy in the lives of black women; it is furthermore worth noting that Keller is primarily 
concerned with how Williams’ reading affects her theology of the cross.  To that end, one might critique 
Keller for only considering one part of Williams’ interpretation of surrogacy in her discussion.  For an 
alternate interpretation, see Dianne M. Stewart, “Womanist God-Talk on the Cutting Edge of Theology and 
Black Religious Studies: Assessing the Contribution of Delores Williams,” Union Seminary Quarterly 
Review, Fall (2004): 69-74. 
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One of the early operators of an agency arranging these pregnancies looked 
forward to the day when embryo transplants would eliminate the need to use the 
surrogate’s egg (thus reducing her claim to the child) and when the surrogates 
would be recruited in foreign countries [or in poor African-American 
communities?] where poverty would drive women to accept less pay for 
functioning as the surrogacy uterus.64 
 
She then uses Bettenhausen’s remarks as a launching pad for her own questions about 
how assisted reproductive technologies might continue to press black women into 
harmful surrogacy roles: 
Will the law legitimate surrogacy to the point that black women’s ovaries are 
targeted for use by groups more powerful than poor black women?  Will surrogacy 
become such a common practice in wealthy women’s experience that laws are 
established to regulate it—laws that work to the advantage of the wealthy and the 
disadvantage of the poor?...Reproductive technology has perfected the process 
whereby one woman can be implanted with the reproduction material of another 
woman and man.  Then the host woman births a child having the physical 
characteristics of the woman and man who furnished the reproduction material.  
Thus a black woman can carry and birth a white child.  Is Elizabeth Bettenhausen 
correct when she labels this surrogacy phase of women’s reproduction history 
“Hagar Revisited”?  Are American women stepping into an age of reproduction 
control so rigid that women will be set against each other like Hagar and Sarah?  
Will the operation of certain reproduction technologies, acting in white women’s 
favor, put even more strain upon the already strained relation between black and 
white women?65 
 
The Wisdom Williams Offers for Practitioners of Contemporary Third Party  
Reproduction 
  The material presented earlier in this chapter about Indian surrogacy tourism 
certainly reinforces Williams’ fears: Third party assisted reproduction has been used by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Elizabeth Bettenhausen, qtd., Williams, 81-82.  See also Elizabeth Bettenhausen, “Hagar 
Revisited,” Christianity and Crisis, (May 4, 1987): 157-9.  Note that the comments inside the brackets 
belong to Williams, not to the author of this dissertation. 
 
65 Williams, 82-3; Bettenhausen 157-9. 
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those with wealth and power (and sometimes white skin) to procreate at the expense of 
those who contribute their bodies as donors and surrogates.  And yet, Williams’ query is 
troubled by Teman’s ethnographic research, which suggests that third party procedures 
may function in a way that validates and affirms all participants instead of dividing and 
dehumanizing them. What wisdom, then, can Williams offer to contemporary third party 
practices? 
At first, it may be reductive to think that ethnographic research from a 
contemporary Israeli context can be put into conversation with Williams’s scholarship.  
After all, African American history and race add a layer of complexity that Teman and 
others who study contemporary surrogacy may not need to address.  However, many of 
the same complications related to class and gender that arise in the African American 
context of surrogacy are at play in contemporary global context, thereby making a 
conversation between these sources meaningful.  As a result, there may be wisdom that 
emerges from Williams’s work that can be offered to other contexts, even if those 
contexts are not exclusively African American.  For instance, as Williams sees it, history 
offers multiple examples of harmful surrogacy arrangements with no unequivocally 
positive ones to balance them out, therefore evidencing the unlikelihood that current 
manifestations of surrogacy will be any different.  This conclusion is essential to 
Williams’ ultimate theological end, which has to do with the location and definition of 
salvation.  As she explains: 
More often than not the theology in mainline Protestant churches (including 
African-American ones) teaches believers that sinful humankind has been 
redeemed because Jesus died on the cross in the place of humans, thereby taking 
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human sin upon himself. 
  In this sense Jesus represents the ultimate surrogate figure; he stands in the place 
of someone else: sinful humankind.  Surrogacy, attached to this divine personage, 
thus takes on an aura of the sacred.  It is therefore fitting and proper for black 
women to ask whether the image of a surrogate-God has salvific power for black 
women or whether this image supports and reinforces the exploitation that has 
accompanied their experience with surrogacy….Can there be salvific power for 
black women in Christian images of oppression (for example, Jesus on the cross) 
meant to teach something about redemption?66 
 
 By concluding surrogacy’s essentially negative value, Williams is able to ground 
a theology of the cross where Jesus functions as the ultimate surrogate who suffers on 
behalf a sinful humanity, thereby calling into question the salvific value of the crucifixion 
itself.  To that end, she strikes an analogy between Jesus’ surrogacy and black women’s: 
Just as the black woman is a scapegoat—an innocent sacrifice—that those with power 
offer to meet their own needs, so Jesus functions as a scapegoated surrogate, the innocent 
bearer of humanity’s sins.  Tackling the historically dominant Anselmian doctrine of 
atonement, Williams explains that Jesus’ embodied experience of being both scapegoat 
and surrogate—his suffering on the cross—becomes important to recognize, for it 
grounds her assertion that the kind of suffering Jesus experienced cannot be the act that 
procures salvation: 
[T]he womanist theologian uses the sociopolitical thought and action of the 
African-American woman’s world to show black women their salvation does not 
depend upon any form of surrogacy made sacred by traditional and orthodox 
understandings of Jesus’ life and death.  Rather their salvation is assured by Jesus’ 
life of resistance and by the survival strategies he used to help people survive the 
death of identity caused by their exchange of inherited cultural meanings for a new 
identity shaped by the gospel’s ethical world view…This kind of account of Jesus’ 
salvific value—made compatible and understandable by the use of African-	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American women’s sociopolitical patterns frees redemption from the cross and 
frees the cross from the “sacred aura” put around it by existing patriarchal 
responses to the question of what Jesus’ death represents.67 
 
Here one observes Williams making the provocative argument that Jesus’ act of 
surrogacy on the cross is an act of suffering rather than an act of salvation.  Thereby, she 
concludes that salvation occurs not on the cross but in the life and resurrection of Jesus.  
As she explains, both scriptural references and the experience of black women suggest 
that redemption has more to do with God using Jesus as a vehicle to offer a new vision of 
resistance through relationships that enable greater human flourishing than it has to do 
with Jesus’ violent death.  In her own words: 
The synoptic gospels… provide resources for constructing a Christian 
understanding of redemption that speaks meaningfully to black women, given 
their historic experience with surrogacy. Jesus' own words in Luke 4 and his 
ministry of healing the human body, mind and spirit (described in Matthew, 
Mark and Luke) suggest that Jesus did not come to redeem humans by 
showing them God's “love” manifested in the death of God's innocent child on 
a cross erected by cruel, imperialistic, patriarchal power. Rather, the texts 
suggest that the spirit of God in Jesus came to show humans life—to show 
redemption through a perfect ministerial vision.68 
 
The life, teachings, and resurrection of Jesus therefore constitute what Williams terms 
God’s “ministerial vision,” arguing that the achievement of salvation occurs when the 
ministerial vision of Jesus is enacted within human community in order to right human 
relationships.69  From Williams’ perspective, that ministerial vision involves six 
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components: Jesus’ ethical ministry of words; Jesus’ healing ministry of touch; Jesus’ 
ministry of expelling evil forces; Jesus’ ministry of faith; Jesus’ ministry of prayer; and  
Jesus’ ministry of compassion and love.70 One might argue that for Williams, this final 
component of the ministerial vision encompasses the vision at large, for Jesus’ ministry, 
she suggests, existed primarily so that humans could receive a new vision of life and 
relational human flourishing that “humans had very little knowledge of” previously.71   
By discovering this new vision, Williams suggests that humans in turn receive hope 
for “righting relations between body (individual and community), mind (of humans and 
of tradition) and spirit.”72 The life of Jesus and the parables of the Gospels therefore 
function as exemplars of the ethics of healthy, redemptive Christian relationships, while 
the resurrection becomes the ultimate hope that such relationships can emerge from 
suffering.73  In other words, they present a model and a vision for righting distorted 
relationships, thereby simultaneously implying that how humans manage their 
relationships can become pivotal to the salvation economy.   
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71 Ibid.  J. Denny Weaver suggests that Williams’ proposal for the ministerial vision and the role 
of the life of Jesus in the salvation economy neglects the narrative of the historic Christus Victor model, 
which likewise emphasizes the role of Jesus’ life in the salvation economy.  He looks to womanist 
theologian Karen Baker-Fletcher’s work to fill that void.  For more on the role of the Christus Victor model 
and its relation to the ministerial vision see J. Denny Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010), 201-206.  See also Karen Baker-Fletcher, My Brother, My Sister: Womanist 
and Xodus God-Talk (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2002). 
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The ministerial vision thereby presses against the redemptive authority of the cross 
for the purpose of establishing a new model of salvation attained through ethical choices 
that result in the righting of distorted human relationships by humans themselves through 
the exemplar of Jesus Christ.  As philosophical theologian Monica Coleman explains, 
“Salvation is found in Jesus and in those who imitate Jesus in these acts of healing.”74  
Therefore, while Jesus’ ministry emblematizes salvation in action, it falls to humans to 
continue to manifest the ministerial vision so that salvation continues to be experienced, 
thereby inaugurating what one might conclude to be a realized eschatological vision.  To 
summarize: 
God’s gift to humans, through Jesus, was to invite them to participate in this 
ministerial vision ("whosoever will, let them come") of righting relations….  
Redemption had to do with God, through the ministerial vision, giving humankind 
the ethical thought and practice upon which to build positive, productive quality of 
life. Hence, the kingdom of God theme in the ministerial vision of Jesus does not 
point to death; it is not something one has to die to reach. Rather, the kingdom of 
God is a metaphor of hope God gives those attempting to right the relations 
between self and self, between self and others, between self and God as prescribed 
in the sermon on the mount, in the golden rule and in the commandment to show 
love above all else.75 
 
Pivotal to Williams, therefore, is a relocation of salvation from the suffering of the 
cross to the life of Jesus and his resurrection.  However, also pivotal to her theology is the 
role of humans in the manifestation of the kingdom of God: The salvific examples Jesus 
offers in his life and resurrection do not automatically bring about the kingdom of God 
but rather provide examples that humans can follow to manifest the kingdom in its 	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fullness.  As theologian Jawanza Eric Clark explains, this shifts the achievement of 
salvation away from Jesus exclusively and recasts it as a joint venture between Jesus and 
humans: 
Salvific efficacy, therefore, does not exist uniquely in Jesus, the person (and his 
body), but in his message of hope, deliverance, and transformation, a message not 
necessarily exclusive to the person.  Williams’s deconstruction of atonement 
theology and her doubt about whether Jesus’s violent death on the cross can say 
something about redemption, ultimately, leads her to a construction of Christology 
that implicitly points toward a deconstruction of special revelation, and 
Christology’s exclusive connection to the doctrine of salvation.  If Jesus’s value 
lies in his ethical posture, his ministry, and his acts and teachings in life on earth, 
then perhaps other human beings who communicated similar ministerial visions 
are equally salvific.76 
 
Much of the lived experience of this chapter reinforces Williams’s concern that 
surrogacy represents a violation rather than an incarnation of the salvific ministerial 
vision: One might say that the treatment of mammies in their role as coerced surrogates 
indeed approximates the kind of maltreatment experienced by some third party 
participants today.  In the case of the Akanksha Infertility Clinic in Anand, India, for 
example, surrogates experience a number of violations—though the form of those 
violations differs from the mammy’s—including limitations on their freedom, 
substandard living conditions, reduction of embryos against their will, and scheduled 
cesarean sections to avoid the lengthy time commitment needed for vaginal birth.  Indian 
surrogates are also often a different race and almost certainly of a different economic 
status than their intended parents, who one might liken to plantation owners; in this way, 
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too, the international surrogate’s arrangement resembles the post-retirement mammy’s, 
for in both cases, one sees wealthy (and oftentimes white) individuals utilizing the bodies 
of poor non-whites to satisfy their own desires.  One might also strike a parallel between 
the Indian surrogate’s experiences and Hagar’s first journey into the wilderness, where 
God seems to be lacking in direct support, advocating for her survival instead of her 
liberation.77   
To apply Williams to current third party practices is therefore to say that salvation 
is not procured through scapegoating, that embodiment of the ministerial vision is 
essential instead.  Phrased differently: healing, salvation, an end to suffering, or the 
manifestation of the kingdom of God cannot be fully achieved at the expense of another 
human being.  Applied directly to the practices discussed in this project, one might say 
that when intended parents create new life in a way that exploits others, then their 
perception that healing occurs via the creation of a child is a selective one viewed only 
from their perspective and only with their needs in mind.   
To that end, as long as third parties suffer as a result of their contribution to new 
life, humans are not taking steps to manifest the kingdom of God that Jesus’ life and 
resurrection symbolize through the ministerial vision.  Rather, in the service of fulfilling 
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their own desires, the actions of intended parents and members of the medical community 
continue to scapegoat others by casting them into surrogate roles.  As womanist 
theologian Diana L. Hayes summarizes, Williams’s “critique of Anselm’s doctrine of 
salvation via atonement is critical in today’s world, where so many ‘have-nots’ sacrifice 
years of their lives and health for the benefit of those who ‘have’ and constantly want 
more.”78 
One might also read Williams onto contemporary third party practices to say that 
the scapegoating of third parties is located primarily in relationship denial.  In Williams’s 
reading of the post-retirement mammy like Frederick Douglass’s grandmother, for 
instance, relational denial results in actual physical separation from the white family by 
the wooded hut that becomes her home.  Likewise, historic plantation owners 
scapegoated the mammy by dehumanizing and denying a relationship with her, just as 
Sarah did with Hagar in her conception of Ishmael and her subsequent banishment and as 
intended parents do with international surrogates at the Akanksha clinic, whom they 
never meet, though they dominate through demands made on their bodies.  While the 
cases described above are extreme, in a more nuanced way, that same relational denial 
could be applied to all cases where intended parents choose to practice anonymous third 
party arrangements: When anonymous egg donors, sperm donors, and surrogates are 
utilized, the intended parents unequivocally deny any relational obligations to them, 
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rendering third party assisted reproduction a business transaction as opposed to a social 
contract. 
One might argue that remuneration separates the modern day third party from the 
coerced surrogate or Hagar: The mammy did not receive payment for her time serving the 
family, and neither did Hagar receive compensation for her role as either servant or 
surrogate.  Contemporary egg donors, sperm donors, and surrogates do, and even in 
controversial international surrogate arrangements, many receive additional benefits—if a 
donor or surrogate must travel to the fertility clinic, for instance, intended parents must 
cover all expenses, including hotel stays, transportation and meals.  Other third parties 
receive the outcome of genetic tests ordered and paid for by the intended parents, thereby 
giving them valuable information about their health and the likelihood that their own 
children may be at risk for any one of a number of genetically predisposed diseases.79  
Even in controversial cases such as Indian surrogacy, many surrogates still feel well-
compensated for their time, receiving enough money to send their children to school, pay 
for needed medical treatments for relatives, or even buy a home.  As Indian surrogate 
Navina Patel said, “Why not [be a surrogate], if it helps me give my own children a better 
future?...We now have a good house to live in.”80 
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80 Navina Patel, qtd., Radha Sharma, “Carry It, Deliver It, Forget It!,” Times of India, May 13, 
2007, accessed August 2, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-05-13/special-
report/27873305_1_rubina-surrogate-mother-brady. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
195	  
Hence, one might argue that various forms of remuneration to third parties 
justifies the arrangement between them and the intended parents—thereby eliminating the 
possibility of scapegoating—and that the monetary compensation they receive substitutes 
for any relational contract they might have otherwise arranged.  For if the shared 
expectation between third party and intended parents is of a monetary or business 
contract and not a social one, and if that monetary contract is fulfilled, then one is hard 
pressed to argue that any violation like scapegoating occurred. 
Moreover, whereas third parties choose whether to donate their bodies to create 
new families, Williams’ discussion of coerced surrogacy hinges on the lack of choice 
afforded to slaves in the antebellum era, allowing her to strike parallels between Hagar 
and slave women precisely because others in positions of power utilized their bodies 
against their will.  To that end, Williams writes that, 
All forms of coerced surrogacy evidence the exploitation of the slave woman by 
the slavocracy.  Like the slave system among the ancient Hebrews (Abraham and 
Sarah), slavery in the United States demanded that slave women surrender their 
bodies to their owners against their wills.  Thus African-American slave women 
(like the Egyptian Hagar) were bound to a system that had no respect for their 
bodies, their dignities or their motherhood, except as it was put to the service of 
securing the well-being of ruling-class families.  In North America fierce and 
violent struggle had to afflict the entire nation before southern slave women could 
experience a measure of relief from coerced surrogacy roles.81 
 
Even though the modern day third party participant may emerge from an impoverished 
background and feel compelled to participate in a procedure because of real economic 
need, it would be remiss to parallel their participation in reproductive technologies with 
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the black slave woman who was physically forced into surrogate arrangements against 
her wishes.  Moreover, excepting in arrangements like those evidenced in the Akanksha 
clinic, most third party participants maintain some degree of autonomy during the 
assisted reproduction process itself: Egg donors, sperm donors, and surrogates can choose 
whether or not to participate in arrangements where they meet the resulting child; 
surrogates can choose not to work with those who desires selective reduction; all can 
choose which clinic to work with and can use legal representation when needed, usually 
free of charge.  To that end, it seems reductive to strike too strong of a scapegoating 
parallel between the modern day third party participant and the black slave woman 
surrogate. 
 Perhaps, then, the wisdom offered to contemporary third party practitioners is the 
wisdom of mindfulness.  Having nuanced the essential value of third party assisted 
reproduction so that it is not necessarily synonymous with scapegoating and instead 
potentially emblematic of Jesus’ ministerial vision, one might say that the question 
Williams’s womanist theology impresses upon current practices is this: Is a particular 
instance—say instance X—of third party assisted reproduction enacting Jesus’ ministerial 
vision?  Or, phrased more concretely: Even if goods are offered to third parties to 
compensate them for their work, are those goods covering up the practice of scapegoating 
a less powerful individual so that more powerful individuals can achieve their goal?  To 
answer these questions, reference to the six-fold definition of the ministerial vision might 
be helpful.  One might therefore ask the following questions in order to mindfully answer 
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the overarching query about how or to what extent a particular act of third party assisted 
reproduction conforms to Jesus’ ministerial vision: 
1. Do the actions and relationships of procedure X violate Jesus’ ethical ministry of 
words? 
2. Are they healing to those in need? 
3. Do they help to remove evil, suffering, or sin from the lives of those who experience 
them? 
4. Is there faith among participants that the future will result in increased human 
flourishing and richer relationships because of the actions and relationships of procedure 
X? 
5. Has the decision to undergo procedure X been prayerfully discerned by all 
participants? 
6. Is the guiding principle of procedure X compassion and love? 
One might conclude that in asking these questions, Williams presses the 
practitioner of third party assisted reproduction to be discerning, to consider what actions 
and philosophies are required to prevent the kinds of violations that permeated black 
women’s historic American experiences and that now characterize many third party 
procedures.  Only by so doing can mindfulness about third party procedures increase 
among all parties, thereby making the procedures healthier for those involved and 
possibly even transforming them into practices that emblematize the ministerial vision 
that enacts the kingdom of God.   
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To that end, the practice of mindfulness and the questions that Williams’ work 
poses to any third party assisted reproduction participant reinforces and offers contours to 
the vision presented by Episcopal clergy who felt it was their role to help cultivate the 
individual conscience of individuals rather in matters of third party assisted reproduction.  
Recognizing both the potential for harm and the potential for good that is possible with 
these technologies, one priest summarized the sentiments voiced by many others when 
she said, “I see that what’s at stake is that this is an opportunity for faith communities 
to…not make it about black and white ethical decision making…I would see that as a 
failure of nerve and [un]willingness to walk into the messiness of the opportunity that this 
provides and say how do we accompany people through the discernment piece of this.”82  
Or, as another priest said, “The big question with assisted reproduction for many priests 
is when is it idolatry?  And when it is a sense of, ‘I deserve something?’  And when is it 
coming from that deep longing and that deep sense of calling?”83   
These six questions presented above, therefore, may offer priests a means through 
which to help others know when third party assisted reproduction is undertaken out of a 
deep sense of calling as opposed to other motives less emblematic of the ministerial 
vision.  They may likewise help provide a concrete rubric for priests as they seek to 
cultivate the conscience of an individual member in discerning their own participation in 
third party assisted reproduction.  Therefore, the wisdom Williams offers to 
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contemporary third party participants is one that may foil a repeat of history, preventing 
the creation of more Sarah’s and Hagar’s, of more coerced and voluntary surrogates, 
instead inaugurating a vision where all act through a sense of calling, in the hope of 
healing and restoring relationships. 
The Wisdom Third Party Practices Offer to Williams 
Williams has a distinct theological goal that differs in many ways from the 
purpose of this dissertation project; however, insofar as the phenomenon of third party 
assisted reproduction that develops because of infertility or reproductive loss may say 
something about the experience of suffering at large, one may surmise that there is some 
overlap.  Phrased differently, this project does not seek to entertain different perspectives 
on third party assisted reproduction in order to rebut Williams’ concerns about liberation 
theology or Anselmian atonement theory.  Rather, it undertakes this task in order to gain 
a fuller understanding of one opportunity God has to address suffering through human 
relationships, in this case, the opportunity being the suffering that emerges when 
individuals cannot start families and the suffering that can emerge when individuals are 
exploited to start families.  To clarify, if—as Delores Williams postulates—the 
ministerial vision of Jesus can be an agent for righting distorted relationships, then the 
relationships that develop through the enactment of the ministerial vision may say 
something powerful about how God addresses human pain.  Or, in different language, 
if—as Maurice surmises—we come to know God through our relationships and 
experiences in this world, then the same goal may be accomplished.   
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From Williams’s perspective, surrogacy does not address this particular 
theological concern; rather, surrogacy is a form of suffering that must itself be addressed.  
And yet, this chapter presented examples that suggest that third party assisted 
reproduction is not always harmful or abusive to donors or surrogates; for some, it is a 
beneficial and life-giving experience.  The question that lived experience therefore poses 
to Williams is this: What variables cause contemporary third party assisted reproduction 
to be emblematic of Jesus’ ministerial vision or emblematic of scapegoating?  In other 
words, what kinds of practices manifest the six-fold ministerial vision today?   This 
question is specifically designed not to query black women’s antebellum or postbellum 
experiences of surrogacy but rather to query the relationship between contemporary third 
party experiences and the concept of scapegoat surrogates.  In so doing, it may be 
possible to show how God responds to one particular kind of suffering through the lived 
experiences of the human community and to press against Williams’s assumption that 
surrogacy is necessarily a “negative force.”84  It may also show what factors cause a third 
party procedure like surrogacy to be more emblematic of the cross than resurrection hope, 
thereby illuminating something new about the concept of resurrection hope itself. 
 For instance, the practices described in the American, Indian, and Israeli contexts 
together press against Williams’s assumption that surrogacy is necessarily a negative 
force.  Considering these practices in light of how Williams frames surrogacy on the 
whole, one at first glance notes echoes of the exploitation she describes within African-
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American women’s antebellum experiences, especially when thinking of Indian 
surrogacy practices at the Akanksha Clinic.  One might even argue that in general the 
experience of modern day third parties could be likened to the instances of voluntary 
surrogacy and scapegoating that Williams documents in postbellum American culture: As 
in contemporary third party in assisted reproduction, the postbellum black surrogate was 
not technically forced into a surrogacy arrangement, though her social and economic 
situation may have left few other options available.  Likewise, in both situations, the 
power held by the surrogate or third party is the power of their bodies.  In using their 
bodies to fulfill the desires of those who need them to create children or crops or factory 
products, they agree to participate in an economy where those with money and, 
oftentimes, white skin, can make demands upon them that can be potentially exploitive, 
dehumanizing, or that can precipitate scapegoating.  Indeed, framed in this way, it seems 
reasonable to strike an analogy between the postbellum black surrogate and 
contemporary third party participants who can choose whether or not to offer their bodies 
in the service of an assisted reproduction procedure, though real economic or social 
pressures may limit the practicality or reality of their options. 
However, perhaps that conclusion is too hastily drawn.   While examples offered 
earlier in this chapter show how many third parties like those in India do come from 
economic situations that resemble the postbellum surrogate’s, egg donors—and to some 
extent sperm donors as well—are likely to have more education, successful careers, and 
achievements in the arts or athletics, as those characteristics tend to be privileged by 
	   	   	  
	  
202	  
intended parents.85  These successes may eventually even launch them into the trajectory 
of individuals who might one day have the means to utilize third party assisted 
reproduction themselves.  Moreover, the instances of surrogacy Teman documents in her 
ethnographic research puncture the assumption that all third party assisted reproduction 
necessarily abuses or harms participants.  Indeed, for some third parties, the experience of 
creating new life fashions them into heroes or gives purpose their existence.  As the 
daughter of one Israeli surrogate named Rinat said, “My mom has shown everyone what 
we have always known.  That she is a hero.”  Rinat herself then went on to say, “It will 
say in the encyclopedia that, how many?  Eight surrogates?  Gave birth in 1998.  And I 
will know that I am one of them, and my children will know.  That is enough for me.”86  
Such processing of the experience of third party assisted reproduction is not limited to the 
Israeli context either: As Indian surrogate Shilpa Patel said, “I feel it is a noble cause as it 
will bring happiness into a couple’s life.”87 
 The multiple experiences of third parties therefore troubles Williams’s conclusion 
that surrogacy is necessarily a “negative force” in the lives of women.  Theologically 
correlating the positive experiences of third party participants with Williams in turn 
presses against the assumption that surrogacy and other third party procedures are 
necessarily synonymous with suffering. 	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Hence, because Williams surmises that because surrogacy is necessarily negative 
and that Jesus himself was the ultimate surrogate, she is able to propose that the surrogate 
Christ’s death on the cross loses salvific relevance.  While the experience of 
contemporary third party participants does not universally take issue with Williams’s 
conclusions, it may nuance them.  For some, the experience of being a donor or surrogate 
is a life-giving one, not only literally for the child birthed because of their efforts but 
metaphorically for their own existence.  In this way, they might be said to function 
imitatio Christi, inaugurating new life from death, creating new life from barrenness.  
Hence, one might say that the donor or surrogate is not necessarily the scapegoat for 
intended parents but rather may also be emblematic of embodied resurrection hope. 
Yet does that resurrection hope come at too high a cost to the donor or surrogate?  
One might say that parents who deny a relationship with third parties can be likened to 
Sarah in her interaction with Hagar or even to Peter when he denied Jesus three times, for 
in refusing to respect or cultivate a relationship with Jesus, Peter became an accomplice 
in scapegoating the Savior, much as Sarah scapegoated Hagar and as contemporary 
intended parents may scapegoat the third party.   Hence, whereas intended parents may 
procure a child regardless of whether they cultivate a relationship with third parties or 
not—see anonymous American gamete donor or surrogate procedures—it is the step of 
cultivating relationships with donors and surrogates that ultimately transforms these 
technologies from ones that allow for the abuse of power and for exploitation and 
scapegoating to ones that can be literally life-giving for all involved, including the third 
party.   
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In light of the importance of relationship cultivation to the overall value of third 
party assisted reproduction, the lived experience of donors and surrogates has something 
important to say to Williams about what it means to embody Jesus’ ministerial vision in 
contemporary times.  As Williams documents, abuse of that vision occurs when 
relationships are denied, both in historic and contemporary times.  Yet contemporary 
third party assisted reproduction, at its best, can offer an important example of the 
ministerial vision in action.  Recall that in the Israeli context, for instance, it falls not just 
to third parties and intended parents to cultivate relationships but also to structures in 
Israeli medicine and government to reinforce them.  This is a contributing factor to the 
positive experience of third party assisted reproduction for both intended parents and 
surrogates in that context.   
Such societal support, however, poses particular challenges when seeking to 
transfer these kinds of relationships into an American context, where the overall structure 
of assisted reproduction not only functions in a more nuclear way but is also predicated 
upon the preexisting wealth, perceived independence, and the power accorded intended 
parents by the medical establishment.  Hence, unlike in Israel, where government-funded 
health insurance at least partially covers multiple assisted reproduction procedures, 
intended parents in the United States are left on their own to procure funding.  Those who 
can afford to do so become consumers purchasing a product, thereby creating a hierarchy 
between intended parent and third party.  For as the saying goes, “The customer is always 
right;” hence, the current American and Indian system is predicated upon the needs of the 
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customer—in this case, the intended parents—while other members of the reproductive 
community are cast into roles designed to meet the customer’s needs.88 
Hence, in contrasting different contemporary cultures of third party assisted 
reproduction, one observes that when the culture at large reinforces power dynamics that 
subordinate or exploit, then it is no surprise that individuals with class or economic or 
racial power will do the same.  However, when a culture works together to support and 
value the contributions of both third parties and intended parents, when governments help 
delineate helpful relational patterns and when all individuals involved acknowledge and 
empower one another, then a practice like surrogacy or gamete donation can potentially 
look much different from what Williams concludes it to be.  It can, indeed, be a powerful 
example of Jesus’ ministerial vision in action.  In other words, when the reproductive 
community is not only broad but also inclusive and empowering, then it actually 
reinforces Williams’s conclusion that Jesus has no exclusive hold on the doctrine of 
salvation.  Rather, inspired by Jesus’ ethics, parables, teachings, and experiences, the 
reproductive community can participate in salvation, in the enactment of the kingdom of 
God and the embodiment of resurrection hope. 
Finally, in light of the variation in third party experiences, I propose that a new 
category be added to Williams’s classification system.  In addition to coerced and 
voluntary surrogacy, I propose the addition of empowered surrogacy to describe the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 One might surmise that the American and Indian medical establishment further thwarts the 
relationships that might develop between third parties and intended parents.  Because the goal of the 
medical community is to produce a viable pregnancy—not to cultivate relationships—they may be said to 
subordinate the importance of relationships between the couple and third parties, thereby blocking the 
possibility of deeper engagement and flourishing between members of the reproductive community. 
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experience of third parties who are empowered by their experience of either literally or 
metaphorically creating new life.  Empowered surrogacy is predicated upon Jesus’ 
ministerial vision as Williams describes it, and it strives to use the phenomena of 
surrogacy or gamete donation as vehicles that work towards the manifestation of the 
kingdom of God for all.  To that end, exploitation and relationship denial—those things 
that define both coerced and voluntary surrogacy—have no place in empowered 
surrogacy.  Instead, empowered surrogacy arises when the reproductive community 
works together to create new life, both literally in the form of a baby and within the lives 
of all its members.  Grounded in mutual respect and relationship, empowered surrogacy 
allows humans to become co-creators of the kingdom of God in a practical, powerful 
way, thereby showing, as Williams suggests, that resurrection hope can be realized in this 
world, in our own lives and in the lives that we create. 
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to put data from third party assisted reproduction 
practices in the United States, India, and Israel into conversation with Delores Williams’ 
writings on the theological significance of surrogacy.  I sought to describe the 
experiences of third party participants in contemporary contexts, paying particular 
attention to the role of power.  Utilizing Williams’ scholarship, I questioned whether 
gamete donation and surrogacy by nature promulgate exploitation and abuse or whether it 
is possible for these procedures to be life-giving—both literally and metaphorically—to 
all participants.  To that end, I concluded that the value of third party procedures like 
surrogacy rests upon its use and that it can hold positive value when participants take 
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steps to ensure that modern day practices promote empowered surrogacy through the 
mindful cultivation of Jesus’ ministerial vision within human relationships. 
The following chapter may be interpreted as a continuation of the work begun 
here.  Whereas this chapter focused on the experience of third parties, the following 
chapter will discuss the experience of intended parents in order to more clearly 
understand the motives that bring them to third party assisted reproduction in the first 
place.  Interfacing this data with the theological work of Sallie McFague will allow me to 
present a new metaphor for God that may speak to modern Christians in a new way.  This 
metaphor may hopefully be seen as yet another manifestation of the ministerial vision, for 
by cultivating life-giving language for God, humans in turn may cultivate life-giving 
practices and relationships in both third party reproduction and other contexts.  To that 
task, therefore, the next chapter turns.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TOWARDS A NEW GOD METAPHOR: A CONVERSATION 
 BETWEEN THE METAPHORICAL THEOLOGY OF 
SALLIE MCFAGUE AND THE EXPERIENCE OF 
INTENDED PARENTS 
 
From the time we are infants, we construct our world through metaphor.1  –Sallie 
McFague 
   
Introduction 
A key premise of this chapter is that religious and secular language matter.  How 
we define God is influenced by the words we use, and this framing, in turn, influences 
how we live out both God-human and inter-human relationships.  Secular language 
matters too, for the same reasons: How we live out our earthly relationships is at least in 
part driven by how we frame them, and of specific relevance to this project, how we as a 
society frame the structure known as the “family” may have important consequences for 
those who struggle with negative reproductive events. 
This chapter will argue that biology largely maps the definition of “family” in the 
United States, thereby creating a model that shapes the imagination of individuals who 
live within the culture.  To that end, when individuals cannot bear biological children, 
they are confronted with the challenge of creating a family in a society that holds a 
normative model that does not accommodate them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 15. 
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In what way, then, might a new metaphor for the God-human relationship and 
family relationships emerge from the process of thinking about the experiences of 
intended parents with the assumption that the God-human relationship maps inter-human 
relationships?  Considering that question will become the focus of this chapter, the 
ultimate goal of which is to propose a new metaphor for the God-world relationship that 
emerges from correlating Sallie McFague’s metaphorical theology with data from the 
experience of intended parents.   
To that end, this chapter proposes that practical theology can assist in reshaping 
the imaginary that is available to intended parents and those who work with them, 
thereby opening the possibility for a transformative shift in the perception of third party 
assisted reproduction.  In other words, by proposing a new metaphor for God-human 
relations, inter-human relations may be reformulated in a way that helps intended parents 
navigate the terrain of third party reproduction while offering them a new understanding 
of what it means to be a family.  My goal, then, by offering these new formulations, is to 
name God-human relationships and inter-human relationships in a way that promotes 
healing for intended parents and their community, offering them a relevant vocabulary 
for God as well as the opportunity to thrive in their family relationships. 
Sallie McFague on Metaphor and Relationship 
 Sallie McFague is a contemporary feminist and ecological theologian whose 
career emerges from a study on the nature of religious language, which she calls 
“metaphorical theology.”  This is the study of how humans speak about God and the role 
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that metaphor plays in expressing the relationship between God and humans.2   
For McFague, all language is metaphorical.  Indeed, as McFague explains it, “we 
always think by indirection,” making language a perpetual approximation of reality rather 
than the embodiment of it.  As she writes,  
From the time we are infants, we construct our world through metaphor; that is, just 
as young children learn the meaning of the color red by finding the thread of 
similarity through many dissimilar objects (red ball, red apple, red cheeks), so we 
constantly ask when we do not know how to think about something, “What is it 
like?”3 
 
As a result of this mechanism for constructing our world, it is impossible for us—
either through language or any other communicational means—to exactly encapsulate the 
entirety, the complexity of what a given object or concept is.  What we can do, however, 
is speak metaphorically about it.  To that end, McFague defines a metaphor as that which 
allows us to see “one thing as something else, pretending ‘this’ is ‘that’ because we do 
not know how to talk about ‘this,’ so we use ‘that’ as a way of saying something about 
it.”4  By expressing “this” as “that,” humans are able to communicate new concepts, 
thereby deepening our understanding of that which might be difficult to voice or 
comprehend.  As McFague explains it, metaphors, “give us new insight; a good metaphor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 McFague characterizes herself in The Body of God, stating that she is “a feminist theologian, that 
is, one who has criticized the androcentric, hierarchical, dualistic models of God in the Christian tradition 
and suggested some alternatives.  More recently, as I recognize the interlocking character of oppression, 
most notably that of women and nature, I have become an ‘ecological theologian’ as well.”  See The Body 
of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 13-14. 
 
3 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 15-6. 
 
4 Ibid., 15. 
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moves us to see our ordinary world in an extraordinary way,”5 such that a metaphorical 
theology, “will emphasize personal, relational categories in its language about God but 
not necessarily as the tradition has interpreted these categories.”6  For instance, McFague 
suggests that a reading of the biblical text will not necessarily undo the metaphor of God 
as father; however, readers may be surprised to find that fatherhood is depicted in a way 
that both mirrors and does not mirror the patriarchal values that often define fatherhood 
in our own world.  Likewise, McFague argues that the faithful will find make surprising 
revelations about concepts like ‘person’ or ‘relationship’ in reading the parables of Jesus, 
which utilize metaphors for the purpose of reconfiguring unhealthy hierarchical or 
relationship models in surprising ways. 
Why Metaphors? 
As the above quotation indicates, McFague believes that metaphors generally 
allow for the communication of new concepts by creating similarities and dissimilarities 
with perceived known concepts.  To that end, McFague explains that metaphors are so 
powerful because they embody the way we naturally communicate: By using words to 
approximate “this” in terms of “that,” we are able to make sense of Unknown X by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Sallie TeSelle [McFague], Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 4. 
 
6 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 21.  Later in the same text, McFague elaborates, writing that, 
“The distinctive goal of a metaphorical theology is to assess the ways in which the foundational language 
of parables and Jesus as parable—with their characteristics of openness, tension, relativity, indirection, and 
transformation—have been retained in the course of the various translation languages comprising theology.  
A metaphorical theology attempts to consider the relationships among metaphor, model, and concept for 
the purpose both of justifying dominant, founding models as true but not literal, and of discovering other 
appropriate models that for cultural, political, and social reasons have been suppressed.”  See McFague, 
Metaphorical Theology, 103. 
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figuring out how it is similar or dissimilar to Known Y.7 This means that we learn 
indirectly, through metaphors that express similarities and dissimilarities rather than 
through concrete embodiments of absolutes.  
As she understands it, the indirect nature of the language we use generally maps 
onto religious language, so that just as young children discover the concept “red” not so 
much by direct knowledge as through a series of connections made by similar and 
dissimilar approximations, so humans discover God the same way.  Religious language, 
therefore, does not express directly what God is so much as it expresses the same kinds of 
approximations, relationships, similarities, and dissimilarities that allow us to make sense 
of secular ideas.  The end result is that metaphors allow God to be known while also 
impressing that there is something unknown and mysterious about the Divine that cannot 
be encapsulated by approximations of “this” in terms of “that.”  In McFague’s own 
words: 
Poets use metaphor all the time because they are constantly speaking about the 
great unknowns—mortality, love, fear, joy, guilt, hope, and so on.  Religious 
language is deeply metaphorical for the same reason, and it is therefore no surprise 
that Jesus’ most characteristic form of teaching, the parables, should be extended 
metaphors.”8 
 
Key to McFague’s theological structure, therefore, is the way that metaphors provide the 
basis for religious language and understanding by expressing what can be known about 
the Divine while also acknowledging that there are elements that remain unknown.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Ibid., 16. 
 
8 Ibid., 15. 
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recognition that there is an unknowable component to metaphor is, for her, essential to 
the theological project for two reasons: First, as stated above, indirect communication is 
the norm for humans, the way that we come to gain knowledge about a variety of 
concepts from an early age.  Second, however, is that this is also the mechanism Jesus 
chose to communicate God to humanity: 
If metaphor is the way we enlarge our world and change it—that is, if the only way 
we have of dealing with the unfamiliar and new is in terms of the familiar and the 
old, thinking of “this” as “that” although we know the new thing is both like and 
unlike the old—if all this is the case, then it is no surprise that Jesus taught in 
parables or that many see him as a parable of God.  For he introduced a new, 
strange way of being in the world, a way that could be grasped only through the 
indirection of stories of familiar life which both “were and were not” the kingdom.  
And he himself was in the world in a new, strange way which was in many respects 
an ordinary life but one which also, as with the parables, called the mores and 
conventions of ordinary live into radical question.9 
Relationships and the Root-Metaphor of Christianity 
 
According to McFague, metaphors are essential to the task of theology because it 
is beyond human capacity to encapsulate God absolutely within language; ergo, all of our 
ways of speaking about God must be metaphoric attempts to express the inexpressible.  
As stated above, this limitation arises in part because all language is metaphorical.  
Summarizing McFague to that end, David Bromell writes that,  
There is [for McFague], remember, no pre-linguistic, uninterpreted access to our 
reality.  We deal only with old, and new, pictures of reality, and our models do not 
picture objects but rather an unfamiliar structure of relationships in terms of a more 
familiar structure.10 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 18. 
 
10 David J. Bromell, “Sallie McFague’s ‘Metaphorical Theology,’ Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 61, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 493. 
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From McFague’s perspective, therefore, our limitations prevent us from making exact 
observations about God, though that does not keep some humans from trying.  Yet 
McFague critiques those who assume they can enclose God so adroitly, explaining that 
they are in fact too comfortable in their assumptions about a specific way of looking at 
reality and are unwilling to acknowledge its socially constructed nature or to 
acknowledge that all learning about God is indirect and therefore contains an element of 
the unknown.11  In the doing of theology, therefore, one must be mindful of that risk. 
McFague goes on to suggest that one of the risks that theologians are particularly 
prone to taking is that they assume that they can define with certainty God’s ontological 
status.  Rather, McFague maintains that metaphorical expressions are an essential 
component of theology precisely because God is not so much defined by ontology as by a 
shared relationship with humanity that is expressed through the life of Jesus and the New 
Testament parables, which are themselves metaphorical.12  This relationship between 
God and humans, in turn, frames how humans relate to each other; hence, it becomes 
important not only for explaining the God-human relationship but for grounding inter-
human ones as well.  Historically, however, McFague suggests that theologians have 
tried to understand God through ontological arguments instead, thereby precluding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For an intriguing contrast between Sallie McFague and Mary Daly on this point, see Wanda 
Warren Berry, “Feminist Theology: The ‘Verbing’ of Ultimate/Intimate Reality in Mary Daly,” in Feminist 
Interpretations of Mary Daly: Re-Reading the Canon, ed., Sarah Lucia Hoagland and Marilyn Frye 
(University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), 37-39. 
 
12 Ibid., 31. 
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consideration of this relational dimension.13   
Aiming to respond to this gap, McFague invokes philosopher Stephen Pepper’s 
term of “root-metaphor” to define the significance of the God-human relationship, 
delineating it as the guiding theological principle of Christianity.14  In the words of Earl 
MacCormac, that root-metaphor is, “the most basic assumption about the nature of the 
world or experience that we can make when we try to give a description of it,” and, in the 
case of Christianity, McFague surmises that the kingdom of God defines it as the 
embodiment of the hope for the God-human relationship.15  To that end, the kingdom of 
God is depicted partially through both the New Testament parables and the life of Jesus, 
but not completely, for it is impossible to encompass the root-metaphor in its entirety 
because of language’s indirectness.16 
Yet if McFague refrains from offering many details about the root-metaphor, she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., 31-66. 
 
14 Ibid., 28, 194.  See also Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses: A Study in Relevance (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1961).  Here Pepper opposes logical positivism, arguing that all data is 
necessarily subject to interpretation by the interpreter, thereby pressing against the assumption that 
objectivity exists.  In the work, Pepper coins the term “root metaphor” to mean the guiding principle or 
grounding for any interpretation. 
 
15 Earl R. MacCormac, Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1976), 93.  See also McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 28; 26-7. 
 
16 McFague’s choice to locate the exemplification of Christianity’s root-metaphor in the kingdom 
of God as exemplified by the person of Jesus and the New Testament parables is not without critique, 
however.  David Bromell has argued the irony of McFague replacing the dominant metaphor of God as 
father with another dominant metaphor of the kingdom of God.  Moreover, from his perspective, the 
kingdom of God metaphor comes with its own set of problems, namely that the relational elements within it 
are not clearly defined.  It would seem then that the metaphor McFague chooses to work with is defined 
more by what it is not than what it is: The metaphor is not God as father.  It is not obviously hegemonic or 
authoritarian.  But what exactly defines the root-metaphor, Bromell feels, is not clearly elucidated.  
Bromell, "Sallie McFague’s ‘Metaphorical Theology,’” 497.  See also Ted Peters.  “McFague’s 
Metaphors.”  Dialog 27, no. 2 (1988): 131-42. 
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does maintain that the divine-human relationship is key to understanding it.  In her own 
words: 
The broadest type of theological model—the metaphysical model of the relations 
between God, human being, and the world—is without limit and hence 
unfalsifiable.  This is the root-metaphor or original model.  In the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, it is characteristically expressed in terms of personal relations…. This 
“model of models” is understood as a cosmic, metaphysical drama of relationships, 
of action and response, which includes everything that exists.   17 
 
To that end, the root-metaphor of Christianity becomes inherently relational.  From 
McFague’s perspective, everything that exists does so in relationship to God.  Therefore, 
every element of creation is an inherently relational being, including the creation of 
human beings.  As a result, transformation towards the enactment of the kingdom of God 
becomes a relational transformation.  Phrased differently, it is by transforming 
relationships—be they inter-human or God-human relationships—that the kingdom of 
God comes into being. 
 
The Problematic God as Father Model 
McFague argues that historically, theologians and other Christian leaders have 
expressed the root-metaphor through the metaphor of “God the father,” accompanied by a 
literal interpretation of that language.  As McFague understands it, that metaphor has not 
enabled the kind of inter-human relationships that represented the kingdom of God but 
rather facilitated hegemony, dominance, and abuse.  At stake for McFague, then, is how 
we express Christianity’s root-metaphor so as to allow inter-human relationships to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 104. 
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mirror the kingdom of God. 
To understand the reasons why McFague attributes certain unsalutary inter-human 
practices to the paternal image of God, it is necessary to understand how she 
distinguishes between metaphors and models.  Because Christianity’s root-metaphor is a 
relational one, and because of language’s limits, McFague argues that it is incorrect for 
one metaphorical expression of God to dominate others because it would claim 
authoritative knowledge about the relationship that humans cannot assume to have, due to 
the indirect nature of language itself.  Terming these dominant metaphors “models,” 
McFague concludes that Christianity throughout history has had a model rather than a 
metaphor to express God’s identity—namely, God as father—and this model has 
obscured other ways of expressing the relationship God shares with humanity.  
She also suggests that the God as father model validates other patriarchal models 
that exist within human societies, thereby rendering it not only harmful in its exclusivity 
but also harmful in how it maps onto praxis.  Referencing the work of feminist theologian 
Sheila Collins, McFague explains that, 
A whole series of “orders of creation,” hierarchically arranged, developed in 
Christianity, a pattern of superior and inferior in which men stood below God, 
Jesus, and the angels but above women, children, and the beasts.  That “superior-
subordinate paradigm” is still with us, Collins insists, in relations between husband 
and wife, boss and employee, priest and parishioner, white and black, affluent and 
poor; at best, she says, it is paternalism, and at worst, tyranny.18 
 
From McFague’s perspective, this tyranny filters down to ecclesial and secular practices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid., 148.  See also Sheila D. Collins, A Different Heaven and Earth: A Feminist Perspective on 
Religion (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press), 1974, 67. 
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because of the God as father model’s dominance and the regard with which it is held.  To 
that end, the model bears practical power within lived experience that is ultimately 
insufficient to the task of informing healthy inter-human relationships.   
The Twin Problems of the “God as father” Model: Idolatry and Irrelevance 
McFague further explains that many Christians adopt the “God as father” model 
with such literalness and exclusivity that their reverence essentially amounts to a form of 
idolatry.  As a result, Christians over the centuries have absolutized the model of God as 
father such that they perceive God to be a literal reflection of paternal attributes rather 
than a metaphorical representation of that which exists beyond language’s confines.19  As 
McFague writes,  
Unless one has a sense of the mystery surrounding existence, of the profound 
inadequacy of all our thoughts and words, one will most likely identify God with 
our words: God becomes father, mother, lover, friend…The root-metaphor of 
Christianity is not God the father but the kingdom or rule of God, a relationship 
between the divine and the human that no model can encompass.20 
 
Meanwhile, as some Christians hold the paternal God model with excessive 
reverence, McFague argues that others find it wholly inadequate to the task of describing 
God, citing the historic suffering and hegemonic inter-human practices in which it has 
been complicit.  Moreover, as awareness rises about the increasing plurality of human 
perspectives informed by factors like economic class, geography, social status, race, 
cultural background, education, and gender, awareness simultaneously rises about how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 21. 
 
20 Ibid., 2, 146. 
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certain metaphors are only meaningful within certain contexts.  To that end, the model of 
God as father becomes meaningless for many, including feminists like Elaine Pagels—
who critiques the patriarchal model on the grounds that the lack of feminine symbolism 
for the Divine translates into patriarchal inter-human practices—or Carol Christ and 
Judith Plaskow, who suggest that a male God named by men shapes our interpretation of 
the world in a way that excludes women.21  Conclusively, then, McFague states that,  
“Patriarchy” then is not just that most of the images of the deity in Western religion 
are masculine—king, father, husband, lord, master—but it is the Western way of 
life: it describes patterns of governance at national, ecclesiastical, business, and 
family levels….And the human images we choose for the divine influence the way 
we feel about ourselves, for these images are “divinized” and hence raised in status. 
22 
 
In other words, how we interpret our own identities and relationships is influenced by the 
language we use for the Divine, such that there is a direct relationship between language 
and the constitution of relationships.  Certain language—like “God as father” language—
may do much to uphold the role of men while excluding or disempowering women.  
Likewise, a hypothetical choice to say that God is a frog would certainly elevate this 
amphibian but might, in turn, overlook the way that humans reflect the divine image.  In 
short, religious language matters, and it matters not only because it says something about 
the divine identity but because it says something about ours as well. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Elaine Pagels, “What Become of God the Mother?  Conflicting Images of God in Early 
Christianity” in Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion, ed. Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 107-120.  See also in the same anthology: Christ and Plaskow, 
“Introduction: Womanspirit Rising,” 7. 
 
22 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 9, 10. 
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McFague’s Anti-Ontological and Biblical Warrants 
The twin problems of idolatry and irrelevance shape McFague’s solution to the 
problem of religious language, as does her perspective on ontology and the authority of 
the biblical text.  Too often, McFague suggests, theological discussions about the 
doctrine of God revolve around ontological premises that undermine what she perceives 
to be the root-metaphor that God’s identity is grounded in relationships.  Jesus’ 
incarnation is one of her primary warrants for this argument: That God adopted flesh 
meant that God became a human being, and by nature of becoming embodied, engaged in 
relationships.  To that end, she writes that, “Whatever more one may wish to say about 
him [Jesus], he was a person relating to other persons in loving service and transforming 
power.”23  Key to developing her metaphorical theology, then, is the repeated premise 
that God is defined not by ontological status but by the divine-human relationship.  As a 
result, therefore, the goal of a successful theological metaphor is not to make a statement 
about God’s ontology but rather to express the kingdom of God relationship as fully and 
richly as possible.   
 She furthermore suggests that Jesus’ life itself serves as a kind of “parable” of 
God, an “extended metaphor…which is the context for envisaging and understanding the 
strange and extraordinary.”  In this way—as with other metaphors for God—Jesus’ 
incarnation and earthly journey become opportunities for humans to learn about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 20. 
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transcendent and incomprehensive God through the vehicle of ordinary human life.24  
This, in turn, allows Jesus to serve as a teaching tool for humans, an embodied example 
of the kind of relationships God seeks to cultivate with the world.  McFague summarizes 
by writing that, 
What is critical here is a new quality of relationship, both toward God and toward 
other human beings.  The content of the root-metaphor of Christianity, then, is a 
mode of personal relationship, exemplified in the parables and with its chief 
exemplar Jesus himself, a tensive relationship distinguished by trust in God’s 
impossible way of love in contrast to the loveless ways of the world.25 
 
In addition to referencing the life of Jesus, McFague also prioritizes the New 
Testament parables Jesus told as grounds for her metaphorical theology.  She explains 
that Jesus’ parables function as his primary teaching tool, showing that he communicated 
the essence of the God-human relationship through extended metaphors that would help 
them understand that which would otherwise be incommunicable: 
The parables of the New Testament are united by a number of characteristics, of 
which one of the most outstanding is their concern with relationships of various 
kinds.  What is important in the parables is not who the characters are (a static 
notion) but what they do (a dynamic one).  The plot is always the heart of a 
parable, what a character or several characters decide in matters having to do with 
their relationships with each other.  Whether one thinks of the parable of the 
Prodigal Son, the Good Samaritan, the Unjust Steward, or the Great Supper, it is 
relationships and decisions about them that are critical.26 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 McFague, Speaking in Parables, 2-3.  See also McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 15-20. 
 
25 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 108.  See also page 109, where McFague explains that, 
“Jesus is inextricably linked with the root-metaphor as both the proclaimer of the kingdom and the way to 
the kingdom.  Its distinctive note is not a new view of God or a new image of human being; neither divine 
nor human nature is at its center, but a new quality of relationship, a way of being in the world under the 
rule of God.  This way of being is highly metaphorical—abjuring identification, possession, absolutism, 
stasis, conventionality, and spiritualism.” 
 
26 McFague, Metaphorical Theology 20. 
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Yet even these parables, McFague says, are not complete depictions of the root-
metaphor.  As she explains, “No one parable tells of the ‘kingdom of God’ and even all 
together they do not add up to a definition of the kingdom, to a doctrine or concept of the 
kingdom.”27  McFague therefore refrains from affording the biblical text the authority of 
offering a full and complete vision of the ultimate revelation of the Christian faith.  To 
that end, her willingness to critique the authority of the biblical text leads some 
theologians like Jean C. Lambert to conclude that McFague possesses, “a willingness to 
journey with a mixed multitude because the company is challenging and freeing, and to 
entertain the possibility that destinations initially understood as different may turn out to 
be on the same continent after all.”28   
In contrast, however, theologian Terrence Reynolds suggests that McFague has 
gone too far in her interpretation of the biblical text.  Contrasting her scholarship with 
that of narrative theologian George Lindbeck, he suggests that their assessment of the 
biblical narrative distinguishes their otherwise shared pragmatic approach to theology.  
According to Reynolds,  
She [McFague] departs from Lindbeck over his appraisal of the coherence and 
performative success of the biblical story.  Where Lindbeck argues on behalf of the 
semiotic universe of the tradition and for its identification of the God about whom it 
speaks, McFague vigorously insists upon its deconstruction.  The rationale for this 
attack is multi-layered.  Most importantly, McFague has come to reject the 
identification of God as it is reflected in the biblical narratives because of its 
dreadful performative record.  The God of tradition no longer satisfies her as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., 43. 
 
28 Jean C. Lambert. “An ‘F Factor’?  The New Testament in Some White, Feminist, Christian 
Theological Construction.”  Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, no. 2 (Fall, 1985): 104. 
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true God because He has failed pragmatically.29 
 
Reading through Reynolds, one might characterize McFague as a performative 
pragmatist who assesses the value of the biblical text based on how it translates into inter-
human experience.  In other words, the biblical text—including those portions that 
reinforce the God as father metaphor—is only as authoritative as its track record in inter-
human relationships indicates, and that track record, from McFague’s perspective, is not 
positive.  As a result, McFague allows herself to critique the text and to supplement it 
with new, revitalized language for the root-metaphor. 
Here one may also wonder whether Reynolds critiques McFague too harshly, for 
McFague does not go so far as to suggest that the God as father image—or the biblical 
texts that reinforce it—is a poor metaphor.  What lived experience challenges, however, 
is the efficacy of the God as father model, for as a model, its exclusivity not only fails to 
represent the root-metaphor relational dimension of Christianity for many in a 
meaningful way, but it also results in idolatrous, hegemonic attitudes and practices.  To 
that end, Kathryn Tanner suggests that Reynolds’s assessment might be nuanced, 
especially given the breadth of McFague’s work.  Commenting on The Body of God, she 
summarizes,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Terrence Reynolds. "Parting Company At Last : Lindbeck and McFague in Substantive 
Theological Dialogue." Concordia Theological Quarterly 63, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 113. ATLA Religion 
Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost (accessed July 24, 2013).  For a lengthier discussion of 
McFague’s perspective on the various schools of literary and theological criticism, especially 
deconstructionism, see McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1987).  21-9.  For a broad overview of the conversation on different methodologies in the 
intersecting fields of religion and literature, see Bednarowski, Mary Farrell. "New conversations in religion 
and literature." Arts 1, no. 3 (June 1, 1989): 4-7. ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost 
(accessed April 7, 2013). 
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The bottom line for her [McFague], however, as a Christian theist is an agential and 
benevolent God.  Although the organization of her argument in the book disguises 
the fact, she has, then, in quite significant sense started from a Christian 
perspective, working, as she says, retrospectively to read into a common creation 
story what cannot be read off it.…[However] her discussion of God’s relation to the 
world remains substantially indebted…to science in a way that a retrospective faith-
seeking-understanding method of earlier times often was not.  As far as I can tell 
there is no agential and benevolent working of God to speak of here besides the 
workings of the various enspirited bodies of this world that the natural and human 
sciences most adequately describe.  For all intents and purposes the agential and 
benevolent working of God is simply equated with those processes of enspirited 
bodies; and, if contemporary science is to be believed, they have very little 
purposive, let alone supremely benevolent, direction to them.30 
 
To that end, McFague is not discarding the God as father metaphor or the biblical text 
that supports it, though she is asking the reader to consider the extent to which the 
metaphor—and the biblical text that documents it—may be incomplete or not intended 
for literal interpretation.31  Meanwhile, she encourages readers to consider other 
metaphors that could illuminate something previously overlooked about Christianity’s 
root-metaphor, thereby opening the possibility for humans to deepen their knowledge of 
and relationship with the Divine.32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Kathryn Tanner. "The body of God: an ecological theology." Modern Theology 10, no. 4 
(October 1, 1994): 418. ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost (accessed July 18, 2013). 
 
31 Reinforcing McFague’s theory of parables as allegorical, New Testament scholar Mary Ford 
offers the following explanation for the growth of literal interpretations: “Perhaps the most obvious point to 
make is that no one ever thought of the parables as realistic narratives until the 19th century, because such 
realistic narratives did not exist until shortly before that time.  Indeed the primary model the critics use 
(uonconsciously [sic], but obviously) for realistic narratives, the realistic novel, only came into full flower 
in that century.” Mary Ford. "Towards the restoration of allegory: Christology, epistemology and narrative 
structure." St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 34, no. 2-3 (1990): 179.  ATLA Religion Database with 
ATLASerials, EBSCOhost (accessed July 14, 2013).  See also Sallie TeSelle [McFague], Speaking in 
Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975),121. 
 
32 Ibid., 29. 
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Alternatives to the Paternal Model 
In response to her concern about the dominance of the paternal God model, 
McFague offers alternative metaphors for God throughout her writings—including God 
as mother, lover, friend, and the world as God’s body—that she proposes to nuance 
implications of the Christian root-metaphor for God-human relationships.  These multiple 
metaphors might be said to function as puzzle pieces that interlock to create a full picture 
of that which no single metaphor alone is capable of encompassing.   Hence, by offering 
varied metaphors, McFague ultimately hopes to eradicate the power of the paternal model 
while presenting new images that complement one another in a way that more fully 
expresses the otherwise inexpressible root-metaphor of Christianity.  At stake in any 
metaphor McFague proposes, therefore, is not only the logical priorities that ground that 
specific image but also how God-human—and, in turn, inter-human—relationships 
function.   
In order to explain this concept more fully, I will present the details of two of 
McFague’s metaphors: the metaphor of God as friend and the metaphor of the world as 
God’s body.  By so doing, I seek to state the logical priorities of each as well as to 
explore how the root-metaphor of Christianity functions through varied imagery and how 
each metaphor translates into inter-human praxis. 
God as Friend 
Prioritized in McFague’s God as friend metaphor is both humans’ free will to 
choose to engage in a divine-human relationship as well as our ontological maturity.  
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From McFague’s perspective, the model of the paternal God casts humanity into the role 
of children, thereby necessitating that humanity function in a physically, emotionally, and 
intellectually child-like way with a parent who can know all, see all, provide all.  The 
friend relationship lacks this dynamic, for, under McFague’s definition, friends are 
neither dependent on nor subservient to one another but instead are mutually 
interdependent.33 Contrasting it with other relational types, McFague explains that 
friendship is freely chosen, whereas children are the desired product of a parent and 
lovers are sexually attracted to one another in such a primal way that it almost isn’t a 
choice: 
The basis of friendship is freedom, and that is part of its power: all other 
relationships are ringed with duty or utility or desire.  But once chosen, a bond is 
created that is one of the strongest bonds: the bond of trust.  It is the bond of 
commitment, each to the other, never to be disloyal.  The sin against the friend is 
betrayal.34 
 
Therefore, if God and humans interact as friends, then humans have a certain level of 
maturity that allows them to become participants in manifesting the kingdom of God.  To 
that end, McFague writes that, “God as friend asks us, as adults, to become associates in 
that work.  The right name for those involved in this ongoing, sustaining, trustworthy, 
committed work for the world is neither parents nor lovers but friends.”35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 McFague, Models of God, 165. 
 
34 McFague, Models of God, 160.  See also McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 178-194.  For more 
of a contrast between McFague’s model of friend and her model of lover, see Models of God, 168: “To be 
friends with God is the most astounding possible, for whereas a mother desires your existence and a lover 
finds you valuable, a friend likes you.” 
 
35 Ibid. 
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That characteristic, in turn, maps onto our inter-human praxes so that we 
undertake these with both freedom and maturity.  We can choose with whom to be in 
relationship, and, in choosing to accept those individuals into our lives, we also agree to 
adopt a mutually interdependent way of communicating with them.  To that end, the 
friendship metaphor prevents the kinds of authoritarian inter-human practices permitted 
by the God as father model.  As it translates to inter-human praxis, the friendship 
metaphor therefore privileges human freedom and maturity in such a way that its 
relational structures can be built upon parity instead of hegemony. 
That said, while the God as friend metaphor provides a corrective to hierarchical 
models for God like the paternal model, it proves lacking in other ways.  The familiarity 
of friendship, for instance, seemingly precludes opportunities for transcendence that 
historically characterizes the Christian deity.  It likewise precludes any ontological 
distinction between God and humans, a concept held dear by many Christians as well as 
theological giants like Anselm of Canterbury.  At a more basic level, it raises the question 
of whether God upholds the three attributes most commonly associated with the Divine in 
Christian tradition: omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence.  Friends, however 
wonderful, possess none of these three qualities.  Therefore, the metaphor of God as 
friend raises the question of how even this most basic Christian tenet can be upheld.   
As a response to such critiques, it is important to remember that McFague is not 
aiming to provide a complete picture of the Divine but rather a partial and perhaps 
overlooked perspective, much like as ant stands in front of an elephant only to glimpse its 
tail or its leg but not its entire being.  If the ant moves, it might see the elephant’s snout 
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but lose view of its hindquarters; the view, therefore, is never complete, though different 
angles may provide different perspectives of the same whole.  From McFague’s 
perspective, therefore, we may be said to be like the ant viewing the elephant.  This, in 
turn, is why McFague repeatedly impresses that multiple metaphors are needed that 
together might paint a more complete picture of the Divine than one alone is able to do.  
Let us therefore turn to another of her metaphors to see how it complements yet differs 
from the first. 
The World as God’s Body 
If McFague prioritizes relational freedom in the friendship expression of the root-
metaphor, her model of the world as God’s body prioritizes God’s immanence and the 
goodness of the body.  As she explains in the introduction to The Body of God,  
We will suggest that the primary belief of the Christian community, its doctrine of 
the incarnation (the belief that God is with us here on earth), be radicalized beyond 
Jesus of Nazareth to include all matter….As long as we refuse to imagine God as 
embodied, we imply…that the body is inferior.36   
 
To that end, in suggesting that the world is God’s body, McFague not only argues that 
bodies matter but that any act of violence, injustice, or ecological destruction done to the 
earth becomes an act against God, thereby drawing attention to the significance of 
previously overlooked bodies, including the bodies of minorities, the poor, women, and 
nature.37  This does not, however, mean that the earth and its contents can be equated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 McFague, The Body of God, xi.  See also pages 19-21. 
 
37 Ibid., 16-22.  To that end, McFague categorizes nature as the “new poor,” meaning that like the 
human poor, nature has become disenfranchised and neglected by those with power in society.  See 
McFague, The Body of God, 165. 
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with God; rather, McFague argues that the only way we can know God is through the 
world, the locus where God chooses to self-mediate: 
The world, creation, is not identified or confused with God.  Yet it is the place 
where God is present to us.  Christianity’s most distinctive belief is that divine 
reality is always mediated through the world, a belief traditionally expressed in the 
Chalcedonian formula that Christ was “fully God, fully man.”…In both instances, 
the Word is made flesh, God is available to us only through the mediation of 
embodiment…. Incarnationalism, radicalized, means that we do not, ever, at least in 
this life, see God face to face, but only through the mediation of the bodies we pay 
attention to, listen to, and learn to love and care for.38 
 
As a result of this fundamental tenet, McFague makes the provocative argument that in 
destroying the earth, we are participating in the destruction of God, because, while “a 
panentheistic model does not reduce God to the world…God is in the young woman 
killed in the accident and in the baby with birth defects as well as in those who suffer the 
loss or diminishment of their loved ones.”39  To that end, God participates in our losses, 
in suffering, in an embodied, intimate way that not only affects us but also affects God.40  
In turn, the embodied world—creation—becomes not only the site of divine-human 
suffering but also redemption: Because God is creation, salvation must take place within 
it.41 
McFague’s metaphor of the world as God’s body has implications for how we 
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understand space, temporality, and the role of the body.42  For McFague, because God is 
part of creation, and because God is in essence good, so too are bodies good.  To that end, 
privileging the body’s goodness becomes a fundamental priority for McFague, for in the 
metaphor of the world as God’s body, each of our bodies—indeed, the bodies of all 
creation—are part of God.  As she writes, when one accepts as axiomatic the metaphor of 
the world as God’s body, then it becomes evident that,  
The “God-part” will take care of itself if we can love and value the bodies.  That is 
what an incarnational theology assures us: it is right to have a nature spirituality.  In 
fact, we should have one….  All of us, living and nonliving, are one phenomenon, a 
phenomenon stretching over billions of years and containing untold numbers of 
strange, diverse, and marvelous forms of matter—including our own…[Therefore] I 
belong not only to my immediate family or country or even my species, but to the 
earth and all its life-forms.  I know this now.  The question is, can I, will I, live as if 
I did?  Will I accept my proper place in the scheme of things?  Will we, the human 
beings of the planet, do so?43 
 
Answering those questions and providing their implications becomes the focus of 
The Body of God.  Throughout the book, McFague parses out the significance of the body 
of God metaphor and its emphasis on solidarity for various Christian doctrines—
including cosmology, anthropology, and Christology—closing with a chapter on 
eschatology.  The goal in so doing is to re-imagine pivotal Christian doctrines in order to 
propose a “new shape for humanity, a new way of being in the world” that predicates 
itself upon “solidarity with all God’s creatures, especially the vulnerable.”44   
This attempt at witnessing the eschatological community—which she terms the 	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44 Ibid., 197. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
231	  
Church—takes on the following practical characteristics: 1. It values the unity of all 
creation and our own individuality, thereby recognizing that we are simultaneously 
interdependent and autonomous; 2. It asks us to see ourselves as part of creation, not the 
center of it, thereby encouraging us to eschew selfishness and keep in mind what actions 
must be taken for the good of the whole; 3. Salvation occurs when all of creation’s basic 
needs are met; 4. Those needs can only be met through solidarity with those who 
experience oppression; 5. As humans, we are called to be stewards of solidarity.45   
 McFague therefore maps the body of God metaphor for the purpose of developing 
not only its eschatological end but also the ethical implications that facilitate it, such that 
her logical priorities result in clear guidelines for praxis, especially in regard to ecology.  
Hence, one witnesses in the work the process of transforming the vocabulary that 
expresses the divine-human relationship into an ethic for lived experience.  As McFague 
summarizes, “The focus of this essay is on thinking differently so that we might behave 
differently.”46 
Yet if McFague’s metaphor strengthens the possibility for an ecological 
theological ethic by relocating God into the physical world, one might critique her for 
sacrificing God’s power in the process.  As she argues, God’s body is the earth, and the 
earth is being destroyed, yet God is not preventing its destruction, despite the fact that to 
destroy the earth is to destroy God’s body.  Here McFague seems to be dismissing the 
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historic belief that God is omnipotent, for if that were the case, then one would presume 
that God would prevent the destruction of God’s body.  Yet not only does God seem 
powerless to prevent self-destruction, but God also seems to be unable to prevent 
destruction specifically instantiated by a part of creation, namely humans.  This seems to 
say that we can destroy God, and to say that we can destroy God has particular 
implications for both anthropology and the doctrine of God that seem to run contrary to 
much of Christian tradition.   
Yet, one might also recall that McFague does not assert that God is synonymous 
with the earth but rather that God is mediated through the earth.  Therefore, McFague is 
able to use this metaphor to yield ethical and pastoral implications for ecological 
theology and the care of bodies, nuancing her understanding of God in such a way as to 
promote those ideals, while not going quite so far as to compromise the divine essence.47  
Likewise, recall that for McFague any metaphor is a partial reflection rather than a 
perfect and complete representation of the Divine.  What she presents through the 
metaphor of the world as God’s body, therefore, is intended not to replace or supersede 
all other representations of God but rather to supplement those representations with a 
vision that might represent the root-metaphor in a new and relevant way.  Perhaps, then, 
the goal of the metaphor of the world as God’s body is not so much to impinge upon the 
ultimate possibility of divine omnipotence as it is to highlight divine vulnerability or 
solidarity. 
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Sin as Selfishness 
Within both metaphors of friendship and the world as God’s body, one notes that 
McFague holds solidarity as a key part of the root-metaphor that has implications for 
praxis.  Conversely, relationships also become central to her definition of sin within each.  
Phrased differently, if the relationship between God and humans as modeled in the life of 
Jesus and New Testament parables comprise the root-metaphor of Christianity, then acts 
that betray the principles of that relationship constitute sin such that sin becomes the act 
of ranking oneself above or apart from others, thereby eschewing relationships.  Ergo, sin 
occurs when people refuses to acknowledge that they are in relationship or refuse to value 
the other with whom they are in relationship.  As McFague summarizes, “Our sin is plain 
old selfishness—wanting to have everything for ourselves….Sin is limitless greed.”48 
McFague describes sin in different ways, depending on the metaphor she is 
working with, though the priority of selfishness remains consistent between each. When 
working with her metaphor of God as friend, she explains sin through language of 
betrayal—because loyalty to the friend and the free choice to be in friend relationships 
ground friendship, sin becomes the act of turning away from the relational loyalty to 
which one committed.49  In contrast, when dealing with the metaphor of the world as 
God’s body, McFague nuances sin somewhat differently.  Here sin becomes denying 
relationships not just with humans but also with all of creation.  Because humans cannot 
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exist apart from a relationship with all of creation—i.e. they need food grown in the soil, 
energy from the sun, heat from wood—they are of necessity in relationship with it.  
Hence, humans sin when they fail to acknowledge that they are in relationship with other 
humans and nature through virtue of their embodiment.  To that end, McFague writes 
that, 
It is obvious, then, what sin is in this metaphor of the world as God’s body: it is 
refusal to be part of the body, the special part we are as imago dei.  In contrast to 
the king-realm model, where sin is against God, here it is against the world.  To sin 
is not to refuse loyalty to the Liege Lord but to refuse to take responsibility for 
nurturing, loving, and befriending the body and all its parts.  Sin is the refusal to 
realize one’s radical interdependence with all that lives: it is the desire to set 
oneself apart from all others as not needing them or being needed by them.  Sin is 
the refusal to be the eyes, the consciousness, of the cosmos….If Christian 
discipleship is shaped by solidarity with the needy, including nature as the new 
poor, then natural evil is not limited to what happens to me and mine, and sin 
becomes the limitation of one’s horizon to the self.50 
 
One observes from this quotation the world as God’s body metaphor, its 
understanding of community, and its definition of sin have major implications for praxis.  
Yet even as McFague acknowledges that the body of God image could transform a 
variety praxes—including prenatal ones—she refrains from offering specific details of 
such transformations within the work itself beyond the previously mentioned guidelines.  
What she does conclude, however, is that applying the body of God metaphor in a world 
defined by its own material limitation is a complex task:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 McFague, The Body of God, 77, 174.  The limitation of one’s horizon is likewise central to 
McFague’s definition of natural evil.  Distinguishing between natural evil and sin, McFague explains how 
they overlap insofar as each roots itself in a kind of selfishness as defined by being unable to see beyond 
one’s personal horizon.  She writes that, “Natural evil and sin join at this one point for both are concerned 
with a limited horizon, the inability to identify with others outside of the self, the refusal to acknowledge 
that one is not the center of things.  Natural evil is narrowly interpreted as bad things happening to me and 
sin is the desire to have everything for oneself.”  See McFague, The Body of God, 175. 
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The range of ecotheological issues is endless, and the view from the body, 
especially the needy body, changes how we see every issue.  To make things more 
complex, the rights of some needy bodies are often in competition with the rights of 
other needy bodies.51    
 
This last sentence of this quotation in many ways encapsulates the issues that emerge 
when one considers third party assisted reproduction: Intended parents seek a baby.  
Donors or surrogates possess the bodily material intended parents lack to make that baby 
a reality, yet, as the chapter on Williams described, these third parties usually have needs 
of their own.  These needs may range from financial ones to the desire to contribute to the 
world in a meaningful way.  Navigating these waters of need, as this dissertation has 
shown, can therefore be treacherous and results in a variety of unhealthy relational 
practices. 
Putting McFague’s metaphorical theology into conversation with the experiences 
of intended parents may therefore illuminate a new dimension to third party reproduction 
and also help develop practical guidelines that can transform their use.  The practice of 
third party reproduction may likewise speak to metaphorical theology by offering a new 
metaphor that can reflect the root-metaphor while also illuminating its dimensions in a 
new way.  However, in order to undertake both these steps, it is necessary to gain a fuller 
picture of the experience of intended parents.  Towards this goal, the chapter now turns. 
The Supremacy of the Nuclear Biological Family Model 
That parenthood will be biological is often assumed, especially for those who are 
members of a heterosexual couple.  However, as I will argue throughout this section, the 	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nuclear biological family can function as a model in American culture—in McFague’s 
sense of the word—that is implicitly superior to other ways of being in family 
relationships.  This model becomes irrelevant for those who find they cannot bear 
children themselves, even as it is simultaneously held in such superior regard that one 
could say it functions as a cultural idol.  Hence, the twin problems of idolatry and 
irrelevance that McFague attributes to the God as father metaphor for God-human 
relationships can be seen in how the biological family model functions within inter-
human relationships.  Moreover, the effects of holding one model of family above others 
may lead to similar kinds of hegemonic and authoritarian inter-human practices that 
McFague attributes to the God as father model. 
The consequences of holding the nuclear biological family model in such high 
regard when it is unobtainable will be the focus of the following section.  I will discuss 
this first by providing evidence that the biological family functions as a model in the 
culture of the United States.  
The Primacy of the Biological Family Model 
 The United States has a long history of privileging families, biological families 
specifically.  Historically in the United States, large biological families were a sign of 
prosperity and therefore privileged over smaller family models or alternative family 
structures.   However, beginning in the nineteenth-century, family size began to decline 
due to a number of factors, primarily the rise of birth control and abortion.  Hence, as 
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quantitative historian Daniel Scott Smith calculates, between 1800 and 1900, the number 
of children per couple in the United States dropped from 7.04 to 3.56.52  
However, while the number of children per family continued to drop into the 
twentieth-century, a decrease in the number of biological children birthed by any given 
heterosexual couple did not correspond to a de-emphasis of the biological family model.  
Legally, for instance, biology continued to play a significant role in the definition of 
family, such that the opinion in the Washington state case of Andersen v. King County, 
which banned same-sex unions, was determined because same-sex unions cannot yield 
biological offspring.  In the words of Washington Supreme Court Justice Barbara A. 
Madsen, “limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers the procreation essential to 
the survival of the human race, and furthers the well-being of children by encouraging 
families where children are reared in homes headed by the children’s biological 
parents.”53 
 More recently, sociologists Brian Powell, Catherine Bolzendahl, Claudia Geist, 
and Lala Carr Steelman found that a significant portion of Americans continue to define 
the concept of “family” by the presence of biological children.  In studying same-sex 
relationships and how Americans define family, this group found that 45.3% of 
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America,” in Controlling Reproduction: An American History, ed. Andrea Tone (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
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Americans—a group they term “exclusionists”—define family through the traditional 
heterosexual family model.54  Within this group, approximately 33% explicitly mentioned 
the presence of biological children as the factor that defined a family, because biological 
children symbolize a new blood line formed between spouses.  To quote one member of 
the study, “A family is a married couple with children….Marriage is what makes the 
family, it makes it legal, because you have blood to be a family if the children carry the 
blood.”55  Or, as the authors of the study concluded, “The focus on blood indicates that, 
for exclusionists, it is not children per se who help make a family, but biological 
children.”56 
 While the moderate group that comprised 29% percent of the sociologists’ study 
tended to reference marriage less as a definitive family factor, this group continued to 
place strong emphasis upon the presence of biological children, though they sometimes 
nuancing their consideration of biological children to allow for adoption.  As one 
participant defined family: 
Well, I guess I would have to say, there have to be children involved or marriage.  I 
mean, any two people can live together.  I don’t think that makes them a family; I 
think that makes them friends.  I think to be a family there needs to be some kind of 
blood relation there.  I’m not necessarily concerned that the mother and the father, 
or that the same-sex couples, aren’t married if they’re raising children together.  But 
if there’s no kids and they’re not married, that doesn’t, to me—there needs to be 
either marriage or some kind of blood relation for that to be a family, I guess.57 	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While moderates did recognize adoptive children as part of the family, Powell, 
Bozendahl, Geist, and Steelman note that interviewees seemed to mention them more as 
an “afterthought” or, quoting sociologist Allen Fisher, as “still not quite as good as 
having your own.”58  As evidence, the sociologists cite one participant whose shifting 
definition of family throughout the interview characterized the sentiments of others in the 
moderate group: 
I think you should be related in some way, by marriage or, I don’t know, a family to 
me can be a man, two women and a couple of kids. I mean, I don’t think, I don’t 
consider just a man [and] a wife with no kids a family, I don’t know why.  Maybe 
that’s wrong.  I don’t know.  It’s an awful small family, and they are not really 
related.  [laughs]  I mean, they’re related by marriage, but they are not blood, you 
know.  I think family is blood, the same genes. [sighs] I don’t know.  I just think of 
families as being relations.59 
 
Later in the interview, that participant shifted her position to include adoptive children 
into the family structure when she said, “Not that there couldn’t be a wonderful family 
adoption thing going on….Well, I guess I consider [adoptive children and parents] a 
family, even though that’s not a blood relative.”60 
 Intriguingly, the smallest group interviewed for the study—whom the sociologists 
termed “inclusionists”—made up 25% of respondents, and of this group, only 1% 
mentioned children at all as a factor defining families.  For this cohort, relationships 
between partners transcended all other defining factors, including blood relations; for 	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members of this group, non-tradition structures including same-sex relationships and 
even platonic roommates could count as families.  One female participant summarized 
the views expressed by others this way, “I just feel like there’s an emotional connection, 
emotional bonding is sometimes a tighter bond than blood.”61 
 Even accounting for inclusionists, sociologist Lynn White notes that the primacy 
of the biological family model displays itself when one considers how Americans react to 
alternative family models, specifically stepfamilies.  In her review of research on how 
stepfamilies relate to one another during their lifespan, White notes that one reason 
stepfamilies may function differently than other family models is because these blended 
families are not bound by blood like historic heterosexual families are.  Citing 
sociobiological research, she explains that, 
The sociobiological argument (taken from Daly & Wilson, 1978) suggests that 
animals are reproductive strategists who maximize the survival of their genes into 
the next generation, in part by focusing nurturance on their own offspring.  Not only 
is their no genetic predisposition to nurture another’s children, such children may be 
seen as rivals who endanger one’s own children’s survival.  In many species 
(including some primates), males will kill a mate’s young from former unions, 
increasing the chances that her attention and resources will be devoted to bearing 
and nurturing his offspring.  This argument was noted by some scholars as an 
explanation for the higher likelihood that stepchildren will be abused or killed 
(Dobash, Dobash, Wilson & Daily, 1992; Finkelhor, 1979).62 
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While White admits that other factors can transcend blood to create the possibility of 
loving, healthy relationships in stepfamilies, she references work by psychologists, 
systems theorists, legal, and family scholars to conclude that in general, American do not 
nurture stepfamilies to be as supportive as biological family environments.  She also 
concludes that this disparity is not a given and that efforts can be made to change the 
dynamic, though she notes that for the time being, “stepfamilies will not be as effective 
as biological families in support to members.”63  In other words, while stepfamily 
systems may not essentially be unsupportive, Americans cultivate these relationships 
with seemingly less reverence than they afford to relationships with biological family 
members, thus demonstrating the regard they hold for each. 
 Evidence to date therefore indicates that American society at large privileges the 
biological family model over other alternatives, causing individuals to operate within a 
cultural script that generates a certain set of expectations that may affect their outlook as 
they begin to contemplate starting families of their own.  However, sociologist David M. 
Newman suggests that the priority afforded blood relationships may shift in the future: 
He cites the changing contours of marriage, the changing role of women, and increased 
life expectancy as factors that are shifting our cultural mindset of what a family is and 
what it looks like.  He also writes that the increasing number of corporations offering 
benefits to unmarried domestic partners and same-sex partners further evidences how 
American society is continuing to evolve in its definition of family.  As he summarizes, 
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In recent years we’ve seen the meaning of family expand beyond the traditional 
definition.  Although nuclear families will always be an important cornerstone in 
this society, they will reflect less and less the reality of family life for most U.S. 
residents in years to come.  Hence the term family will most likely be used with 
increasing looseness in the future.  In part, the liberal use of the word is a testament 
to its profound cultural and personal importance.  To metaphorically refer to a 
sports team or a work group as a family is to symbolically reinforce the power that 
family holds over our lives.  Aside from such usage of the term, the trend toward 
including various nontraditional relationships under the legal rubric of family will 
be at the forefront of emotional debates for years to come.64 
 
However, while the abovementioned factors in American society may indeed be 
gradually shifting the supremacy of the biological family model, it is still an assumed 
model of family for many.  In considering a new imaginary, therefore, it is essential to 
acknowledge the significance of the biological family as a model in American culture. 
A New Metaphor for God that Promotes Healing and Hope for Intended  
Parents 
Thus far in the chapter, I have argued that the philosophy about reproduction that 
many intended parents hold implicitly assumes a certain goodness or even superiority to 
the nuclear biological family.  In other words, if biological offspring were not of positive 
value over and against other forms of family creation, then being unable to have children 
by these means would not lead to psychological or epistemological distress in parents, the 
use of secrecy, or to the increasing use of assisted reproduction procedures on the whole.   
All of this, therefore, leads to the following question: What if the nuclear 
biological family was, in fact, not superior to other forms of family creation, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 David M. Newman, Families: A Sociological Perspective (Boston: McGraw Hill Higher 
Education, 2009), 432-33. 
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adoption or third party reproduction?  One could make this argument both using the kind 
of logic proposed in the prior section as well as the biblical texts cited by interviews with 
Episcopal clergy, including Ephesians 1:5, Galatians 4:4-6, Matthew 18:5 and Mary’s 
conception of Jesus, which one might loosely consider an early instance of third party 
reproductive technology.  Same-sex, transgender, and single individuals with a calling to 
parenthood might likewise serve as experiential warrants for such an argument, if one 
accepts that the families they create are of no lesser good than families created by 
heterosexual couples. 
 So if new metaphors for family might transform the contours of the imaginary in 
our society that so negatively affects some intended parents, then might a new model of 
God also contribute to this effort?  Phrased differently, McFague encourages us to adopt 
the standpoint that the language we use to describe the God-human relationship impacts 
our inter-human relationships.  Therefore, what kind of new language could we fashion 
for the God-human relationship that might bear relevance to the formation of new 
metaphors for family that accommodate alternative models like third party reproduction? 
 In this final section of the chapter, I would like to propose five criteria for the 
formation of new metaphors: 1. That such language present an awareness of its 
metaphorical basis; 2. That it occur within the context of relationship; 3. That it have a 
biblical warrant; 4. That it resonate with cultural scripts while being able to challenge 
them; 5. That it maintain some extrapolatory power to other contexts. 
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The Centrality of Metaphor 
For McFague, the indirect essence of knowledge becomes the basis for her 
argument that all language is metaphorical.  Therefore, in proposing new God-language 
in the tradition of McFague, its metaphorical nature must be highlighted.  In other words, 
any new language proposed must be offered with an awareness that it is itself not a direct 
reflection of the Divine but rather a metaphorical image designed to speak about a God 
who cannot be encapsulated through a singular word or phrase.  Hence, a plurality of 
metaphorical expressions are needed, all of which may express something valuable about 
the God-human relationship.  As McFague explains it, that is the nature of metaphor, that 
it allows us to explain an unknown quantity X through the more recognizable Y.  By so 
doing, we become able to understand how the unknown X is both similar and dissimilar 
from Y and therefore gain a better understanding of X in the process.  
Given the context for this new metaphor, the immediate question is whether a 
preexisting metaphor for God might be employable.  In considering this possibility, father 
and mother may be the first metaphorical possibilities that come to mind; however, both 
may be lacking for this task.  McFague throughout her body of literature critiques the 
paternal metaphor for its hegemony and authoritarianism, and while God as mother 
addresses some of these concerns, it addresses only the parental relationship and not the 
contributions of other members of the reproductive community who are often overlooked 
or abused, as Williams described in the prior chapter.  Therefore, God as mother validates 
only these traditionally biological-based roles, excluding those who help create or 
maintain a family but lack these identifiers—this group might include not only donors 
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and surrogates but also friends, grandparents, coaches, babysitters, and teachers, to name 
just a few.   
Moreover, both parental metaphors may serve as painful reminders to intended 
parents who cannot seem to acquire those roles for themselves.  In turn, it may also 
prevent intended parents from thinking expansively about how to live in God’s image or 
about new endings to their reproductive story by offering them only traditionally-based 
biological parenting images for thinking about the God-human relationship.  Serene Jones 
taps into this inadequacy of mothering God language when she writes about an 
experience with a friend named Wendy who experienced reproductive loss.  As she 
explains:  
Having spent years together in a women’s group at our local church, we were 
accustomed to praying to God in the feminine.  But today, lifting up prayers to 
“Mother God” seemed a cruel joke, and we felt bereft as we struggled to find other 
theological images that might hold us in this moment.65 
 
As a result, therefore, it would seem that both the historic paternal God metaphor as well 
as the maternal God metaphor prove inadequate to the task before us.  Hence, it becomes 
necessary for any new language developed for this context to be both aware of its 
metaphorical basis while also avoiding the traps of the two parental metaphors listed 
above. 
 One might, therefore, turn to McFague’s metaphor of the world as God’s body.  
This metaphor might seem more relevant to the context at hand, for it represents God as a 
participant of embodied destruction.  It also images God as capable of living even as 	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death co-exists in the same space, for much as men’s and women’s bodies may thrive 
overall despite the death of their reproductive abilities, so does earth survive even as it is 
being destroyed.  Likewise, what was cited above as a possible critique of the 
metaphor—that God’s power seems threatened within it—may become a strength in this 
particular context: Just as intended parents find themselves incapable of controlling their 
own embodied reproductive capacities, so does God find God’s body a victim of 
destruction by creation.  
 However, recall that the purpose of the metaphor of the world as God’s body was 
primarily to press for a Christian ecological ethic.  To that end, McFague develops her 
metaphor with an eye towards the global ecological context rather than the personal 
pastoral one.  As a result, the metaphor as McFague constructs it would need to be 
repurposed for this particular setting, highlighting the pastoral dimensions that might be 
relevant to this particular population of individuals.  It would seem a relatively smooth 
transition to make, however, given that the building blocks for solidarity in embodied 
suffering are already present.   
This metaphor, then, might be a fitting one for priests and other faithful Christians 
to reference.  It may also be the case that to aid in repurposing this particular metaphor, 
such individuals may want to incorporate the remaining characteristics described below.  
The following characteristics, therefore, could be potentially incorporated into the world 
as God’s body metaphor in order to assist in that task.  That said, they could also become 
the building blocks of a new metaphor entirely. 
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Relational Awareness 
McFague postulates that how we model the God-human relationship impacts our 
own inter-human choices.  In this regard, McFague sees God as essentially relational, and 
any proposed metaphor for God is therefore not a reflection of God’s ontology but rather 
a reflection of the kind of relationship God has with humanity.  Likewise, for Maurice, 
humans are not defined by ontological status as much as they are defined by their 
relationships with one another.  As he writes, ‘“I am a son,’ ‘I am a brother;” these 
categories define a given person by explaining who he is in relation to another person.66  
In this case, Maurice is someone’s son; he is also someone’s brother.  By the same logic, 
I would be defined by my relationships to others: I am Eric’s wife; I am Elle and Aidan’s 
godparent.  These relationships therefore constitute the essence of my being, much as 
God’s relationship to humanity constitutes the divine essence from McFague’s 
perspective. 
Any new metaphor proposed, therefore, must contain an awareness of its 
relational significance.  Hence, because the set of every human’s relationships are 
different, the employment of this new metaphor requires interpretation for any given 
context: For instance, I am Elle and Aidan’s godparent, but you likely are not; likewise, I 
am Eric’s wife, and I am the only woman who holds that relationship to this particular 
Eric.  Therefore, were I to consider the meaning of a given metaphor for the God-human 
relationship for my life, I would do so with reference to relationships such as these.  
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Similarly, an intended parent might consider how a metaphor impacts their relationships 
with a spouse, a future child, or a third party, while third parties might consider how the 
metaphor influences their relationship with intended parents or future children who result 
from the medical procedure in which they participate.   
Likewise, a metaphor that emphasizes relationships may encourage intended 
parents to think outside of the biological family model.  Instead of operating within one 
cultural script that says family relationships must occur via biological reproduction, 
intended parents who cannot create families this way may have the possibility to 
encounter reproductive difficulties by asking the question: What kind of relationship with 
a child do I want?  To that end, instead of dictating that the proper end goal is the creation 
of a nuclear biological family, a metaphor that highlights relationships outside of the 
biological family model may free these individuals to discern their own sense of calling, 
affording them the kinds of choices that some intended parents may feel they do not have. 
An awareness of this relational basis of the metaphor therefore has implications 
for praxis.  Because every human has a unique set of relationships that forms them, an 
ethic for third party reproduction—and perhaps for other issues—may not necessarily 
work with a one-size-fits-all model.  Rather, individual conscience or personal 
discernment may be a more valid way of interpreting the relevance of this new metaphor 
to a given context.  In this regard, we see the wisdom of the Episcopal priests consulted 
for this study highlighted.  As chapter two explained, the priests felt strongly that 
individual conscience be the basis of any practical theology of third party reproduction 
proposed for The Episcopal Church.  As one priest summarized:  
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None of these [reproductive technologies] are inherently right or wrong…but the 
main thing is starting with sex, that this is an intense form of communication 
between two people and depending on what you do, it may become sinful.  Treating 
one inappropriately what have you.  A lack of consideration or care for one 
another.67 
 
As a result of this commitment to individual conscience, the priests consulted for this 
study felt strongly that their pastoral responsibility to anyone considering participation in 
a third party procedure was to help them discern and be intentional about their decision to 
create new life.  They also felt that this was what Episcopalians hoped for themselves as 
well.  As one priest stated, “Often, when people come for counseling, they want you to 
tell them if something is right or wrong.  But Episcopalians don’t think that way.”68   
 A new metaphor grounded in the essential relational nature of human beings and 
God may also result in praxes that protect against the kind of abuse and coercion that 
Delores Williams cites in her writings about historic and contemporary instantiations of 
surrogacy.  This can occur because highlighting the centrality of relationships within an 
individual’s life casts that individual as a subject in relationship to other subjects, rather 
than as an object manipulated by subjects or a subject who can reduce other humans to 
objects.   
Moreover, it is fitting for this new metaphor to centralize relationships, given the 
hesitance that many of the authors quoted in this dissertation had about autonomy.  
Indeed, a concern for the emphasis of individual autonomy has been woven throughout 
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68 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
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this project, shared by Maurice, Williams, and McFague.  For Maurice, sin became 
synonymous with autonomy, embodied through the example of some of the Hebrew 
Bible kings who saw themselves in isolation from those who lived during their reign.  For 
Williams, sin became synonymous with scapegoating, which by nature reduces the other 
to an object.  Finally, for McFague, sin occurs when individuals refuse to acknowledge 
those with whom they are in relationship.  In some ways, therefore, even in spite of the 
different historic and social contexts in which these theologians operate, they may be said 
to share a basic understanding of what sin is and how it is grounded upon relationship 
denial.  Keeping in mind the wisdom of these thinkers, therefore, necessitates that any 
new metaphor proposed be one that highlights both God-human and inter-human 
relationships, such that it encourages humans to remember that they operate within the 
context of relationships rather than in isolation from the other. 
Biblical Warrant 
This chapter earlier cited critiques leveled at McFague by scholars like Bromell 
and Reynolds who suggest that her metaphorical theology strays too far from the biblical 
text.  Therefore, in proposing a new metaphor, a mindful recognition of its relationship to 
the biblical corpus seems necessary.  To that end, there may be several pericopes worth 
highlighting for further investigation as new metaphors are proposed and developed. 
Gabriel’s announcement to Mary and her conception of Jesus, for instance, may 
be relevant, as one may argue that Mary’s conception functions as a biblical 
representation of third party reproduction.  Likewise, one might reference the stories of 
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Hannah and Elizabeth, both of who conceive naturally after praying to God.  While 
reproduction occurs biologically in the latter two stories, it might not be unreasonable to 
argue that God in some way contributes to their successful conception in a way that does 
not occur in other biblical conception stories.  
In contrast, the Bible also provides examples of third party reproduction gone 
awry.  As Williams documents at length, the stories of Sarah and Hagar’s interactions 
result in Hagar’s rape, abuse, and betrayal.  Indeed, the story of Sarah and Hagar may be 
said to exemplify relational abuse or sin in a way that would resonate with Maurice, 
Williams, McFague, and the Episcopal priests.  One could therefore argue that the toxic 
relationship between Sarah and Hagar results not from some essential negative 
component to surrogacy but rather from the way that Sarah chose to be—or rather to not 
be—in relationship with Hagar and her wider reproductive community.  In other words, 
by objectifying her surrogate and ignoring her God, Sarah functions in an instructive way 
by exemplifying the kind of abuse, dehumanization, and objectification of the other that 
the experts consulted throughout this dissertation advocate against.69  Therefore, even 
that story may prove an important one to reference in the proposal of a new metaphor for 
this context. 
 
Awareness of Cultural Scripting 
 
As this chapter earlier argued, the biological family remains a model in American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See Genesis 16.  See also Phyllis Trible. “Hagar: The Desolation of Rejection,” in Texts of 
Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1984) 9-37. 
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society, even as alternative forms of family arrangements become increasingly common.  
This chapter also argued that the biological family model poses a similar set of challenges 
to intended parents with reproductive difficulties as the paternal God model poses to 
people of faith, specifically the twin problems of idolatry and irrelevance named by 
McFague. 
Using a combination of biblical interpretation and experiential warrants, I 
questioned the authority of the biological family model, pressing instead for a more 
expansive culturally-held definition of the family that may ease expectations or anxiety 
when an individual experiences reproductive difficulties.  For if individuals penned their 
reproductive stories from the start within the context of a cultural imagination that 
supported multiple life-giving endings, then perhaps the improbability of one possible 
ending would not become so devastating.   
Likewise, McFague advocates for multiple metaphors for God because they 
simultaneously eradicate the idolatry and irrelevance problems while presenting new 
dimensions of the Divine beyond what one model might allow.  A new God-metaphor for 
this particular context, therefore, must have an awareness of the kinds of cultural scripts 
at play in order to be identifiable to this given population.  However, it must also be 
willing to challenge such scripts when they show themselves to be yielding more harm 
than good.  As Serene Jones explains, 
The experience of grief associated with infertility, stillbirth, and miscarriage never 
occurs in a vacuum.  It is always socially mediated.  It is a grief, which like all 
griefs is shaped by its cultural context, and this cultural shaping occurs at many 
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levels.70 
 
Therefore, an awareness of the role that culture plays in the shaping of this 
particular form of loss as well as the role that culture plays in the shaping and expressing 
of the Divine must factor into the development of this new metaphor.  That said, 
awareness is not synonymous with complicity: The metaphor need not simply reinforce 
preexisting scripts, especially when such scripts prove harmful or irrelevant.  Instead, by 
developing a new metaphor with an eye towards social construction and cultural 
scripting, it may be possible to reshape the cultural imagination to present a new 
landscape onto which individuals can map their understanding of concepts like family 
and God. 
Extrapolatory Power 
Thus far, this chapter’s discussion of a new metaphor has limited itself to the 
context of this dissertation: namely, contexts that lead one to the consideration of third 
party technology.  A new metaphor developed for this context, however, need not be 
exclusive to it, for, one might argue that the inability to conceive a biological family is in 
many ways a metaphor for the general problem of suffering itself.  In other words, a 
negative reproductive event like infertility is painful, traumatic even, to the people who 
experience it because it eradicates the hope for new beginnings, creating emptiness and 
barrenness where life, creativity, and fecundity ought to be.  In this regard, one can see 
how this phenomenon functions as a metaphor for other forms of suffering that are also 	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defined by barrenness where life ought to be: Death, the loss of a job, serious illnesses, 
natural disasters, limb amputations, divorce, and sexual violence all share this 
experiential aspect.  Such events are therefore bonded together by what they cause people 
to lose—possibilities for new beginnings, for growth, and love, in other words, all that is 
life itself.  Suffering creates barrenness, and to respond to barrenness, new life is needed, 
whatever form it takes. 
To offer forth a metaphor of God that takes this core dimension of suffering into 
account is therefore to attempt to speak of a God who not only stands in solidarity with 
those in need but who also attempts to find a creative path to healing through the 
redemptive hope of creating new life in situations where barrenness once seemed to be 
the only option.  While such a metaphor will hopefully resonate with the particular 
context of this dissertation, it may also be easily extrapolated to other contexts because of 
the way barrenness, whatever the form it takes, encapsulates a universal reality of 
suffering.71 
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to consider new metaphorical approaches to thinking 
about God through reference to Sallie McFague’s metaphorical theology and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 McFague proposes that God addresses suffering through two dimensions, one active and one 
passive.  An awareness for and cultivation of these two dimensions may also prove pivotal in the 
development of a new metaphor.  As she writes, “In both forms of Christian solidarity with the oppressed, 
the active and the passive, liberation and suffering, the cross and resurrection of the Christic paradigm are 
central to an embodiment theology.  The death of our natural, sinful preference for hierarchical dualisms 
that favor the healthy, well-fed bodies is a necessary prerequisite in the embodiment ministry of Jesus.  His 
parables, healing stories, and eating practices demand our deaths—just as the practice of his embodiment 
ministry also brought about his own death.  Neither biological nor cultural evolution includes this radical 
step of identification with the vulnerable and needy through the death of the self.”  McFague, The Body of 
God, 174. 
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experience of intended parents who struggle in the aftermath of negative reproductive 
events at least in part due to the dominance of the biological family model.  In order to 
undertake this task, I first explored McFague’s metaphorical theology, paying special 
emphasis to the metaphors of “God as friend” and “the world as God’s body” and the 
twin problems of idolatry and irrelevance that she identifies with reference to the “God as 
father” model.  I also considered the role of the root-metaphor for McFague in crafting a 
theology built upon the God-human relationship as opposed to divine ontology, as well as 
the kinds of critiques about biblical warrant leveled by David Bromell and Terrence 
Reynolds. 
 Following a consideration of McFague’s theological work, I turned to the 
experience of intended parents.  Here I proposed that the nuclear biological family 
functions as a model and presents the twin problems of idolatry and irrelevance not 
unlike those present in the God as father model.  
Finally, I returned to McFague’s postulation that how we express the divine-
human relationship has implications for our inter-human relationships.  From that 
premise, I presented a set of characteristics for a new kind of language that would express 
the God-human relationship in such a way that it would simultaneously assist in the 
formation of new metaphors for family.  The goal in so doing was to the present 
characteristics of the God-human relationship in a way that might accommodate 
alternative models like third party reproduction. These characteristics were chosen 
because they bore relevance to the context in question while also upholding McFague’s 
theological work, as well as the work of other experts consulted for this study, including 
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Maurice, Williams, and the Episcopal priests.  
 A cornerstone of McFague’s work is the premise that how we craft God-human 
relationships impacts how inter-human relationships proceed.  In proposing 
characteristics for a new way of speaking about the God-human relationship, therefore, 
this chapter also sought to re-craft family relationships so that the nuclear biological 
family becomes one of many ways of being family instead of the exclusive cultural 
model.  Likewise, it aimed to validate the important roles played by members of the 
reproductive community—including donors and surrogates—who are overlooked in this 
nuclear model, thereby seeking to prevent the kinds of abuses documented in the chapter 
on Delores Williams.  My hope, therefore, is that by reframing the God-human 
relationship, humans themselves will become empowered to discern new ways of 
conceiving their own relationships, creating the possibility of reconfiguring and 
strengthening all families, including those whose existence comes about through third 
party reproduction.
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CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION 
 
Not too many years ago, interracial marriage was a rare thing in America.  In fact, it 
was against the law in many states.  Those who challenged this law found 
themselves open to negative public sanction.  But today interracial marriage is both 
more widely practiced and more widely accepted.  Maybe in another 40 years our 
society will find it both easier and more acceptable for children to have a complex 
biological history.  What do you think?  —Cheryl Albers, Sociologist1 
 
Concluding Remarks and Findings 
The advent of assisted reproduction in 1977 facilitated thousands of live births to 
those who might otherwise have been unable to start families.  Today, technologies like 
in vitro fertilization, gamete donation, and surrogacy comprise just some of the 
technological options that the one in ten heterosexual couples who encounter 
reproductive difficulties in the United States might consider.  They are also increasingly 
being used by same-sex couples, transgender couples, and single individuals who cannot 
start families on their own.2 
The thesis of this dissertation was that third party procedures offer an opportunity 
for Christians to enrich their relationships with one another and with God in unique 
and—literally—life-giving ways that have implications for family, the ministerial vision 
of Jesus, and the doctrine of God, all of which are influenced by the essence, purpose, 
and execution of inter-human and God-human relationships themselves.  My goal in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cheryl Albers, Sociology of Families: Readings (London: Pine Forge Press, 1999), 104-5. 
 
2 There are without doubt theological challenges to assisted reproduction in these cases that 
involve layers of analysis not included in this dissertation.  While the findings of this study will hopefully 
be of value to all Christians, much work is needed to be done beyond the scope of this dissertation in 
relation to these particular populations. 
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dissertation was to engage these theological loci while simultaneously offering a practical 
theological response that emerged from specific engagement with the Episcopal tradition 
and its ecclesial practices.  In the process of so doing, I argued that Episcopal clergy use 
sources within the Christian tradition—such as biblical texts and theological tenets—to 
ground their theological understanding of third party assisted reproduction and to aid in 
pastoral interactions with parents, offspring, and third parties.  I also argued that the 
sources and values upheld by these clergy are not dominant in the way that third party 
reproduction is currently practiced in the United States. 
Chapter Summaries 
As a practical theologian, I sought throughout this dissertation to foreground the 
sources used by Episcopal clergy to address the challenges that emerge for relationships 
between intended parents, third parties, offspring, God, and the wider community.   I 
began this task in chapter two by presenting qualitative data obtained from interviews 
with 21 Episcopal clergy.  These priests were randomly selected from five geographical 
regions in the United States using the Red Book, the Episcopal clergy and parish locator.  
The priests who participated ranged in age from their mid-twenties up to their mid-
sixties, with no age group receiving a majority; 10 men and 11 women were interviewed 
for the study.   
At the start of this chapter, I explained that The Episcopal Church has issued few 
public statements about assisted reproduction generally and third party assisted 
reproduction specifically, and that the statements that have been issued at the triennial 
meetings of the governing body of The Episcopal Church are vague or inconsistent.  I 
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therefore chose to interview individual priests within The Episcopal Church in order to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of how these leaders process the theological 
significance of third party reproduction.  I was particularly interested in seeing what 
pastoral and theological themes and narratives motivated them in their thinking about 
these technologies, and I also sought to discover what kind of practical theological 
response they hoped to see developed. 
In collating data from the interviews, I suggested that there were certain guiding 
principles that formed the foundation for how clergy understood the theological 
significance of assisted reproduction generally and third party reproduction specifically.  
These guiding principles made up the narratives and themes that emerged across the 
interview pool.   The first of these guiding principles was the importance of relationships, 
especially the marriage relationship and the way that the marriage relationship mirrored 
the Trinitarian relationship.  The clergy consulted for this study overwhelmingly felt that 
God fashioned humans, by essence, to be relational creatures.  As one priest summarized: 
“That’s the whole crux of faith and life lived in faith—it’s all about relationships.”3  
Likewise, another said, “Jesus says, when you cut it all out, ‘This is what it’s about.  It’s 
about loving God and being completely immersed in God’s presence and out of that, 
having this kind of radical relationship with the people around you in your life.”’4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
 
4 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
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Following from this, the priests consulted for this study felt that marriage 
functioned as an intimate relationship that could be used as a testing ground for other 
relationships.  They felt that marriage taught humans the value of being other-directed 
and, by being other-directed, it helped them learn about God and God’s intention for their 
lives through their relationships.  They also felt strongly that the marriage relationship 
can allow individuals to practice how to be in relationship to the wider community. 
For the priests, praxes related to assisted reproduction were part of a broader 
conversation about what it meant to be in relationship with others and what it meant to 
love one’s neighbor well.  The priests felt strongly that because humans were created for 
relationship, assisted reproduction generally and third party procedures specifically could 
provide unique opportunities to be in relationship with others, though they could also 
provide relational challenges.  As a result, the priests were unwilling to issue universal 
prohibition or permission for the procedures.  Rather, they felt that when individuals used 
these technologies with an emphasis on other-directed relationships and generosity, then 
these technologies became opportunities through which to practice love of neighbor.  
However, if they utilized these technologies without regard for the other—where the 
other might be one’s spouse, a donor, surrogate, or resulting child—then these 
technologies could be considered sinful.  
The second guiding principle that informed how priests thought about assisted 
reproduction involved their interpretation of the words “mutual joy” and “when it is 
God’s will” in the 1979 Book of Common Prayer.  Priests noted that a significant change 
to The Episcopal Church’s theology of marriage occurred with the advent of its most 
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recent prayer book and that this change was significant when considering an Episcopal 
theology of parenthood.  Whereas previous incarnations of the prayer book stated that 
marriage foremost existed for the procreation of children and as a preventive against the 
sin of fornication, the most recent incarnation of the prayer book states that marriage 
exists primarily for the “mutual joy” of the couple.  It also does not assume children 
within the marriage relationship, but rather states that the birth of children need only 
occur “when it is God’s will.”5 
The marriage rite within the 1979 Book of Common Prayer and the language of 
“mutual joy” and “when it is God’s will” therefore became important guiding principles 
as the priests considered the theological significance of third party procedures.  Many felt 
that this theological shift in the marriage rite signified a shift in expectations for family 
relationships: This iteration of the prayer book implied that a healthy marriage 
relationship was predicated upon caring for one’s partner, as opposed to previous 
iterations that presumed parental relationships were necessary to fulfill the obligation one 
owed one’s spouse within the marriage relationship. 
This shift in the prayer book informed the priests’ theology of marriage and in 
turn informed their conception of parenthood.  Because the prayer book no longer 
assumes that parenthood is necessary to the marriage relationship, priests felt that 
parenthood was a calling that needed to be discerned by each individual.  Calling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Book of Common Prayer: the Texts of 1549, 1559, and 1662, Brian Cummings, ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 435.  Note: This quotation comes from the 1662 Book of Common 
Prayer.  For corresponding texts, see the marriage liturgies for the 1549 Book of Common Prayer and the 
1559 Book of Common Prayer on pages 64 and 157, respectively.  See also Marion J. Hatchett, 
Commentary On the American Prayer Book, 429. 
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language therefore became another guiding principle that informed how the priests 
constructed the theological significance of third party reproduction.  Many stated that just 
as they were called to the priesthood, so some individuals felt called to parenthood.  The 
act of becoming a parent and the beginning of the relationship with one’s child was 
therefore the response to a discerned call, whether reproductive technologies were 
involved or not.  The priests consulted for this study also extended this language of call to 
third party participants, suggesting that donors and surrogates might be said to function 
like the Holy Spirit or the angel Gabriel.  As one priest said:  
That could be an interesting way to frame it with somebody [a donor or 
surrogate], that you get to participate in a literal way in an incarnation on 
someone else’s behalf like the Holy Spirit.  Not the same kind of incarnation 
[as Jesus’], but still something becoming flesh.6 
 
Throughout the interviews with clergy, a resounding theme was that the marriage 
relationship, the parent-child relationship, and the choice to become a third party 
participant in assisted reproduction were all responses to individual discernment.  As a 
result, the priests were wary of accepting any kind of authoritative statement about 
assisted reproduction made by the governing body of The Episcopal Church, known as 
General Convention.  Instead, many felt that this sense of call ought to emerge from a 
more personal desire for a certain kind of relationship with one’s spouse, with one’s 
child, with the third party, and with God that was other-directed, founded on gifting and 
not upon selfishness.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 29, 2012. 
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To that end, all of the concerns clergy voiced might be summarized as concerns 
that stemmed from the consequences of denying relationships to others: Their concerns 
about the cost of assisted reproduction, payment to donors and surrogates, exploitation of 
third parties, the possibility of aborted embryos and the way that intended parents might 
overlook children in need of adoption in order to utilize assisted reproduction all 
indicated that clergy felt that love of neighbor extended to the wider community, 
including to donors, surrogates, and unknown children eligible for adoption.  Violating 
those relationships, therefore, could be construed as sinful, and as a result, clergy felt that 
it was their role to help individuals prayerfully discern whether, when, and how they were 
truly called to utilize these technologies to become either parents or third party 
participants. 
  In the third chapter of this dissertation, I addressed the writings of Frederick 
Dennison Maurice and David H. Smith in order to provide additional context for an 
Episcopal practical theology of third party reproduction.  Referring to the incarnational 
works of Anglican theologian F.D. Maurice, I reinforced his claim that relationships are a 
primary locus of God’s self-revelation while pressing against his assertion that the family 
is defined by biology.  Within that same chapter, I also discussed the work of Anglican 
ethicist David H. Smith, whose writings might be said to be a contemporary outgrowth of 
Maurice’s incarnational theology.  Here I explored Smith’s view on third party 
reproduction, which he opposes due to his assumption that loyalty is defined as the 
exchange of concrete goods in equal quantities between members of a couple. As a result, 
Smith opposes third party procedures because they prevent the enactment of such loyalty 
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between members of the heterosexual couple; he does not comment about the ethics of 
third party procedures for same-sex couples, transgender couples or single individuals, 
though one assumes he would be similarly opposed, given that he also felt third party 
procedures deprived children of valuable knowledge about their identities.   
The second half of the dissertation moved from exclusive engagement with 
Episcopal resources to incorporate resources from the womanist and feminist traditions of 
Christian theology.  I began this section of the dissertation with a chapter that intersected 
the work of Delores Williams with contemporary data from the experiences of third 
parties, including those who live in India and Israel.  I discussed the cost of third party 
reproduction in the United States, and how its exorbitant price tag—especially in 
procedures that involve surrogates—has led an increasingly large number of Americans 
to pursue options overseas, often in India.  I also discussed how Indian surrogacy, while 
less expensive, can cause great harm to surrogates, who often come from financially 
impoverished backgrounds, have little education, and can be subjected to abuse by clinics 
through isolation, forced abortions, and induced labor.  Intended parents may be unaware 
of—or disinterested in—the harm done to surrogates due to the anonymity policy that 
many of these clinics maintain.  Even within the United States, the common use of 
anonymity in third party procedures may prevent intended parents from understanding 
the experience of third parties, thereby fostering a climate that accommodates third party 
abuse by both clinics and intended parents alike.  These factors can also cumulatively 
reduce third party reproduction from a social contract to a business one between intended 
parents and donors or surrogates.  Perceiving third party reproduction as a business 
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contract may, in turn, further the possibility of abuse by creating a toxic power dynamic 
between the intended parent and third party predicated upon the assumption that 
surrogates or donors offer their bodies out of need to intended parents who can purchase 
them and use them as they please.7 
Not all third party procedures, however, come at such a high cost to third party 
participants.  Contrasting the experience of Indian surrogates, I turned to the experience 
of Israeli surrogates as documented by Elly Teman.  Teman describes a different 
interpersonal dynamic—especially between the surrogate and intended mother—which is 
primarily defined by the relational interactions between the two women instead of by an 
exchange of bodily or financial goods.  As she documents, both women participate in 
rituals and activities that are designed to reinforce their respective and desired identities 
as either mother or gift-giver.  Surrogates may, for instance, refuse to touch their bellies 
but instead encourage the intended mother to do so.  Surrogates may also ask that the 
baby be placed on the intended mother’s belly after birth.  Likewise, the intended mother 
may help the surrogate reinforce her role as gift-giver by writing a thank you note after 
the birth or by including her in post-birth rituals, like Shabbat dinner.  Intriguingly, 
Teman also documents that the Israeli medical system supports the women in this ritual-
based undertaking of identity creation: A doctor might wait for the intended mother to 
arrive before performing an ultrasound on the surrogate because the ultrasound is 
traditionally a ritual undertaken by a mother’s body.  Likewise, after birth, surrogates are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Helena Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, 41. 
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moved to a women’s health unit of the hospital while mothers are given the option of 
retaining a room in the maternity ward, complete with hospital gown.  Such measures 
reinforce the non-maternal identity of the surrogate while allowing the mother to 
participate in the typical ritual of the post-birth maternity ward stay. 
These examples portrayed a different set of relational dynamics than those 
ordinarily seen in the United States or India, and I placed both into dialogue with the 
wisdom of womanist theologian Delores Williams.  I turned to her exegesis of the Sarah 
and Hagar story to explore how she understood surrogacy as essentially exploitative and 
built upon scapegoat mechanisms.  In turn, she showed how Hagar’s exploitation was 
mirrored by the biological and social-role surrogacy of black women in the antebellum 
and postbellum United States.  Her exegesis allowed her to construct a theology of the 
cross that removed its salvific value, which she relocated to the ministerial vision 
exemplified through Jesus’ life.   
Contrary to Williams, I suggested that while contemporary third party practices 
may have the potential to exploit third parties or cast them as scapegoats, they do not 
essentially or necessarily do so.  Rather, as ethnographic research shows, much relies 
upon the emphasis that participants place upon cultivating relationships during the 
procedures; when all participants undertake practices in the service of relationship 
cultivation, then these procedures can become relationally salutary and even agents of 
transformation for all parties. I also suggested that the use of Williams’s six-fold 
ministerial vision definition may alleviate potential abuse to third parties by promoting 
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the practice of mindfulness among those who utilize the procedures.  In this way, the 
wisdom of contemporary practices both informed and was informed by Williams’s work. 
The findings of the dissertation all shared an implicit or explicit emphasis on how 
inter-human relationships in third party procedures could be transformed through the act 
of mirroring the divine-human relationship and vice versa.  Hence, these relational 
findings may influence how we define God and voice that definition.  Likewise, these 
findings may also have implications for the definition of the family.  In the final 
movement of this dissertation, I turned to the work of Sallie McFague in an effort to 
explore how our use of language affects how we identify the family and the Divine and 
how lived experience may challenge and transform our language for both.  I began by 
discussing Sallie McFague’s metaphorical theology, paying special emphasis to her belief 
that all knowledge is indirect and that all language is metaphorical.  I explored how that 
premise affects her understanding of the doctrine of God, pointing to her distinction 
between the terms “model” and “metaphor” and explaining that her opposition to paternal 
God-language derives not from its use as a metaphor but rather from its use as a model 
that is interpreted both literally and idolatrously.  In response, she advocates for a variety 
of metaphors that might together illuminate something about God’s relationship with 
humanity, and I explored some of her alternative suggestions, including the metaphors of 
God as friend and the world as God’s body.   
I then turned to intended parents, suggesting that they may be influenced to use 
third party procedures due to the status of the biological family in American society.  I 
questioned the power of the biological family within this discourse, suggesting that just 
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as the paternal God-model can inaugurate suffering due to the twin problems of idolatry 
and irrelevance that McFague identifies, so is the biological family functioning as a 
model in the United States in much the same way.  As a result, I advocated for a broader 
definition of family, using both the experience of intended parents and the existence of 
other family structures in the United States as warrants. 
I then placed McFague’s theological work into conversation with the data about 
the biological family’s status to query whether we could fashion language for the God-
human relationship that could accommodate alternative lived experiences like third party 
reproduction.  I suggested a five-fold set of criteria by way of an answer, thus opening the 
possibility for new language for how we might conceive of God in light of assisted 
reproductive realities. 
A Practical Theology for Episcopal Priests 
Having accomplished these steps, the final movement of this dissertation is to 
incorporate this research into a practical theology Episcopal priests might be able to 
utilize as they continue to think about third party reproduction and offer pastoral 
counseling to members of their communities.  The following, therefore, comprises a set 
of theological themes that emerge from this study, alongside a set of practical responses 
clergy may want to adopt. 
Applying Discernment to the Navigation of Loyalty Claims 
Within their interviews, discernment emerged as a common theme used to 
navigate pastoral relationships.  Discernment also became a keystone for explaining how 
priests understood their own role in working with intended parents, surrogates, and 
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donors.  To that end, clergy felt that they were responsible for helping individuals 
discover God’s will for their lives and to, in turn, help them grow into the people they 
were intended to be.  For the priests, discernment became essential to this process.  As 
one priest explained:  
I see that what’s at stake is that this is an opportunity for faith communities to…not 
make it about black and white ethical decision making…I would see that as a 
failure of nerve and [un]willingness to walk into the messiness of the opportunity 
that this provides and say how do we accompany people through the discernment 
piece of this.8 
 
 For the clergy consulted for this study, the term “discernment” became a keyword 
that expressed how an intended parent, donor, or surrogate explores and discovers God’s 
will for their lives, with the priest as companion in the journey.  Clergy felt that for 
intended parents, this process of discernment could result in the choice to engage in 
assisted reproduction, adoption, or childless living, all of which were equally valuable.  
Loyalty therefore takes on specific meaning for the clergy, one that differs from Smith, 
who argued that loyalty was predicated upon the equal exchange of concrete goods.   For 
the clergy, loyalty was not predicated upon the equivalent presence or absence of a 
concrete good but rather upon where personal discernment led with regard to a 
relationship with one’s spouse and the wider community.  The end result could therefore 
be a choice to become a parent, a third party, or something else entirely. Therefore, 
practices like surrogacy or gamete donation might fulfill not only God’s will for intended 
parents but also for third party participants, leading towards the practice of loyalty not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author phone interview, May 25, 2012. 
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only within the community of sexual love but also towards loyalty within the wider 
community that includes the third party. 
Because individual and communal discernment was so important to clergy in their 
pastoral interactions with those considering third party reproduction, most did not issue 
an endorsement of or proscription against the procedures.  Instead, they felt that merit 
needed to be evaluated on an individual basis, so as to account for the unique 
circumstance of each intended parent, donor, surrogate, and resulting child.  Therefore, 
the clergy’s commitment to discernment allowed them to include third parties as 
members of the reproductive community—and possibly as members of the community of 
the family—so long as discernment leads towards that end.  In this way, how clergy 
fashioned the possibility of third party relationships derived through a process of 
discernment and also allowed for the exercise of loyalty in the enactment of these praxes.   
In contrast, Smith would not include third parties in the reproductive community, 
the community of sexual love, or the family community because of the way that he 
envisions loyalty as a guiding principle to be navigated only between members of the 
couple; thus, because Smith privileged loyalty within the community of sexual love, he 
sanctioned third party procedures on the grounds that they violate this principle.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Smith’s commitment to loyalty between spouses ultimately leads him to encourage couples that 
are unable to conceive via intercourse to adopt.  Yet here Smith contradicts himself; while he suggests that 
childless couples can avoid disloyalty by adoption, he also writes that “ceteris paribus it is more gratifying 
to conceive one’s own children than adopt them,” and therefore in cases of infertility where couples 
consider procedures like infertility, “the fertile partner faces a choice between reproduction in which my 
spouse and I are equal partners—partners in what we do not have as well as in what we do have—or 
reproduction in which I have a full kind of gratification and my spouse does not.”  David Smith, Health and 
Medicine in the Anglican Communion, 84. 
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However, what the clergy indicate is that perhaps the contours of relationships and the 
variety of human personalities and experiences are such that third party technologies are 
not monolithic enough to apply a single ethical prescriptive.  To that end, discernment 
becomes an important tool that can be used to assess what loyalty entails within a specific 
context.   
Speaking to Smith, then, the clergy do not necessarily press against his insistence 
that loyalty is an important component to third party procedures.  Instead, they encourage 
one to consider whether a singular understanding of loyalty can be applied, given the 
multiplicity of human experiences that leads one to consider utilizing third party 
reproduction to become a parent, donor, or surrogate.   
This is where the priest’s role as the cultivator of individual conscience becomes 
central.  As one priest said, “Often, when people come for counseling, they want you to 
tell them if something is right or wrong.  But Episcopalians don’t think that way.”10  To 
that end, it is not surprising that the priests would implicitly press against a singular ethic 
like Smith’s that is intended to be applied to all instances where third party procedures 
are being considered.  Interfacing their wisdom with Smith’s, therefore, encourages 
priests to ask those they counsel the kinds of questions that Smith asks, but to leave the 
answers up to individual or communal discernment.  Such questions might include: 
1. What does discernment mean to you?   
2. What would a meaningful process of discernment involve? 
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3. How can I help in your discernment process? 
4. What are you afraid of when you think about participating in third party 
reproduction? 
5. What gives you comfort when you think about participating in third party 
reproduction? 
6. What excites you when you think about participating in third party reproduction? 
7. What does loyalty mean to you? 
8. To whom do you owe loyalty in the context of third party reproduction? 
9. Is it important for your child to share genetic material with you and/or your partner?  
Why or why not?  (Or, in Smith’s more technical language: Is it important for the 
community of sexual love to be synonymous with the community of reproduction?) 
Questions like these hopefully accomplish two ends: First, they provide clergy with 
resources for working with those considering third party reproduction.  Second, they help 
those Episcopalians who might use the procedures to think about their usage in a way that 
resonates with both the historic and contemporary aspects of their tradition.  Drawing 
upon the wisdom of Maurice, Smith, Williams, McFague and the interviewed clergy, they 
likewise encourage those who ponder them to draw upon the relational tenets that ground 
the tradition while avoiding the kinds of proscriptive ethics that the priests pressed 
against. 
Reproduction as a Calling 
Unlike Maurice, clergy often did not assume that children had to be part of the 
family but rather that intimate experience and knowledge of God could be gained 
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sufficiently within marriage itself—exclusive of whether children were present or not—
or even through celibate life.  Summarizing the sentiments of several of the clergy 
consulted for this study were the words of two priests in particular.  One, referencing 
marriage, explained how neither marriage nor children are necessary for humans to fully 
experience the kinds of relationships that illuminate the Divine, though either of these 
may indeed serve that purpose: 
As human beings we’re created for relationship, and that marriage is one way of 
living fully into that in a particular way, by which two people accompany each 
other through life and are there as companions and support and to help each other 
flourish and become the people they’re meant to be and for the purpose of love.  
We were created for love, and the primary purpose of marriage is not so that 
children may be born…but that it is a holy and desired outcome for some and 
maybe many married people.11 
 
Likewise, another priest who chose to adopt celibacy explained how her theology of the 
family influenced both her own choice and her feelings towards childlessness in general: 
[In counseling parishioners,] I would frequently point to the descriptions of the 
Church as your true family….  I myself have chosen not to have children, but I feel 
that having children is a choice that parents should be able to make and for which 
they should receive the full support of society and the Church.  I do not believe it is 
a sin to choose not to have them; I don’t believe it is inferior to other forms of 
creativity.  I mean, obviously all over Scripture it says children are a blessing, but I 
also know an awful lot of people who are not good at parenting them or who don’t 
want more or who have enough.12 
 
These two examples summarize the sentiments generally expressed by clergy interviewed 
for this study: While many of the priests reiterated Maurice’s belief that God is 
discovered through relationships and can be known intimately through the marriage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
12 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
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relationship, they did not share in Maurice’s assumption that either marriage or 
parenthood were necessary to fulfilling one’s human vocation or to cultivating a rich 
relationship with God.  Nor were they, in fact, essential to the marriage relationship.  
Rather, they considered both to be callings that an individual might choose to adopt from 
a number of equally valuable other options, including celibacy and the choice not to have 
children. 
 This language of “calling” appeared repeatedly throughout the interviews as 
clergy framed themselves as cultivators of individual conscience.  This may have arisen 
because historically, the denomination used language of “call” specifically to refer to the 
vocation of a deacon, priest, or bishop.  Perhaps because of the liturgical emphasis of the 
denomination, The Episcopal Church has tended towards a high theology of the 
priesthood, with many congregations carefully delineating the roles of priest and 
parishioner, creating a hierarchy between the two or supporting an ontological gap 
between priest and lay person that was reinforced by the priest’s exclusive ability to lead 
certain sacramental rites.  Clergy and other Church leaders have therefore become 
increasingly mindful of the balance of power that such a mindset creates and have taken a 
number of steps to address it, including steps to empower the laity in not only mission but 
also identity.  As a result, in recent years, the language of call has been extended more 
broadly, in conjunction with this overall movement to empower the laity within 
congregations.  Hence, while the language of call was historically reserved to describe 
the vocation of a person of the cloth, today, an increasing number of Episcopalians use 
	   	   	  
	  
275	  
the term in reference to a vocation of any sort, the philosophy being that a call to the 
priesthood is equally as valuable as a calling within the secular realm. 
Therefore, as one priest explained, her job as a pastoral listener was to help identify, 
cultivate and empower the unique calling of each individual.  Rooting her belief in 
Genesis 1, she said: 
Connected to all of this is the perception of God as creator and the understanding 
that we’re made in God’s image, and the bringing forth of new life is deeply 
connected to our identity as created beings and conscious beings that seek to imitate 
God.  And, I guess you know, the big question with assisted reproduction for many 
priests is when is it idolatry?  And when it is a sense of, “I deserve something?”  
And when is it coming from that deep longing and that deep sense of calling?13 
 
Likewise, when another priest imagined having a pastoral conversation with a 
potential donor, he too invoked the language of calling, sensing that it was important that 
a sense of call motivate the decision to participate in a third party procedure.  “What will 
it be like if you ever find out that this person is your child?” he asked.  Then he 
elaborated: 
Pastorally or theologically, yeah, I’d want to know what’s behind your willingness 
to do this.  Is it a general sense of benevolence?  Are you doing this for a 
friend?...Are you getting paid?  And if so, what does it mean for that to be your 
motivation instead of a general altruism or a sense of call potentially that one might, 
well, feel called to bring about someone’s parenthood?14 
 
Because the priests believed that an individual’s choice to become a parent or a third 
party participant was a calling, this study suggests that clergy may want to consider 
discussing the language of “call” in a wide variety of pastoral settings. With reference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, July 5, 2012. 
 
14 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 29, 2012. 
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parents, such settings might include premarital and marital counseling or an adult 
education series on personal discernment, which would address the calling of not just 
heterosexual couples but also of others considering whether they want to become parents.   
Clergy may also want to consider other opportunities to teach the wider community 
about additional forms of reproductive callings as part of an overall desire to cultivate the 
unique calling of each individual.  To that end, clergy may want to remind parishioners 
that even though the most traditional reproductive call is to parenthood, other callings 
could include participating in the reproductive cycle as a third party or as a medical 
professional, as a caregiver like a doula, babysitter, or baby nurse, as a coach or Sunday 
School teacher, or as a lay person delivering meals to new parents.   
In regard to third parties in particular, helping the wider community to see a donor or 
surrogate as a person with a calling not only empowers the third party but also reduces 
the risk of exploitation that so rightly concerns Williams and the social scientists 
referenced in the chapter that discusses her work.  To that end, clergy may find it 
especially helpful to discuss the concept of “calling” in individual counseling sessions 
with those who are considering becoming donors or surrogates, and they might also 
consider engaging in broader educational opportunities—like adult forums—which could 
help transform the entire Episcopal community’s view of third party participants.  In 
counseling sessions in particular, clergy may want to consider asking the following 
questions of those considering becoming third party participants: 
1. What does calling mean to you? 
2. How would you know if you were called to do something? 
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3. When have you felt a sense of call before, and what did it feel like? 
4. Why do you feel called to be a donor or surrogate? 
Such questions would be aimed, therefore, to address the concern of the priest quoted 
earlier in this section who felt it was important to ask what motivated a third party as part 
of an overall conversation about the calling to “bring about someone’s parenthood.”15  
Adult forum sessions, in contrast, might address the topic of third party callings more 
broadly, perhaps referencing the birth narratives of Jesus and the role of the Holy Spirit 
and Gabriel, both of which clergy referenced in interviews as serving as biblical entry 
points to a discussion of third party reproduction. 
Beyond the Biological Family 
Throughout this dissertation, I have pressed against the assumption that the 
biological family is a superior form of family or a superior manifestation of relationality.  
In the chapter on F.D. Maurice, I challenged his belief that the biological family was 
necessarily a privileged way to achieve knowledge of the Divine.  In the chapter on Sallie 
McFague, I presented social scientific findings that suggest that those in the United States 
privilege the biological family, while simultaneously offering the possibility of dispelling 
this privileging through new linguistic configurations of the God-human relationship.  I 
suggested throughout that insofar as the biological family is seen and utilized as an idol, 
harm can result for parents, third parties, and children alike. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 29, 2012. 
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To that end, because relationships are so central to any Episcopal theology or 
ethic, it becomes important for clergy to become aware of the nuanced ways that many in 
the United States privilege the biological family and to, in turn, press for a wider 
construction of family, as well as to press for a wider sphere of relational commitments 
between individuals.16  Phrased more simply, it may be important for clergy to remember 
and to teach that when Jesus said to love our neighbors, He did not just mean that our 
neighbors were limited to our biological family.   
In some ways, the clergy were already taking this step.  They were aware of the 
way that third party assisted reproduction procedures trouble the historic formulation of 
the family as a community of two heterosexual parents who, through intercourse, create 
the life of children that, in turn, become part of that community.  In response, they 
pressed against the biological model so prominent in other spheres of American culture.  
The priests consulted for this study also took the additional step of suggesting that what 
assisted reproduction procedures like surrogacy and gamete donation forefront is the 
assumption that the family community as it has historically been defined is limited to 
parents and their biological children.  From their perspective, even among heterosexual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This conversation is taking place within the United States already in a variety of forums.  Many 
states have engaged in legal conversations about how to frame romantic relationships between gays and 
lesbians in relation to legal marriage.  Additionally, in 2013, a United States District Court struck down the 
cohabitation clause for polygamists in Utah, thereby allowing consenting adults to engage in such family 
configurations.  Finally, Louisiana, Delaware, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Oregon, 
Washington, Massachusetts and Alaska have all passed laws that permit children to have more than two 
legal parents in an attempt to acknowledge the increasingly diverse ways that those in the United States 
configure their caretaking relationships.  Such laws allow gamete donors to obtain legal status as parents as 
well as step-parents or men who father children to married women.  For more on three parent families, see 
Gabrielle Emanuel, “Three (Parents) Can Be a Crowd, but for Some It's a Family,” National Public Radio, 
March 30, 2014, accessed April 1, 2014, http://www.npr.org/2014/03/30/296851662/three-parents-can-be-
a-crowd-but-for-some-its-a-family. 
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couples who birth their own children—thereby creating the kind of biological family 
communities Maurice assumes to exist—the idea that the family community is limited to 
those particular members is an illusion.  As one priest said, “Reproduction is not just a 
private matter; it never is.  It’s always about the community.”17  Or, in the words of 
another priest: 
It seems like the greatest benefits [of assisted reproduction] are that it brings us 
into the equation in a very active and involved way, and by us I mean the people 
involved in the relationship, their community, and the medical community, all of 
those people become participants in the process and to me that’s a great gift.  It’s 
not separating this [reproduction] from the other parts of our lives and the 
community.18 
 
To that end, the clergy seemed to already be querying the ways that practices like 
gamete donation and surrogacy press against the assumption that the family community is 
limited to parents and biological children.  As iterated in the qualitative data chapter, 
several clergy rooted their objection to this assumption in the theological concept of 
adoption.  Citing passages like Ephesians 1:5, Galatians 4:5, and prayer book texts that 
reference adoption as warrants, these clergy stated that if humans are God’s adopted 
children and if humans are called to be in God’s image (Gen. 1:27), then the family is 
rooted not so much in the biological family as in the adopted one.  To that end, they 
challenged Maurice’s belief that the biological family is the primary means through 
which one obtains knowledge of the Divine because of how New Testament texts and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 30, 2012. 
 
18 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, May 24, 2012. 
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prayer book encourage readers to think more broadly about to whom family allegiance is 
owed. 
Circling back to praxis, then, one would expect the clergy to support the 
development of stronger relational bonds between third parties, intended parents, and 
children not because they perceive them all as members of the same contemporary 
nuclear family but because they conceive them as members of the same adopted family in 
which all children of God are members.  They might likewise encourage a greater 
awareness of the biological family model’s prominence in their pastoral counseling 
conversations.  Therefore, when considering the exercise of healthy relationships within 
third party assisted reproduction, clergy engaging in pastoral conversations might 
advocate for more radical forms of hospitality, for broader spheres of commitment, and 
for more engaged relationships between non-biologically related individuals than those 
currently practiced.  They might likewise press for a more inclusive definition of the 
family than what Maurice or the American public envision. 
Certain biblical texts may assist in this task, and these texts may become useful 
tools in both counseling and adult education settings.  One priest, for instance, referenced 
Gospel passages such as Mark 3:31-35, Matthew 12:46-50, and Luke 8:19-21 to explain 
how Jesus asks Christians to be family to one another regardless of biological kinship.  
Because Jesus calls Christians to form “networks of relationships amongst strangers,” this 
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priest believed Christians were called to query the ways that family extended beyond 
biological kinships.19  Or, as another priest summarized: 
If adoption is so reflective of God’s love—and I think it is—then the Church 
ought to commend it to all couples, not just those who can’t bear children without 
assistance. They’ve got the order of commendation all wrong. It should not be: 1. 
Try to have kids 2. If you can’t, consider adoption 3. Be careful about this sketchy 
new technology.  But [instead it should be]: 1. Consider adoption, then 2. 
Consider having biological children, assisted or otherwise.20 
 
These New Testament texts, alongside the New Testament’s emphasis on adoption, 
therefore present a number of helpful starting points for talking about third party 
reproduction theologically with a faith community.  In addition, clergy may find that they 
also may help facilitate a broader conversation about topics like what the concept of 
family means or who should be considered one’s neighbor or a member of one’s 
community.  They may also provide opportunities to discuss how these spheres of 
relationships intersect.  Is, for instance, one’s neighbor always a member of one’s family?  
Is one’s family always one’s neighbor?  In relation to third party reproduction 
specifically, such texts also provide entry points into crucial questions for praxis.  These 
may include but are not limited to the following: 
1. If you are a donor or surrogate, do you see yourself as the neighbor of intended parents 
or the resulting child?  Do you see yourself as a part of their family?  Is being a neighbor 
different from being part of a family? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 18, 2012. 
 
20 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 10, 2012. 
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2. If you are an intended parent, do you see a donor or surrogate as being part of your 
family?  As being a neighbor?  Is being a neighbor different from being part of a family? 
3. Adoption is a central metaphor in the New Testament for the relationship between God 
and humanity.  What leads you to consider participating in a third party procedure as 
opposed to adopting?    
 
How Autonomy Perpetuates Idolatrous Behavior 
 
Another prominent theme clergy may want to integrate into their pastoral 
conversations is the relationship between autonomy and idolatry: Maurice, for instance, is 
concerned about the idols people create through individual autonomy and self-will.  
Indeed, he repeatedly stresses that when people seek their own will—rather than God’s 
will—they distort their relationship with God.  McFague is also concerned about the 
power of idols, specifically idolatrous language that allows for the perpetuation of 
misogyny and other discriminatory practices that privilege those in power.  For her, sin 
occurs when that idolatry results in a privileging of oneself above others, refusing to 
acknowledge that one is in relationship to others who may have different needs, 
identities, and values from themselves.  In short, when one makes an idol of oneself, sin 
occurs.  As McFague summarizes, “Our sin is plain old selfishness—wanting to have 
everything for ourselves….Sin is limitless greed.”21 
In their pastoral conversations about third party reproduction, priests may want to 
keep the intersection of autonomy and idolatry in mind.  They might, for instance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 McFague, The Body of God, 114-5. 
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specifically highlight that we are communal beings and that this communal essence of 
who we are extends to the realm of reproduction, be it assisted or otherwise.  
Encouraging those who are struggling with reproductive choices to remember the role of 
community may therefore respond to some of the problems clergy highlighted when they 
spoke about current assisted reproduction praxes.  From the perspective of the clergy, 
challenges arose when intended parents forgot this communal standard of reproduction, 
whether in assisted or non-assisted reproduction.  To that end, privileging the biological 
family because it allows the intended parent to maintain control—control of when to have 
children, control of the genetic makeup of their children, etc.—could be perceived as the 
kind of exercise of self-will to which Maurice and McFague so vehemently object.   
By way of example, one priest mentioned a series of pastoral conversations with a 
parishioner who hired a gestational surrogate to carry her baby; however, it was 
discovered that the child had a mitochondrial defect that would result in death shortly 
after birth.  As the priest explained, she was troubled that the mother’s response was to 
blame the surrogate, though the surrogate was in no way responsible for the 
mitochondrial defect, which would have been passed on genetically.  What the priest 
noticed was that the woman was capable of blaming the surrogate because she assumed 
the surrogate’s role was to deliver a consumer product—namely the baby—and because 
the baby suffered from a medical problem, the product was “not what she paid for.”  As 
this priest summarized: 
Having used her vast resources to have a surrogate and have an embryo implanted 
in the surrogate, and to pay the surrogate a lot of money because she had a lot of 
money, she had this sense of control that she didn’t have a right to have in the first 
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place….  I was trying to help her to see because the baby really was amazing, but 
she couldn’t see it, because that’s not what she paid for.22 
 
In this story, one finds a concrete example of how the clergy are aware that current 
assisted reproduction practices may facilitate both autonomy and idolatry, with the result 
that they do not acknowledge various members of the reproductive community—like 
surrogates—and thereby enable the kind of abuse or exploitation to which Williams 
objects.  For while this priest does not explicitly reference Williams, one could argue that 
Williams’s work is implicitly present in her interpretation of the events: As the priest 
notes, this mother blames the surrogate—or, one could say, scapegoats her—for the 
child’s illness, invalidating her contribution to the creation of this new life and refusing to 
accept her as a member of the reproductive community.  The priest also notes that this 
mother was not so much disturbed by her child’s suffering or the fate of her child as she 
was about the fact that her own investment had not paid off to her liking: She had 
contracted the surrogate with the assumption that she would deliver not a child, but rather 
a specific kind of child, namely a physically healthy child.  When this unspoken aspect of 
her agreement with the surrogate was not achieved—through no fault of the surrogate’s—
the mother became despondent and angry because her desire or image of this baby had 
not been realized.  In other words, she idolized her own autonomy, and she manifested 
that idolatry as she sought to control reproduction.  As a result, she was disappointed 
when she could not and in turn made decisions that were harmful to her, her child, and 
the surrogate. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 22, 2012. 
 
	   	   	  
	  
285	  
Reminiscent of Maurice and McFague, the priest suggests that this kind of 
autonomous control of reproduction is not something a person should try to assert in the 
first place.  Instead, the priest holds the stance that it is spiritually inappropriate for a 
person to seek his or her own will rather than God’s will in regard to reproduction.  Put 
differently, when individuals seek to control reproduction according to their own will, 
they engage in autonomy that can result in idolatrous behavior that is ultimately harmful 
to themselves, others, and their relationship with God.  This teaching about the danger of 
autonomy manifesting as idolatry may therefore be a theme that priests want to impress 
upon individuals as they consider participating in third party procedures.  However, 
insofar as such autonomous practices and such an idolatrous mindset may be conceived 
as sinful—pace both McFague and Maurice—clergy may want to integrate this theme 
into their broader teaching opportunities about sin, opportunities that might emerge in 
sermons or adult education settings. 
Encouraging Disclosure and Healthy Boundaries 
The material provided in the chapters on Williams and McFague strongly 
advocated against non-disclosure, citing a number of psychological, ethical, and 
theological concerns that emerge if one does not tell a child about his or her origins.  
Therefore, another implication for pastoral praxis among clergy might involve 
highlighting the importance of disclosure to those considering participating in a third 
party procedure in any way.  They might also ask those entrusted to their care to consider 
the intersection between non-disclosure and biological family idolization, given the 
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findings highlighted in the McFague chapter, which suggested that non-disclosure was 
actually a practice in service of that idolization. 
In order to accomplish this, clergy might encourage intended parents to think 
about when and how they would approach the subject with their children.  They might 
familiarize themselves with children’s books on the market that help parents begin that 
conversation—books like Tabitha and Timothy Grow a Flower, which helps young 
children understand egg donation, or The Kangaroo Pouch, which teaches young children 
about gestational surrogacy.  They might also encourage parents to consider whether they 
are inclined to not disclose and if so, what motivates that decision.  In the words of one 
priest:  “I would begin by asking why they wanted to keep this a secret.  Shame?  Guilt?  
Is it because one or both could not physically be a biological parent, or is this a 
choice?...What are they afraid of?”23 
Here one observes some awareness among the clergy that the practice of secrecy 
or non-disclosure may be undertaken out of fear as opposed to a sense of call or an other-
directed desire to better the life of the resulting child, both of which they felt should 
undergird the decision to participate in third party reproduction.  Moreover, while this 
priest did not explicitly mention Maurice in her response, it is intriguing to note that 
Maurice’s commitment to relationship superseding autonomous desires seems to be 
privileged.  As a result, one might say that a guiding principle for clergy praxis would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, phone interview, June 5, 2012. 
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therefore be Maurice’s principle that relationships take precedence over autonomy.24  In 
other words, as Episcopal clergy participate in pastoral conversations with intended 
parents, donors, or surrogates, they may want to inquire about how these individuals 
perceive the intersection of relationships, autonomy, and disclosure.  They may also want 
to encourage intended parents to publically acknowledge their relationship to the donor or 
surrogate, without whom their family would not exist.  Likewise, they may want to 
encourage donors or surrogates to engage in open or known procedures, in other words, 
procedures that are not anonymous.  
  Along the same lines, the findings from the Williams chapter document how, at 
both a theological and practical level, the practice of surrogacy is often fraught with 
exploitation and abuse.  To that end, clergy may want to strongly encourage intended 
parents particularly to pay attention to the kind of boundaries they keep during the course 
of an assisted reproduction procedure, as both anonymity and enmeshment can harm the 
third party, the resulting child, and themselves.  Again, disclosure is one visible way that 
such boundaries reveal themselves.  To that end, a discussion about disclosure becomes 
an important way to open up the conversation to the broader topic of boundaries in 
general.  One priest, for instance, thought it was important to encourage those she 
counseled to be aware of how healthy boundaries present themselves in the overall 
exercise of an intended parent’s relationship to a third party and the wider community.  
As this priest explained, it might not be necessary to tell every person acquainted with the 
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intended parent or child about the use of reproductive technology but it would be remiss 
to tell no one, at least in part because it undermined the essentially relational nature of 
human beings.  As she commented, “In this situation, there is of course an important 
distinction to be made between boundaried sharing, which is healthy, versus secret-
keeping, which is a recipe for spiritual dis-ease.”25 
This priest may therefore provide a model for others who seek guidance about the 
concrete details of what might occur in a pastoral conversation about third party 
boundaried relationships.  In regards to intended parents, priests might note that it may 
not be necessary, for instance, to hang a sign outside one’s house proclaiming that a 
given child resulted from donated sperm.  However, as this priest acknowledges, just 
because a situation does not warrant universal sharing, it does not follow that 
“boundaried sharing” is not appropriate.  To that end, a priest might counsel that the 
child, at least, should be told.  Priests may also wish to ask the intended parents who else 
might be important to reveal this information to.  Likewise, one might extrapolate that 
while it might not be wise to cultivate an enmeshed relationship with one’s surrogate or 
donor, it might be remiss to avoid cultivating any relationship at all.  Creating boundaries 
for developing relationships between third parties, parents, and offspring could therefore 
become one way to allow for the development of healthy relationships.  One role the 
priest could therefore play is to query what such a boundaried relationship would look 
like. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Follow-up interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, Lexington, MA, October 19, 
2013. 
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Finally, among the priests consulted for this study, the theme of shame and guilt 
loomed large as a reason priests thought that parents might not disclose the use of a third 
party to a child or pursue a relationship with a third party.  One priest, summarizing the 
feelings of others, voiced that, in such instances when fear seemed to be motivating the 
reproductive decision-making process, she would encourage questions like,  
Why the secrecy?  Is there some level of shame here?  Do they think this is 
somehow wrong?  Is there a family history contributing to their feelings and 
concerns?  Are they afraid of being judged by others or God?”  One thing I have 
learned in a current course is that shame is not a course-correcting emotion (like 
guilt for having made a mistake).  It is a labeling of oneself as flawed—not healthy, 
and inconsistent with the theology of celebrating all that God makes.26 
 
Interpreting this priest’s words, one might say that this priest worried that secrecy might 
be motivated by a perception that the biological family was the paradigmatic embodiment 
of family; therefore, if family had to be created via another means, then a person might 
experience shame as a result.  Alternatively, it may be that an intended parent feels 
threatened by a third party or that a third party is intimidated by a parent or is afraid of 
the kind of relationship he or she might develop with the resulting child.  Because 
reproduction is such a sensitive matter, it makes sense that shame and guilt would appear. 
However, allowing these to motivate one’s decision to become part of a third party 
procedure may be a sign of reactive decision-making, or decision-making that is not 
made out of a true sense of call.  As a result, it becomes the responsibility of a priest in a 
pastoral interaction to help individuals discern the role shame and guilt may be playing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Follow-up interview with an Episcopal priest, interview by author, New York, NY, July 22, 
2013. 
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Learning Through Liturgy  
The theological wisdom of Delores Williams and Sallie McFague, along with the 
social scientific data presented throughout this dissertation, highlights the way that the 
biological nuclear family unit itself may be theologically idolized at the expense of the 
wider community.  An awareness of this idolization in turn encourages changes to third 
party reproductive practices and a broader conception of family.  
As elaborated above, third party procedures therefore provide an important 
opportunity for clergy to highlight a central tenet of their faith, namely the theological 
premise voiced by Maurice, which says that: 
Human relationships are not artificial types of something divine, but are actually the 
means, and the only means, through which man ascends to any knowledge of the 
divine—and that every breach of a human relation, as it implies a violation of the 
higher law, so also is a hindrance and barrier to the perception of that higher law—
the drawing a veil between the spirit of a man and his God.27 
 
To that end, they also provide important opportunities for clergy to teach those entrusted 
to their care about the centrality of relationships to their faith.  In other words, they 
provide an opportunity for clergy to teach the theological guiding principle that Maurice, 
Williams, and McFague all privileged in their thinking.  This is, as David H. Smith 
summarizes, the idea that,  “Salvation is found in true community; damnation in 
isolation; sin involves the pretense of radical independence.”28   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Frederick Denison Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ; or Hints Respecting the Principles, 
Constitution, and Ordinances of The Catholic Church (New York: D. Appleton & Co, 1843), Nabu Public 
Domain Reprint, 226. 
 
28 David Smith, Health and Medicine in the Anglican Communion (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 
10. 
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This may be one of third party assisted reproduction’s greatest strengths: that it 
evidences in a concrete way a more communal vision of reproduction. It therefore can 
become a tremendous teaching tool within the Episcopal community, and because 
Episcopalians often learn through liturgy, it makes sense that the Episcopal tradition may 
want to develop liturgies for those participating in third party procedures that highlight 
the central tenets that we come to know God through human relationships, that sin is 
synonymous with autonomy, and that salvation is found in community.   
To date, no liturgies have been developed by the Church in specific relation to 
third party procedures, though Enriching Our Worship 5: Liturgies and Prayers Related 
to Childbearing, Childbirth, and Loss does include a set of prayers for infertility and for 
difficult reproductive decisions.29  It is clear, therefore, that there is still a great deal of 
liturgical work to be done in this area.  For instance, clergy may find it useful to develop 
liturgies that bless third parties or bless the relationship between third parties and 
intended parents. Likewise, they may also look to develop liturgies in thanksgiving of the 
reunion of a child who located a previously anonymous donor or surrogate.  Finally, 
clergy may attempt to fashion liturgies that address God with new metaphors that do not 
privilege the biological family.  Such liturgies would contribute to the overall effort of 
describing God in new ways that in turn have ramifications for how we think of our 
families and ourselves.  Such metaphors might be incorporated into worship using 
language like God as Donor or God as Adopter.  The Donor metaphor, for example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Church Publishing, Liturgies and Prayers Related to Childbearing, Childbirth, and Loss: Enriching 
Our Worship 5 (New York: Church Publishing Inc., 2010), 56, 62-5. 
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might explore how God relates to humans through creation, a profound act of divine 
donation whose gifts include food, shelter, and even relationships with other humans.  
Such a metaphor might be reinforced or further defined by the Episcopal hymn whose 
lyrics read: 
Glory, love, and praise, and honor 
for our food  
now bestowed 
render we the Donor. 
Bounteous God, we now confess thee: 
God who thus 
blessest us, 
meet it is to bless thee.30 
 
In contrast, God as Adopter might reference biblical texts like Ephesians 1:5 and 
Galatians 4:5, which describe humans as adopted in Christ.  These texts cast the 
relationship between God and humans through the language of adoption, thereby 
indicating that biological kinship is not a necessary part of family relationships. 
The criteria developed at the conclusion of the McFague chapter may therefore 
assist clergy as they develop these possibilities and others through new liturgies and 
languages.  In developing them, clergy also provide opportunities to reinforce the themes 
presented above with the principle of lex orandi, lex credendi in mind.  Phrased 
differently, given that Episcopalians hold central the principle that prayer facilitates 
belief, it makes sense that clergy would want to reinforce the themes above not only in 
their pastoral conversations but also in their worship settings.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Hymnal 1982 (New York: Church Publishing Company, 1982), hymn number 300. 
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Implications of Findings and Areas for Future Research 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have relied upon the wisdom of Episcopal, 
womanist, and feminist thinkers, priests, practitioners and scholars of assisted 
reproduction to argue that the current praxes of American third party reproduction are not 
rooted in the cultivation of relationships.  As it stands now, intended parents and third 
parties who utilize assisted reproduction in the United States are encouraged to see 
themselves more as purchasers or sellers of a product rather than as members of the same 
family or community.  To that end, the goal of any assisted reproduction procedure 
becomes the commodity of the live birth, not the cultivation of relationships.  This 
priority, in turn, means that relationships between participants are not fore-fronted in 
current praxes, which can lead to denial of the other and abuse.  The lack of prioritizing 
relationships in third party procedures therefore has implications for the community of 
the family, the role of the third party, and how the resulting child understands his or her 
identity, family, and community. 
Therefore, as persons of faith seek to utilize these technologies, they may well 
find themselves feeling unsupported because the exercise of third party procedures in the 
United States does not value relationships or interconnectedness in the way that I have 
advocated it should.  To that end, this work has attempted to provide Christians with 
some resources while also reminding them that third party assisted reproduction is only 
as healthy as the various participants allow it to be: When surrogates, donors, or intended 
parents keep assisted reproduction a secret, when they violate relational boundaries, or 
when they refuse to acknowledge the other, then these procedures can produce great 
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harm.  However, when they value discernment, loyalty, and the ministerial vision of 
Jesus, when they strive to acknowledge and empower the other, when they cultivate 
relationships, and when they value a more expansive definition of family, then these 
technologies may become powerful vehicles of transformation that model love of 
neighbor in a profound and even salvific way. 
 While it is my hope that this dissertation provides both practical and theoretical 
resources for persons and communities of faith, there is still much work to be done.  
Theological ethicists and practical theologians may want to consider the implications of 
these findings for assisted reproduction more broadly as well as for organ donation, 
another medical procedure that involves vital physical contributions like those offered by 
third parties.  They may also want to consider at greater length the implications of these 
findings for adoption.  Finally, they may want to spend more time considering the 
concepts of loyalty and discernment as they relate to procedures like stem cell donation, 
stem cell therapy, and discarded embryos in assisted reproduction and abortion.  This 
latter category of scholarship may be particularly relevant to Roman Catholic medical 
ethicists who study documents like Donum Vitae and Dignitas Personae that primarily 
ground themselves in the language of human dignity rather than the categories I named 
above. 
In addition to ethical scholarship, these findings may also bear relevance for 
biblical scholars.  Those who study the Hebrew Bible may want to revisit the surrogacy 
narratives of Sarah, Hagar, Zilpah, Bilhah, Rachel, and Leah in light of these findings in 
order to consider how these narratives might inform current third party practices.  While 
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the unhealthy relational dynamics that exist between many of these women may make it 
tempting to discredit surrogacy entirely, the findings of this study press biblical scholars 
to consider whether these texts might instead offer proscriptive advice about third party 
relationships rather than a prohibition of them. 
 Additionally, this dissertation suggested at various points that the angel Gabriel 
and the Holy Spirit may both be models for the role that donors and surrogates play in 
assisted reproduction.  Therefore, New Testament scholars may want to revisit Luke 1 
and Matthew 1 to consider what kind of wisdom the birth narratives offer to the 
contemporary Christian community in light of the role of third parties in assisted 
reproduction.  They may also want to consider how the wisdom of the lived experience of 
donors and surrogates can contribute to a richer understanding of the biblical text. 
 
Conclusion 
In the epigraph to the introduction of this dissertation, I quoted bioethicist Arthur 
Caplan, who said that with the advent of assisted reproduction,  
A core aspect of human life, reproduction, moved from a mystery to a technology, 
moved from something that we were in awe of to something that we manipulate…. 
There’s nothing more basic you’re going to change before or since in the history of 
humanity.31   
 
It is my belief that this is true.  Assisted reproduction has transformed the way that life 
comes into the world.  The use of third parties transforms it even further by inviting an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Arthur Caplan interview via Public Broadcasting System, “Ethical Questions: Test Tube 
Babies,” WGBH American Experience, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/interview/ethical-questions/ (accessed July 13, 
2012). 
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outsider, sometimes even a stranger, to participate in the most intimate act in which a 
person can engage—the creation of a life.  It is no wonder, then, that third party 
relationships can seem intimidating, frightening, and even destructive.  Yet I hope that I 
have demonstrated that they can also be life-giving—both metaphorically and literally.  
For when donors, surrogates, and intended parents choose to utilize these technologies 
while valuing loyalty, discernment, the ministerial vision of Jesus, and a regard for the 
other, then they and the resulting child can pattern what it means to be in relationship, 
what it means to be family, for the wider Christian community.  Using metaphors, they 
may also find profound ways to speak about these relationships that in turn say something 
about the relationship God has with all humanity.  In doing all of this, these individuals 
can model what transformative, life-giving family relationships look like here and now, 
and they may also become a symbol of the community Christians hope to see more fully 
realized in the future. 
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